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D i rector : Mi chae l J .  McCue , DBA 
Pro f e s sor 
Depa rtment o f  He a l t h  Admi n i s t rat i on 
Thi s research focu s e s  on t he re l a t i onship between 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and opera t i ona l perf ormance , market 
f act ors , and organi z a t i onal f a c t ors fol l ow i ng t he Bal anced 
Budget Act of  1 9 9 7 . Re source dependence and f i nanc i a l  
t heory gu i ded t he me t hodol ogy . Accord i ng t o  re source 
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dependence t heory , organi zat i ons de s i re to rema i n  autonomous 
unt i l  t hey are f aced w i t h  scarce re sourc e s . Th i s  scarc i ty 
o f  resources i s  caused by t he dynami c i nt e rac t i on w i t h  the 
ext e rnal envi ronment . F i nanc i a l  t heory re cogni zes t he 
organi zat ions abi l i t y  to be succ e s s ful by ensuring access  to  
c ap i t a l  t hrough pro f i t ab i l i t y ,  s t rong bond ra t i ngs , l i nes o f  
c red i t , and equ i t y f i nanc i ng . The Bal anced Budget Ac t of  
1 9 9 7  reduced hosp i t a l  Med i care reimbursement and wi l l  have 
an i n f l uence on hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
The fol l ow i ng re search que s t ions gu i de t h i s  s t udy : 
• What a re t he market , opera t i ona l , and organizat iona l 
f a c t ors t ha t  pro f i l e  t he charac t e r i s t i c s  o f  hosp i t a l s  
acqui red a f t e r  t he Bal anced Budget Act ? 
Underlying research que s t i ons eva l u a t e  whe ther acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s are i ne f f i c i ent ly managed and ope rate f i nanc i a l l y 
a t  a l o s s . They become t a rge t s  for t akeove r because t hey 
l a c k  t he cap i t a l  to mode rn i ze t he i r  p l ant and to expand 
t he i r  s i ze and s e rvi c e s . However ,  acqu i red hosp i t a l s  may 
have a s t rong market pos i t i on .  
• Do acqu i red hosp i t a l s  ope rate a t  a f i nanc i a l  l o s s ?  
x 
• Do acqu i red hosp i t a l s  own aging p l ant and equ ipment and 
l ack t he f i nanc i a l  capi t a l  to  rep l a c e  t he i r  pl ant and 
equ ipment ? 
• Do acqu i red hospi t a l s  have f ac i l i t i e s  l ocated i n  
marke t s  w i t h  l e s s  compe t i t ion and f e w e r  HMOs ? 
• Do acqui red hosp i t a l s  have sma l l e r  f a c i l i t i e s  and 
prov i de fewer servi c e s ?  
Given t he resul t s  o f  t he descript ive s t at i s t i c s  and log i st i c  
regre s s i on ,  i t  may b e  conc l uded that reduct i ons i n  Medicare 
re i mbursement have reduced hosp i t a l  return on a s s e t s ,  and 
have resu l t ed in f ewer hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . On an 
i ndividual hosp i t a l  bas i s , those f ac i l i t i e s  w i t h  l ower 
occupancy ra t e s , f ewer serv i ce s , o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  and for­




The pas sage by Congre s s  o f  t he Bal anced Budget Act 
( BBA ) of  1 9 9 7  had a s igni f i cant impac t  on t he f i nanc i a l  
vi abi l i ty of  hospi t a l s . T h i s  l a w ,  be s i de s  re spond ing to t he 
grow i ng prob l em of  Ame r i c ans l ac k i ng hea l t h  i nsurance , 
e s tabl i she s cost - cu t t i ng mea sures to  curt a i l  t he growth i n  
Medi care he a l t h  care expend i tures . A f t e r  passage of  t he 
BBA , hospi t a l s' Med i care prof i t s  dec l i ned , a s  d i d  t he i r  
overa l l  f i nanc i a l  performance . Among other s t ra t egi e s , t hey 
have sought new sources of cap i t a l  in order to mode rni ze 
t he i r  fac i l i t i e s  and t hus expand t he i r  ma rket pos i t ions . One 
opt i on has been acqu i s i t ion by another hosp i t a l  or mul t i ­
hosp i t a l  sys t em . 
The a i m  of  t he pre sent research i s  an emp i r i c a l  
ana lys i s  of  t he under l y i ng market , ope rat iona l , and 
organi z a t i onal f a c tors a s so c i a t e d  w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions 
s i nce BBA . Because previous re search has evaluated only 
t hose acqui s i t ions made b e f ore BBA , t h i s  re search wi l l  add 
to the unde r s t andi ng of hosp i t a l acqui s i t i ons . 
Hospitals and the Changing Healthcare Environment 
Two e a r l y  e f f o r t s  by Congre s s  to reduce hea l t h  care 
expend i t ures were t he HMO Act o f  1 9 7 3  and t he TEFRA Act o f  
1 9 8 2 . Both Ac t s  e s t abl i s hed i nnovat ive approache s to  
f und i ng hea l t h care servi c e s . 
The HMO Ac t o f  1 9 7 3  i ncreased fund i ng for managed care , 
marking a f undament a l  s h i f t  i n  t he payment s t ru c t ure o f  t he 
hea l t h  care i ndus t ry .  Accord i ng t o  t he Bureau o f  t he 
Census , 119th edition, managed care enrol l ment grew f rom 1 9  
percent o f  t he popu l a t ion i n  1 9 9 0  t o  3 5  percent i n  1 9 9 8 , 
when over 6 4  mi l l ion Ame r i c ans were enrol l ed . 
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The TEFRA Ac t o f  1 9 8 2  e s t ab l i shed t he Med i care 
i npa t i ent prospe c t ive payment system ( PPS ) , wh i c h  set 
payment s t o  hosp i t a l s accord i ng to D i agnos t i c  Re l a t ed Groups 
( DRGs ) . Unde r PPS payment i s  made prospect ively to t he 
hosp i t a l  for each Med i care d i s charge . PPS payment s a re 
int ended to cove r a l l  hospi t a l  cost s ,  except capi t a l  cos t s , 
for i npa t i ent servi c e s  to  Med i care bene f i c i a r i e s . The sys t em 
l eave s hosp i t a l s  a t  ri s k  f or any pat i ent re l a t e d  expendi t ure 
beyond t he DRG rate . Thus TEFRA , as we l l  a s  t he HMO 
l eg i s l a t i on ,  i ncreased at r i s k  capi t at ion . 
From 1 9 9 0  to  1 9 9 7 , hospi t a l s  reacted to t he new a t  r i s k  
payment s t ructures o f  Med i care and managed care . The 
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comb i na t ion o f  l eg i s l a t ion and reduced payment s f rom priva t e  
t h i rd party paye rs forced t hem to reduce cos t s . T o  d o  so , 
t hey reduced l engt h  o f  s t ay ,  cut opera t i ng cos t s  and 
res t ruct ured . Unde r t he s e  pressures to  improve e f f i c i ency , 
acute care hospi t a l s  i ndeed d i d  l ower t he i r  i npa t ient cos t s  
and s hort ened t he i r  l engths o f  s t ays . A s  noted by t he 
Medi care Payment Advi sory Commi s s ion ( 2 0 0 1 ) , f rom 1 9 9 0  to  
1 9 9 3  cost pe r c a s e  f o r  a l l  U . s .  hosp i t a l s  increased a t  an 
ave rage rat e  o f  5 percent per year . Howeve r ,  f rom 1 9 9 4  
t hrough 1 9 9 7 , average cost  per c a s e  de c l i ned for every year 
except 1 9 9 4 , w i t h  t he l a rgest dec l i ne , a negat ive 2 . 3  
percent occur r i ng i n  1 9 9 7 . Hosp i t a l  l eng t h  o f  s t ay de c l i ne d  
an average o f  2 . 4  percent e a c h  year f rom 1 9 9 0  t o  1 9 9 7 . The 
grea t e s t  dec l i ne in l engt h  of s t ay was 4 . 3  percent in 1 9 9 5 . 
The s t eep r i se i n  Med i care expend i t ures by 1 9 9 7 , l ead 
Congre s s  t o  enact t he B a l anced Budget Act i n  t hat year . The 
l aw not only reduced Med i care i npa t i ent and outpat i ent 
payment s to  hospi t a l s , but a l so reduced payments for 
hospi t al s '  pos t - acute s e rvi ces , for home hea l t h  care , 
s k i l l e d  nurs i ng care , rehabi l i t a t i on care and psych i a t r i c  
servi ces . A s  a re sul t o f  these reduc t i ons and t he cont i nued 
payment pressures of t h i rd party payers , ove ra l l  hosp i t a l  
pro f i t  marg ins i n  1 9 9 9  f e l l  to  2 . 8  percent . Med i care 
i npat i ent pro f i t  marg ins f e l l  f rom 1 6 . 9  percent i n  1 9 9 7  to  
12 . 0  percent i n  1 9 9 9 . 
S i nce t he BBA o f  1 9 9 7 , hosp i t a l s '  pro f i t  marg ins have 
dec l i ned and o t he r  l i nes of  bus i ne s s  such as outpa t i ent 
servi ces , home hea l t h ,  or ski l l ed nurs i ng f ac i l i t i e s  a l so 
have had s i gni f i cant l os s e s . Thus further de t eriorat i on i n  
hospi t a l  f i nanc i a l  perf ormance occurred i n  1 9 9 8  and 1 9 9 9 . 
Significance of the Study 
The resul t s  of  the s t udy w i l l  enhance t he current body 
of knowl edge about hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . The s t udy wi l l  
provide unde r s t and i ng of  the key var i ab l e s  re l a ted to 
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ions after t he cos t - cu t t i ng l eg i s l a t ion of  
t he Bal anced Budget Act of  1 9 9 7 . 
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The growt h i n  mergers and acqu i s i t i ons f rom 1 9 9 4  to  
1 9 9 6  suppor t s  t he premi se that ma j o r changes in t he 
a l locat ion of  re sources w i t h i n  t he hea l t h  care i ndu s t ry have 
i ncreased envi ronme n t a l  unc e r t a i nty for acute care 
hosp i t a l s . Though reduced s i nce 1 9 9 7 , t he cont i nu i ng me rge r  
and acqu i s i t ions s how hospi t a l s  are s t i l l  contend i ng w i t h  
envi ronment a l  unc e rt a i nty , and are adap t i ng to survive . I n  
part i cu l a r , acute care hosp i t a l s  are agre e i ng t o  acqu i s i t ion 
by other hea l t h  c are organi zat i ons , to  ma i n t a i n  pat i ent 
vol ume a s  we l l  a s  for access to  f i nanc i a l  resources . 
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I n  addi t i on , a s  HMOs and other payers cont i nue to 
migrate to  l ower cost prov i ders , acute care hospi t a l s may 
f ind i t  di f f i c u l t  to ma i n t a i n  suf f i c i ent pat i ent vo l ume s and 
revenue to f i nance i nve s tment s in new t ec hnology and 
phys i c a l  pl ant i mprovement s .  
Th i s  research s e t s  out t o  advance the unde r s t andi ng o f  
how acute care hospi t a l s t h a t  a r e  f a c i ng eros ion of  t he i r  
pat i ent base a s  we l l  a s  re s t r i c t ive payment syst ems adapt 
t he i r  organ i zat i ona l s t ructures unde r such f i nanc i a l  
pressures . I t  w i l l  expl ore t he re l a t ionship be tween 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons and c e r t a i n  f a c t ors : market , operat i ng 
pe rformance , and organ i za t i onal s t ruct ure . I ns i ght into 
these r e l a t ionships shou l d  bene f i t  hea l t h  care pol i cy 
makers , econom i s t s  and hosp i t a l  execut ives seeking to 
unde r s t and t he change s to  t he hea l t h  care envi ronment of  t he 
l a t e  1 9 9 0s . From a po l i cy s t andpo i nt , the cont r i but i on o f  
t h i s  s t udy i s  i t s  a s s e s sment o f  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons a f t e r  
t he passage of  t he BBA of  1 9 9 7 . The s tudy t hus compl ement s 
previous re search on acqu i s i t ions p r i or to the BBA 
( S t arkweathe r , 1 9 8 1; Al exande r and Morr i sey , 1 9 8 7 , 1 9 8 8 , 
1 9 8 9; McCue and Furs t , 1 9 8 6; McCue , 1 9 8 8; Bogue , e t  a l . ,  
1 9 95 )  . 
Purpose of the Study 
I n  t he f ace of  increasing uncertainty in t he hea l t h  
care indu s t ry ,  t he survival of  many acute care hospi t a l s  i s  
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in que s tion . The purpose of  t hi s  s t udy is to  profi l e  market 
factors , operationa l perf ormance f actors , and organi zationa l 
chara c t e ri s ti c s  a s socia t ed wit h  t he acquisition o f  hospi t a l s 
a f t e r  t he Bal anced Budget Ac t o f  1 9 9 7 , in order to add to 
empirical knowl edge about t he surviva l s t rat egy adopted by 
hospit a l s .  
Hospi t a l s  o f t e n  agree to acquisition to a t t ain a 
s t ronger competitive position for managing t he uncertaintie s 
in t he environment . They seek to improve t heir a c c e s s  to  
financial resources and t hus t heir opport unity for 
organi z a tional surviva l .  The acquisition o f  organi zations is 
we l l  documented in the financia l lit erature . For purpo ses of 
t hi s  s t udy , t he de finition o f  acquisition is a s  fol l ows: 
"Wheneve r one organi zation is purcha sed by another 
organization" . This de finition is found in t he t ext book 
Modern Corporat e  Finance wri t t e n  by Shapiro ( 20 0 0 )  and is 
accepted wit hin t he finance indu s t ry . 
Research Questions 
The pr ima ry research quest i on guiding t h is s t udy is as 
f o l l ows : 
• What a re t he market , operat i ona l , and orga n i z a t i onal 
f actors t hat pro f i l e  the characte rist ics o f  hosp i t a ls 
acqu i red a f t e r  t he Bal anced Budget Act ?  
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Under l y i ng research ques t i ons eva l ua t e  whe t her acqu i red 
hosp i t a ls are i ne f f ic i e n t l y  managed and operate f i nanc i a l l y  
at a l oss . They become t argets for t akeove r because t hey 
l ack t he cap i t a l  to  moderni ze t he i r  pl ant and to expand 
t he i r  s i ze and services . Howeve r ,  acqu i red hosp i t als may 
have a s t rong market pos i t i on . 
a re as f o l l ows : 
The other research quest i ons 
• Do acqu i red hosp i t a ls opera t e  at a f i nanc i a l  l oss ? 
• Do acqu i red hosp i t a ls own ag i ng pl ant and equipment and 
l ack the f i nanc i a l  cap i t a l  to  repl ace t he i r  p l ant and 
equi pment ? 
• Do acqu i red hosp i t a ls have f ac i l i t i es l ocated i n  
markets w i t h  l ess compe t i t ion and f ewer HMOs ? 
• Do acqu i red hosp i t als have sma l l e r  fac i l i t i es and 
prov i de fewer services ?  
Theoretical Approach 
The conceptua l f ramework provided by resource 
dependence t heory a rgues that organi zat i ona l surviva l 
depends on t he acquis i t i on of  necessary resources f rom t he 
envi ronment . S i nce many organ i z a t i ons do not gene rate a l l  
the resources necessa ry t o  accompl ish t he i r  miss i on ,  t hey 
must i n t eract w i t h  t he envi ronment to  obt a i n  addi t i ona l 
resources . One way t o  do so is to  g ive up some autonomy by 
b e i ng acqu i red . Use o f  a conceptual f ramework based on 
resource dependence t heory is we l l  supported in t he heal t h  
c are l i t e rature . 
Of  part i c u l a r  i n t e res t is research by Al exande r and 
Morr isey ( 1 9 8 9 )  on t he use of  resource dependence t heory as 
a f ramework to eva l ua t e  hosp i t a l  cont rac t management . The 
ana l ysis by Al exander and Morr isey uses resource dependence 
t heory in demons t ra t i ng how organi z a t i ons o f t e n  seek an 
opt i mum f i t  w i t h  t he envi ronment to  ensure survival . For 
organ i za t i ons f a c i ng an envi ronment w i t h  high unc ert a in t y , 
resource dependence provi des a so l i d foundat ion for 
deve l op i ng s t r a t eg i es for organ i za t i onal i mprovement by 
seeking resources ext e rna l l y . I n  part i c u l a r , hosp i t a l  
organ i za t i ons abi l i t y  t o  dea l  w i t h  chang i ng p a t t e rns o f  
prac t i ce and reduced pro f i t  c reates a concern about t he i r  
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organ i zat i onal survi va l . As discussed by Al exander and 
Morrisey , that pressure forces hosp i t a ls to interact w i t h  
t he envi ronment to  genera t e  t h e  resources needed for 
survival . Such resources may i n c l ude pat i ents , phys i c i ans , 
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hea l t h  care t e chnol ogy , or f inanc i a l  cap i t a l, dependi ng on a 
hosp i t a l ' s  s i tuat ion . The l i t e rature a lso suggests t ha t  
hosp i t a ls comb i ne to enhance t he i r  survival i n  markets i n  
whi c h  t here i s  excess bed capa c i ty and h e l p  ensure access t o  
f i nanc i a l  resources . 
Corporate f i nanc i a l  t heory ident i f i es several 
mot iva t i ng f a c t ors t ha t  wou ld cause one organi zat i on to 
a cqui re anothe r : i ne f f i c i ent management t heory , st rengthened 
market pos i t i on , economi es of  sca l e , i n f orma t ion t heor i es , 
agency probl ems , reduced dependence on one bus i ness segment , 
i nvestment of  excess cash , and t ax cons i derat i ons ( Cope l and 
and West on , 1 9 8 8 ; Ll oyd , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
Hea l t h  care acquis i t ion l i terat ure suggests t ha t  
management i ne f f i c i ency , market powe r , and economies o f  
s c a l e  may t hems e l ves l ead to hosp i t al  acquis i t i ons ( McCue , 
1 9 8 6 ; Al exande r and Morrisey , 1 9 8 8 ; Bogue e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 5 ) . 
Research by Baz zol i and Andes , ( 1 9 9 5 )  a lso found that hea l t h  
sys t ems seek to acqu i re hosp i t als t hat need management 
enhancement and i mprovements in opera t i ng e f f i c i ency . 
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Methodology 
The s t udy u s e s  a cros s - sec t i onal de s i gn t hat examines 
hospi t a l s  acqu i red i n  1 9 9 9  and 20 0 0  subsequent to the BBA 
and compares t hem to hosp i t a l s t ha t  were not acqu i red dur i ng 
t hose t i me pe riods . 
1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  dat a . 
I t  a l so i nc l udes a poo l ed mode l u s i ng 
The s t udy examines t he re l a t ionship 
between hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons and ma rke t , opera t i ona l and 
organi zat ional f actors . The uni t  o f  ana l ys i s  for t he s tudy 
is t he individua l non - f edera l , acu t e -care hospi t a l . 
The s tudy performs two typ e s  of  dat a  analys i s . F i r s t , 
descrip t i ve s t a t i s t ics are comp i l e d  f rom t he dat a  and 
ana l y zed . A univa r i a t e  analys i s  t e s t  o f  s igni f icance i s  
per formed on each i ndependent va r i ab l e  by comparing acqu i re d  
hosp i t a l s  t o  non - acqu i red hospi t a l s . Corre l at ion analys i s  
was comp l e t e d  t o  i dent i fy potent i a l  mul t ico l l i nea r i t y  among 
t he independent va r i ab l es . 
Second , l og i s t ic regre s s i on ana l ys i s  i s  performed , t o  
t e s t  t he a s soc i at i on between t he acqu i red and t h e  non ­
acqui red hosp i t a l s ,  ( t he dependent vari ab l e ) , and cert a i n  
market , ope ra t i ona l , and organ i zat i ona l f actors ( t he 
i ndependent var i ab l e s ) . The s t udy w i l l  a l so exami ne t he 
a s soci a t i on o f  t he marke t , ope rat i onal and organ i zat i onal 
factors w i t h  respect to  t he hosp i t als acqu i red by e i t he r  a 
f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  or not - fo r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l . 
Data are drawn f rom seve ral  sources . Accord i ng to t he 
nature o f  t he measure , the dat a  a re drawn f rom Modern 
Hea l t hcare ( MHC ) , t he Ame r ican Hosp i t a l  Assoc i a t ion Survey 
( AHA ) , t he HCFA Min imum Cost Data F i l es ( HCFA) , or the Area 
Resource F i l e  ( AR F ) . These dat a  provi de informa t ion on 
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marke t , ope ra t i ona l performance , and organi zat i ona l f e atures 
assoc i a t e d  w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu is i t ion . 
Market f actors wi l l  be ana lyzed a t  t he county l eve l . 
Hospi t a l  ope rat i ona l perf ormance and organ i zat iona l 
charac t e rist ics are exami ned at t he hosp i t a l  l eve l . The 
data on hosp i t a l  acqu is i t i ons are as reported in Modern 
Hea l t hcare . 
Overview of Following Chapters 
Chapter 2 is a review o f  t he pert i nent l i t e ra t ure , 
i ncluding resea rch related to market f act ors , organ i z at i ona l 
performance and hosp i t a l  me rge rs . Also revi ewed a re 
emp i r ical stud i es on hosp i t a l  acqu is i t i ons , hosp i t a l  
convers i ons f rom not - fo r - p ro f i t  to  for-pro f i t , and the 
current hea l t h  care envi ronment . 
Chap t e r  3 presents t he t heoretical  perspectives and 
conceptual mode l for t he research . The t heories inc l ude 
both t he organi zationa l t heory of resource dependence and 
merge r  and acquisition t heories re l a ted to corpora t e  
finance . These t heories a re used in deve l oping the 
hypot heses for t he study . 
Chap t e r  4 exp l ains t he me t hodo l ogy . I t  presents t he 
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dat a  sources and the variabl es used for the st udy . The 
anal ysis and s t a tis tical procedures are exp l ained in de t ail . 
Chap t e r  5 presents t he resu l ts o f  t he ana l ysis . The 
findings for t he variabl es and t heir re l ationships are 
presented . The chap t e r  inc l udes bot h descriptive and 
mu l tivariate findings . 
Chap t e r  6 discusses t he resu l ts of  t he research 
hypot heses . I t  int e rpre ts the resu l ts and draws conc l usions 
about t he re l ationships between ma rket factors ,  operational 
pe r formance f actors ,  organi z a tiona l f act ors and hospi t a l  
acquis i tions . The chapt er a lso points out t he implica tions 
of  t he s tudy resu l ts for organizationa l t heory and hea l t h  
care policy . 
o f f e red . 
Suggestions for further areas of  research are 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Recent Trends in Hospital Acquisitions 
As recounted by Reardon and Rea rdon ( 1 9 9 5 ) , before 1 8 7 0  
v i rtua l l y  a l l  hosp i t a l s  i n  t he Uni t ed S t a t e s  were pub l i c  or 
not - for -prof i t . By 1 9 1 0 , a s  phys i c i a n  owne rship o f  hosp i t a l s  
i ncreased , 5 6  percent o f  hosp i t a l s  were i nve s t or owned . By 
1 94 6 ,  however ,  l ower pro f i t s  and t he need to i nve s t  i n  
t echno l ogy had reduced f or-pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  to  1 8  percent o f  
the t o t a l . Then the growth o f  Med i care reimbursement , whi c h  
began i n  1 9 6 5 ,  l e d  to  t he re surgence o f  f o r - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l s . 
The mos t  recent decade , the 1 9 9 0 ' s ,  wa s marked by t he 
t rend i n  hosp i t a l  owne rship toward acqu i s i t i ons by l arge 
for -pro f i t  chains . The t rend was fost ered by hosp i t a l s 
j o i n i ng networks to  g a i n  l eve rage w i t h  managed care 
companies and to g a i n  access  to  cap i t a l  ( Ki rchhe imer , 2 0 0 1 ) . 
As shown i n  Tabl e  1 ,  8 8  hosp i t a l s  were acqu i red i n  1 9 9 4  and 
76 in 1 9 9 5 . The l a rgest  acqu i s i t ion in 1 9 9 5  was the $ 5 . 6  
b i l l ion acqu i s i t i on o f  Hea l t h Trust  by Co l umb i a  HCA ( Japsen , 
1 9 9 6 )  . I t  i s  not eworthy that bot h hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons and 
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mergers dec lined sign i f i cant ly i n  t he yea r s  1 9 9 8  t hrough 
2 0 0 0 , subsequent to t he balanced budget a c t . Reasons for 
t h i s dec line are an important part o f  t he s t udy . 
Table I: Hospital Acqu isitions by Year 
Year 1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 6  1 9 9 7  1 9 9 8  1 9 9 9  2 0 0 0  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Numbe r  o f  8 8  7 6  9 9  4 2  7 6  62 6 3  
Acquisitions 
* Da t a  drawn f rom Modern Hea l t hcare 
Acqu i s i t i on :  Wheneve r one hospi t a l  i s  purchased by another 
f a ci l i ty or mul t i - hosp i t a l  sys t em . 
I n  1 9 9 6 , 9 9  hospit a l s  were acqu i red wh i ch was a record 
year . I t  i s  int eres ting to not e that wh i l e  t he number o f  
f acilities acquired increased , the number o f  mu l t i- f a ci l i ty 
dea l s  dropped ( Be l l andi , 1 9 9 9 ) . I n  1 9 9 6 , t he growing 
a c t i v i t y  o f  not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  was not ed w i t h  7 3  
percent o f  the hospi t a l  acqui s i tions by not - f or - profit 
organizat ions ( Levin , 2 0 0 1 ) . 
I n  1 9 9 7 , which saw pas sage o f  t he Bal anced Budget Ac t 
( BBA ) , acqu i s i t i ons dropped to 42 fa c i l i t i e s , a 5 0  percent 
reduc tion f rom the prev i ous year . Not - f or - p ro fit hospi t a l s 
again domi nat ed t he marke t mak ing 7 5  percent o f  the 
acqu i s i tions ( Levin , 2 0 0 1 ) . 
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In  1 9 9 8 , reduced Medicare re imbursement , turmo i l  in the 
debt marke t s  and l ower s t ock price s a l l  cont r i buted to a l ow 
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ra t e  o f  a cqu i s i t ions ( Levi n ,  2 0 0 1 ) . Acqu i s i t i ons grew 
s l ight l y ,  to 7 6 , but were we l l  b e l ow t he peak o f  99 in 1 9 9 6 . 
I n  1 9 9 9 , hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions further dec l i ned by 2 3  
percent t o  6 2  f a c i l i t i e s . I n  that yea r ,  acqu i s i t i ons by 
f or - pro f i t  organ i za t i ons dropped 3 4 %  f rom t he previous yea r . 
At t he s ame t ime ,  a cqu i s i t i ons by not - f o r - pro f i t  
a cqu i s i t i ons i nc reased 2 0% .  I n  1 9 9 9 ,  a new t rend was 
apparent , f o r - p ro f i t  sys t ems were dive s t i ng hosp i t a l  
f a c i l i t i e s  ( Be l l andi , 2 0 0 0 ) . Meanwh i l e ,  Columb i a / HCA 
Hea l t hcare , t he l a rg e s t  for - pro f i t  cha i n ,  spun o f f  many 
f ac i l i t i e s  i n  two separa t e  d i ve s t i ture s . Tenet Hea l t hcare 
Corpora t i on ,  t he s econd l a rgest f o r - p ro f i t  cha i n ,  a l so 
dive s t ed hosp i t a l s . The se two cha i n s  reverse consol idat i ons 
accounted for an i nc re a s i ng number o f  not - f o r - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions ( Be l l andi , 2 0 0 0 ) . 
Whi l e  2 0 0 0  saw s t ock pri ces r i s i ng i n  the hosp i t a l  
i ndu s t ry ,  acqu i s i t i ons grew only s l ight l y  to 6 3  f ac i l i t i e s . 
Acqu i s i t ions by f o r - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  now comp r i sed 6 9  
percent o f  t he t ransac t i ons w i t h  3 1  percent by not - f or -
pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  ( Be l andi , 2 0 0 1 ) . The l a rge s t  acqu i s i t i on 
was the $2 . 4  b i l l ion a cqu i s i t i on o f  Quorum Hea l t h  Group by 
Triad ( Levi n ,  2 0 0 1 ) . Acqu i s i t i ons by f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  
may cont i nue to grow i n  2 0 0 1  i f  incre a s e s  i n  stock p r i c e s  
cont i nue . 
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Both hospi t a l  l eadership and nat i ona l hea l t h  c are 
po l i cy maker s  have encouraged the growth in hosp i t a l  sys t ems 
t hrough acqu i s i t i ons , on t he as sumpt ion that economies o f  
s c a l e  provi de mul t i - hosp i t a l  syst ems w i t h  performance 
advant age s ove r i nd i v i dual hosp i t a l s  ( Levi tz , 1 9 8 5 ) . 
Advantages are expected f rom i mproved operat i ng e f f i c i ency , 
greater t echn i c a l  expert i se , increased market share and more 
access  to cap i t a l  re source s .  
The Impact on Hospitals of The BBA of 1997 
On August 5 ,  1 9 9 7 ,  Pre s i dent Cl i nton s i gned t he 
Bal anced Budget Act ( BBA ) o f  1 9 9 7 . The BBA was passed i n  
re sponse t o  doub l e - d i g i t  growth i n  Medi care payment s and was 
i nt ended t o  help t he Medicare t ru s t  fund rema in solvent . At 
t hat t ime ,  t he Medi care t rust  fund was expe c t ed to rema i n  
solvent o n l y  unt i l  2 0 0 8 . The passage o f  t he BBA ensured 
solvency o f  t he Med i care Trust f und unt i l  2 0 25 . S i nce t here 
was a gene ral percept ion among f ederal hea l t h  pol i cy makers 
t hat t he f i nanc i a l  prof i t ab i l i t y  o f  hosp i t a l s  was se cure , 
the BBA t arge t e d  acute care hosp i t a l s  as an area i n  whi c h  to 
reduce Medi care spend i ng . 
The Congre s s i onal Budget O f f i c e  ( CBO ) origina l l y  
proj e c t ed t h e  BBA ' s reduc t i on o f  Med i care spend i ng to be 
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$ 1 0 3  B i l l i on f rom 1 9 9 8  t hrough 2 0 0 2 . The eBO ' s revi sed 
e s t i ma t e s  predi c t ed Med i c are reduc t i ons gre a t e r  by $ 8 8 . 5  
b i l l ion a t  $ 1 9 1 . 5  b i l l i on ( see t ab l e  2 ) . Subsequent 
research by Ernst & Young ( 2 0 0 0 )  projec t s  a reduc t i on i n  
t o t a l  Med i care spend i ng between 1 9 9 8  and 2 0 0 2 o f  $2 2 7  
b i l l i on . 
Table 2 :  Medicare Spending Projections Under BBA ( In  billions) 
FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 Five-Year Difference 
Pre - BBA $2 2 7 . 0  $2 4 8 . 2  $2 7 3 . 0  $2 8 5 . 6  $ 3 1 3 . 7  -spend i ng 
Est ima t e s  
spendi ng 
reduct ions ( 6 . 9 ) ( 1 5 . 5 ) ( 2 7 . 6 ) ( 1 7 . 1 ) ( 3 5 . 9 ) ( $ 1 3 0 . 0 ) 
unde r BBA 
( 1 2 / 9 7 )  
Est ima t e d  
spend i ng 2 2 0 . 1  2 2 3 . 7  2 4 5 . 4  2 6 8 . 5  2 7 7 . 8  -unde r BBA 
( 1 2 / 9 7 )  
Revi sed 
e s t i ma t ed 
spend i ng 2 1 1 . 0  2 1 4 . 0  2 2 9 . 0  2 4 6 . 0  2 5 6 . 0  -
unde r BBA 
( 3 / 9 9 )  
Add i t i ona l 
spend i ng 
reduc t i ons ( 9 . 1 ) ( 1 8 . 7 ) ( 1 6 . 4 )  ( 2 2 . 5 ) ( 2 1 . 8 )  ( 8 8 . 5 ) 
pe r revi sed 
e s t i ma t e  
, Source: CBO, "An Analysl.s of the Presl.dent s Budgetary Proposals 
for FY 2000 A Preliminary Report," March 3, 1999; CBO, "Budgetary 
Implications of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997," December 1997. 
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A major area o f  Medi care cost reduc t i on by t he BBA was 
hosp i t a l  PPS payment s .  The reduc t i ons i nc l uded: l i mi t i ng 
t he opera t i ng update to  an ave rage o f  1 . 7  percent be low t he 
ma rket basket; cap i t a l  payments s e t  a t  9 0  percent o f  
ant i c ipated capi t a l  cos t s; a 2 9  percent reduc t i on i n  
indirect med i c a l  educat i on ( I ME ) payment s ove r 5 years; a 5 
percent reduct ion i n  the d i sproport i onate share hosp i t a l  
( DS H )  payment s ove r 5 years f o r  hosp i t a l s t h a t  t reat l arge 
numbers of i ndi gent pat i ent s; and t he reduct i on of out l i er 
payment s for cases t ha t  a re exc e s s ive l y  expens ive 
( Gut t e rman , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
The BBA a l so reduced Medicare spend i ng i n  the 
f o l l ow i ng hosp i t a l  serv i c e  l i nes : outpat i ent care , sk i l l ed 
nurs i ng f ac i l i t i e s  ( SNFs ) , home he a l t h  agenc i e s  ( HHAs ) and 
p sych i a t r i c  uni t s . 
By 1 9 9 8 , t he BBA had brought Med i care spending growt h 
to a ha l t  at $2 1 1  b i l l i on; i n  1 9 9 9  i t  was further reduced to 
$2 0 9 . 3  b i l l i on . I n  2 0 0 0  i t  i nc reased s l ight ly to $2 1 6  
b i l l i on . Th i s  period o f  no growth i n  Med i care spendi ng 
sharp l y  cont rasted w i t h  the 1 0 . 1% annual growth for the 6 
years b e f ore the BBA ( Gardne r ,  2 0 0 1 ) . 
According to He f f l er et  al . ( 2 0 0 1 ) , Med i care spendi ng 
on hosp i t a l  servi ce s ,  i n  part i cu l a r , reached $ 1 2 4  b i l l ion i n  
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1 9 9 7  and dec l i ned $2 . 3  b i l l ion ,  o r  b y  1 . 8  percent , i n  1 9 9 8 . 
I n  1 9 9 9 , Med i ca re hospi t a l  spendi ng dec l i ned by another 0 . 3  
percent . To make up for t he losses i n  Fede ral  fund i ng ,  
hosp i t a l s began t o  aggre s s ive ly negot i a t e  rates  w i t h  private 
heal t h  p l ans . As a resul t ,  payment s t o  hosp i t a l s  by priva t e  
i nsurance compa n i e s  i nc reased f rom 3 9  percent of  a l l  
payment s i n  1 9 9 7  to  4 1  percent i n  1 9 9 9 . 
Never t he l e s s , because of  t he BBA ' s cap on Med i care 
expendi t ures and a l so l ower re imbursement s f rom managed care 
p l ans hosp i t a l  prof i t s  f a l l a f t e r  1 9 9 7 . The dat a  s how that 
just be fore t he BBA , Medi care pro f i t  marg i ns had i ncreased , 
f rom 2 . 3% i n  FY 1 9 9 6  to  3 . 5% i n  FY 1 9 9 7 . Fo l l owing t he BBA , 
Medi care pro f i t  marg i ns f e l l to  2 . 5% i n  FY 1 9 9 8 , - 0 . 1% i n  FY 
1 9 9 9  and - 0 . 5  percent in 20 0 0 . Sma l l  hosp i t a l s  ( 9 9 beds or 
l e s s )  were harde s t  h i t  by t he BBA , w i t h  Medicare pro f i t  
marg i n s  decreas i ng f rom 4 . 2% i n  FY 1 9 9 8  to  a - 5 . 6% i n  FY 
2 0 02 , a decrease of 2 3 3  percent ( Ernst and Young , 1 9 9 9 ) . 
Howeve r ,  the s ame Ern s t  and Young s t udy projec t s  hospi t a l  
pro f i t  marg ins t o  increase to  0 . 0 0 percent i n  2 0 0 1  and to 
0 . 5  percent i n  2 0 02 . 
The cuts i n  reimburs ement manda t e d  by the BBA reduced 
hea l t h  care f a c i l i t i e s  earnings , and beg i nn i ng in 1 9 9 9  t he i r  
s t ock prices  f e l l  ( Levi n ,  2 0 0 1 ) . Fo l l ow i ng t he BBA t he 
c redi t rat i ngs o f  hospi t a l s  f e l l as wel l ,  w i t h  a 1 0 0  percent 
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surge i n  downg rade s i n  1 9 9 8  to the highe s t  l eve l i n  1 0  years 
( Moody ' s  I nves t ors Serv i c e , 1 9 9 9 ) . As c red i t  rat i ngs 
dec l i ne , t he cost o f  capi tal  i ncrease s ,  put t i ng more 
pre s sure on a hosp i t a l ' s  prof i t s . I f  hosp i t a l s cannot 
f i nance t echnol og i c a l  improvement s ,  t he i r  abi l i ty to provide 
qua l i ty pat i ent c a re is  comprom i s e d  and t he i r  market share 
may su f f e r . Thus , a s  t he cost o f  cap i t a l  i ncrease s , t h i s  
dom i no a f fe c t  c a n  f orce hosp i t a l s i nto acqu i s i t i on .  
Among t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s ,  c l i n i c a l  serv i c e s  gene rate 9 0  
percent o f  hosp i t a l  revenue . P r i or t o  the BBA , Med i care 
c l i n i c a l  payment s to  t eaching hosp i t a l s  repre sented 2 9  
percent o f  t h i s  s egment o f  t he t each i ng hosp i t a l  budget 
( Anderson e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 9 ) . I n  1 9 9 7 , b e f ore t he BBA , t e a c h i ng 
hosp i t a l s had rece i ved an add i t i ona l $6 . 8  b i l l ion o f  
Medicare payment s f o r  ind i rect  med i ca l  educat i on ( I ME ) 
Al t hough , the BBA reduced payment s for i nd i rect  med i c a l  
educat ion ( I ME ) b y  $ 5 . 6  b i l l ion between 1 9 9 8  and 2 0 02 , $ 4  
b i l l i on w a s  re a l l oc a t e d  back to t e a c h i ng hosp i t a l s f o r  
serv i c e s  to  managed care enrol l e e s . A s  a re sul t ,  teach i ng 
hosp i t a l s  had , on average , a hosp i t a l  Medi care marg i n  o f  
1 9 . 0  percent i n  1 9 9 7  compared to 6 . 7  percent for non ­
teaching hosp i t a l s  ( Medi care Payment Advi sory Comm i s s i on ,  
2 0 0 1 )  . S i nce s i mi l ar hosp i t a l Med i c are margins are 
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proj e c t e d  f o r  t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s  through 2 0 0 2 , t he i mpact o f  
the BBA o n  t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s  i s  minima l . 
The recent ly enac ted Bal anced Budget Re f i nement Act o f  
1 9 9 9  ( BBRA ) prov i ded some re l i e f , for hospi t a l s su f f e r i ng 
f i nanc i a l ly f rom t he BBA . Th i s  re l i e f  i nc l uded : s l ow i ng t he 
reduc t ions i n  I ME payments to  t ea c h i ng hospi t a l s ,  s l ow i ng 
t he reduc t i ons i n  DSH payment s and i nc reased payment s f or 
post acute care and outpat ient c are . Projec t i ons s how the 
BBRA w i l l  prov i de only $ 1 1  b i l l ion i n  addi t i ona l Medi care 
payment s t h rough 2 0 0 2 ( Medi care Payment Advi sory Commi s s i on , 
2 0 0 1 )  . 
I n  summary , t he BBA shi f t ed the f i nanc i a l  c r i s i s  i n  
hea l t h  care f rom t he Med i care t rust  f und , whi c h  i s  now 
solvent unt i l  2 0 2 5 ,  to  t he acute c are hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry 
( Erns t and Young , 2 0 0 0 ) . The CBO c l early undere s t i ma t e d  t he 
mag n i t ude o f  BBA cut s in Med i c a re spendi ng ,  whi c h  l e f t  
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  t he i r  lowe s t  pro f i t  marg ins s i nce 1 9 8 4 . 
I ndeed , some organiza t i ons : sma l l  hospi t a l s ,  SNFs and HHAs 
have had negat i ve pro f i t  ma rg i ns . I n  add i t i on , t he BBA has 
shaken t he con f i dence o f  the f i nanc i a l  marke t s  i n  t he 
hosp i t a l  i ndu s t ry ,  resul t i ng i n  l ower c red i t  rat i ng s . 
re sul t many hosp i t a l s  are unab l e  to  ma i n t a i n  adequate 
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cap i t a l  l eve l s . Given these factors , many hospi t a l s  a re at 
r i sk to  close or be acqu i red . 
Differences Between Merger and Acquisition 
The de f i n i t i on o f  hosp i t al  me rger i s : " t he comb i nat ion 
o f  two or more hospi t a l s ,  o f t en through a pool i ng o f  
i n t e re s t s ,  where one o f  t he hosp i t a l s  survives a s  a l egal 
ent i ty ; or  when two or more hosp i t a l s  comb i ne toge t he r  to 
f orm a new operat i ng ent i t y ,  rep l a c i ng t he or i g i na l l y  
i ndependent i ns t i tut i on s "  ( Cope l and and Wes ton , 1 9 8 8 ; 
Downes ,  1 9 9 9 ) . Thi s  de f i n i t ion i s  supported i n  t he 
f i nanc i a l  l i t erature and i s  cons i s tent w i t h  hea l t hc are 
research ( Bazzol i ,  1 9 9 5 ; Bazo l l i  and Andes , 1 9 9 5 ; Connor e t  
a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . 
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In cont ra s t , t he de f i ni t ion o f  hospi t a l  acqu i s i t i on i s : 
"Wheneve r one hosp i t a l  i s  purchased by another f ac i l i t y  or 
mu l t i - hosp i t a l  syst em" ( Shap i ro ,  2 0 0 0 ) . Thi s  de f in i t i on i s  
cons i s t ent w i t h  the f i nance l i t e rature and i s  accepted 
w i t h i n  t he hea l t h  care i ndu s t ry . 
The me rge r  dec i s ion i s  o f t en based not so much on 
pro f i t  max i mizat ion as on f a c t ors re l a ted to t he l ocal  
market : i mproved market share , enhanced reput a t i on ,  gre a t e r  
c o s t  e f f i c i ency and s i mi l a r  c ha r i t ab l e  mi s s ions . S i nce a 
me rger i s  o f t e n  a poo l i ng o f  i nt e res t s ,  no cap i t a l  out l ay i s  
requ i red . As a resul t ,  an organiza t i on may merge i n  
s i tuations whe re l ow profit and weak market wou l d  not 
support acqu i s i tion . 
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Many mergers have great l y  increased t he market share o f  
t he a f f e c t ed hospi t a l s . I n  turn , gre a t e r  market share has 
l ed to  a 1 0  percent increase in hospi t a l  DRG reimbursement 
rat e s  fol l ow i ng me rge r  ( Kr i shnan , 2 0 0 1 ) . The l i t e ra ture 
supports increased DRG payme n t s  among consolida t ed hospi t a l s  
due to  more aggre s s ive bil ling fol l owing consol i dat ion . I t  
i s  a l so pos s i b l e  that increased DRG payment s are due t o  a 
higher int ens i ty l eve l o f  serv i c e  caused by t he migration o f  
more acute patient s to  t he consolidated f ac i l i ties . I n  
marke t s  w i t h  higher concent rat i on , i . e .  an i ncrease in t he 
Herfindahl - Hirs chman I ndex ( HH I ) o f  2 0 0 0  point s a f t e r  merge r 
or acqui s i tion , the DRG reimbursement rat e s  grew 1 5 . 6  
percent ( Kri shnan , 2 0 0 1 ) . The increase i n  r e i mbursement 
ra t e s  is due to increased ma rket concent ration ( Krishnan , 
2 0 0 1 )  . The se findings are cons i s tent with other recent 
s t udie s  ( Ke l l e r  et a l . ,  1 9 9 9; Dranove and Ludw i c k , 1 9 9 9 )  
Other pot entia l bene f i t s  o f  merger inc l ude cost savings 
f rom economies of s c a l e ,  reduc tion of unused capacity 
through poo l ed re source s ,  better access  to  capit al , h igher 
vol ume s o f  spe c i a l ized procedures and broade r geograph i c  
cove rage ( Connor et  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . 
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I n  cont rast to  many o f  the f ac t ors f a c i l i t a t i ng 
mergers , the acqu i re r ' s dec i s ion t o  purchase a f ac i l i t y  i s  
norma l l y  based on maximiz i ng pro f i t s , a s  occurs when the 
s a l e  price o f  t he hosp i t a l  i s  be l ow t he net pre sent va l ue o f  
t he hosp i t al's income s t ream . A n  acqu i r i ng organ i zat ion 
w i l l  purcha se a hosp i t a l  when i t s  net revenue exceeds i t s  
p r i c e . I n  1 9 9 8 , the med i an acqu i s i t i on p r i c e  per hosp i t a l  
bed was $2 1 0 , 0 0 0 , w i t h  a price - to-revenue coe f f i c i ent o f  
. 8 8X ( Levi n ,  2 0 0 1 ) . From the acqu i re r ' s pos i t i on , revenue 
and pro f i t ab i l i ty a re key cons iderat ions in the acqu i s i t i on 
dec i s i on . S i nce an acqu i s i t i on i nvo lves f i nanc i ng t he 
purchase , a c c e s s  t o  cap i t a l i s  a l so a c r i t i cal  component . 
The potent i a l  hazards to soc i ety o f  both acqu i s i t ions 
and mergers i n c l ude : decreased compe t i t i on , higher consume r 
p r i c e s  and l e s s  a c c e s s  to  c l i n i c a l  care , due to 
consol idat ion . As a resu l t , gove rnment a l  dec i s i ons to  
approve acqu i s i t i on or me rgers mus t  eva luate the e f f e c t s  o f  
t he consol idat ion on t he commun i ty ' s we l f a re . 
Hospital Conversion from Not-For-Profit (NFP) to For-Profit (FP) 
The pr imary l egal d i s t inct ion between for - pro f i t  and 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  i s  that f or - pro f i t  organiza t i ons can 
d i s t r i bute earn i ngs to  individual shareho l ders but not - fo r -
pro f i t  organizat i ons mus t  re t a i n  or spend t he i r  earnings 
( Et t ner and Hermann , 2 0 0 1 ) . Not - for -pro f i t  organizat ions 
have t he bene f i t  o f  tax exempt i on . From a pub l i c  po l i cy 
perspect ive , nei ther form o f  corpora t e  ownership i s  opt ima l 
at a l l  t imes . Changes i n  t echno l ogy , consumer demand , 
government regu l a t i on and f i nanc i a l  marke t s  c an provide 
advant age s t o  t he organiza t i on for a new f orm o f  ownership . 
The Cen t e r  for Hea l t h  A f f a i rs ( 1 9 9 7 )  de f i ne s  hosp i t a l  
conve r s i on a s : " The Conve r s i on o f  private not - f or - pro f i t  
i n s t i tut i ons , 5 0 1  c 3 Corpora t i ons , t o  f o r-pro f i t  
enterp r i s e s  whi c h  are able to  i s sue s tock and d i s t r i bute 
pro f i t s" . The Cent e r ' s  research f ound t hat many hosp i t a l  
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conver s i ons are driven b y  poor f i nanc i a l  performance a s  we l l  
a s  by t he nec e s s i ty t o  upgrade hosp i t a l  f ac i l i t i e s  and 
equ ipment . Hosp i t a l s  that conve rted f rom not - fo r - p ro f i t  to  
f o r - p ro f i t  were sma l l e r ,  had l ower pro f i t  margins , and had 
highe r s t a f f i ng expend i tures t han t he i ndu s t ry average s 
( Needl eman e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 9 ) . 
Concern has i nc reased t hat as not - for -prof i t  hea l t h  
care f ac i l i t i es  are acqui red by for - p ro f i t  organiza t i ons , 
chari table a s s e t s  are b e i ng conve rted t o  f o r - pro f i t  use and 
t he pub l i c  i s  not be i ng compensated f o r  t he val ue 
repre sented by the past t ax sub s i d i e s  and other publ i c  
support . Th i s  f a c t  p l u s  t he s ign i f i cant impact on market 
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compe t i t ion and other i s sues of publ i c  interest have brought 
i nc re a s i ng s c rut i ny of for - pro f i t  acqu i s i t i ons by s t a t e  and 
f edera l agenc i e s . 
H i s t o r i ca l l y ,  not - fo r - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s rai sed capi t a l  
f rom phi l anthrop i c  grant s ,  pub l i c  grant s ,  and t he i r  t ax 
subs i d i zed ope ra t i ng surp l u s e s  ( Robi nson , 2 0 0 0 ) . S i nce many 
of these sourc e s  are dwind l i ng ,  t he current hosp i t a l  
i ndus t ry i s  pursu i ng other f inanc i ng source s :  venture 
c api t a l , pub l i c  equ i t y , convert i b l e  bonds , and t axabl e  
corpora t e  debt . Not - for - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons a re borrow i ng 
more heavi l y  i n  t he t ax - exempt bond market s and a re meet i ng 
i s sue s about t he i r  solvency and c re d i t  rat i ngs . Thus , not -
for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s' need for a l t e rnat ive sources o f  
cap i t a l  may b e  encourag i ng t he i r  conve r s i ons t o  for - p ro f i t  
s t atus . 
S igni f i cant growth i n  for - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  f i rms began 
in t he 1 9 7 0's w i t h  t he r i s e  of Hosp i t a l  Corpora t i on o f  
Ame r i c a  ( HCA ) , Ame r i can Med i c a l  I n t e rnat iona l (AM I ) ,  
Nat i ona l Medi c a l  Ent e rpr i se s  ( NME ) , and Humana , among 
other s . By 1 9 8 3 , t he Hosp i t a l  Corpora t i on o f  Ame r i c a  ( HCA ) 
owned 3 4 9 hospi t a l s . The t hree ot her for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  
chains ment i oned owned a n  add i t ional 2 0 6  f ac i l i t i e s . 
Together those f or-pro f i t  chains a ccounted for 1 0  percent o f  
the acute c are hosp i t a l s  i n  the Un i t e d  S t a t e s  ( Dranove , 
1 9 9 8 )  . 
McCue and Furs t  ( 1 9 8 6 )  prof i l ed the pre - acqu i s i t ion 
f i nanc i a l  cond i t ion o f  not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  prior to 
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b e i ng acqu i red by f or - pro f i t  compan i e s . The i r  resu l t s  f ound 
t hat f o r - p ro f i t  corpora t i ons t end to acqu i re f i nanc i a l ly 
d i s t re s se d  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  the f o l l owing chara c t er i s t i c s : 
sma l l  s ize , an ag i ng phys i c a l  pl ant , l ow pro f i t ab i l i t y  and 
minimal owne rs equ i ty . 
By 1 9 8 9 ,  t he percent age o f  U .  S .  hosp i t a l s t hat were 
f o r - p ro f i t  had i nc reased to 1 4 . 6  percent , subsequent l y  
decreas i ng to 1 2 . 7  percent i n  1 9 9 6  ( Ya f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . S i nce 
these conve rs i ons enta i l e d ,  chang i ng t ax s t atus f rom exempt , 
a s  not - for - prof i t s , to  t axabl e ,  as for - pro f i t s , t hey 
requi red government approval . 
Pre and Post BBA Environments of Hospital Acquisitions 
Ac cord i ng to Rob inson's ( 2 0 0 0 )  analys i s ,  the hea l t h  
care i ndu s t ry d i splays the components o f  t he I ndus t ry L i f e  
Cyc l e . O f  part i cu l a r  intere s t  i s  the hosp i t a l  i ndust ry's 
movement f rom Eme rg i ng ,  to Growt h ,  to Matur i ty and now to 
f a c i ng Dec l i ne . 
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The Pre BBA Environ ment of Hospital Acquisitions 
I n i t i a l l y ,  not - f or-pro f i t  organizat ions popul ated the 
Eme rg i ng and Growth periods when phi l ant hropy and gove rnment 
grant s were ava i l ab l e  to  m i ni mize r i sk . Th i s  phase i nc l uded 
the early growth of pub l i c  hospi t a l s and cont i nued t hrough 
the fund i ng of new hosp i t a l  cons t ruc t ion by t he H i l l  Burton 
Ac t o f  1 94 6 . The movement f rom Emerg i ng to Growt h ,  however ,  
increases t he requi rement for i nve stment cap i t a l  i nc l ud i ng 
s tock o f f e ri ngs and bond f i nanc i ng . 
Accord i ng t o  Al exander and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 5 ) , for - pro f i t  
organiza t i ons f requent l y  acqu i red unpro f i t ab l e  hosp i t a l s  i n  
urban l ocal i t i e s . The se were acqu i red w i t h  the i nt ent of  
rel ocat i ng t he f ac i l i t y  to a reas of  hi ghe r growt h .  McCue and 
Furs t  ( 1 9 8 6 )  a l so found that for -pro f i t  organiza t i ons are 
more l i ke ly to acqu i re hosp i t a l s w i t h  poor prof i t ab i l i t y ,  
high l eve l s  of  debt , and o l d  f a c i l i t i e s . S i nce many of  t he 
acqu i red f ac i l i t i e s  were sma l l  not - f or -prof i t  hosp i t a l s , 
sma l l e r  s ize was a l so pos i t ive ly assoc i at e d  w i t h  
acqu i s i t i on . I n  sum , f o r - p ro f i t  cha i ns acqu i red f ac i l i t i e s  
w i t h  t he charac t er i s t i c s  o f  a f i nanc i a l l y  d i s t re s sed 
hospi t a l . S i nce t he acqu i red hosp i t a l s  were unab l e  to  
gene rate an ope ra t i ng prof i t , they were forced to rely on 
debt to f i nance opera t i ons and cap i t a l  i mprovements. When 
debt l eve l s  became exc e s s ive t he f i nanc i a l l y  d i s t re s sed 
hosp i t a l s  became t a rge t s  for acqui s i t i on . 
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Accordi ng to McCue ( 1 9 8 8 ) , for -pro f i t  hosp i t a l  
acqui s i t ions re f l ec t ed a h ighe r l eve l of debt f i nanc i ng . 
Thi s  was due t o  i nt e rest payment s b e i ng t ax deduct i b l e  t hus 
provi d i ng an i ncent ive for t he use of  debt f i nanc i ng by for -
prof i t  organiza t i ons . For - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s a l so d i s t ributed 
more earn i ngs t o  t he owne r ' s t hus reduc i ng cash l eve l s .  
McCue a l so found t hat hospi t a l s acqu i red by for - pro f i t  
organi zat i ons had l ower occupancy rates and newe r f ac i l i t i e s  
t hen not - f o r - p ro f i t  hospi t a l s . I n  addi t i on , acqu i red f o r -
prof i t  hosp i t a l s  w e r e  located i n  more a f f l uent commun i t i e s  
w i t h  f ewer i nd i v i dua l s  b e l ow t he pove rty l eve l . I n  many of  
t hese commun i t i e s , t he pr imary mot ive for acqu i s i t ion was t o  
acqu i re add i t i ona l c ap i t a l f o r  serv i c e  expans i on . S i nce 
for-pro f i t  organ i za t i ons have gre a t e r  access  to  t he capi t a l  
marke t s , t hey were f requent l y  i nvolved i n  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions . 
Accord i ng to Ermann and Gabe l ( 1 9 8 4 ) , for - pro f i t  and 
not - f or - prof i t  organizat i ons have grown pri mari l y  through 
t he acqu i s i t ion of f i nanc i a l l y  t roub l ed i ndependent 
hospi t a l s . Al exander and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 7 )  i dent i f i ed 
d i f ferences i n  t he rea sons that for-pro f i t  and not - for ­
pro f i t  f a c i l i t i e s  ent e r  i nto acqu i s i t i ons . According to 
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t he i r  re searc h ,  f o r - p ro f i t  organizat i ons acqu i re f a c i l i t i e s  
t o  i ncrease prof i t s . Thi s goal d i f f e rs f rom t hat o f  not -
f or - pro f i t  organiza t i ons , whose m i s s i on i s  commun i ty ­
re l a ted . The i r  acqu i s i t i on mot iva t i ons may i n c l ude re l i g i ous 
commi tment s ,  care for t he i nd igent or ensuring hea l t hcare 
for t he commu n i t y . As a resul t ,  not - for - prof i t  
organiza t i ons a re more l i ke l y  t hen f o r - pro f i t s  t o  acqu i re 
hosp i t a l s  i n  l e s s  economi cal ly f avorabl e  envi ronment s . More 
i mport ant l y ,  not - fo r - prof i t  organiza t i ons are wi l l i ng to 
acqu i re f ac i l i t i e s  opera t i ng at a l o s s . Al exande r and 
Morr i s ey a l so f ound that f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s are more 
l i ke ly to be acqu i red by for - pro f i t  organizat i ons , and not ­
f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  a re more l i kely to be acqu i red by not ­
f or - pro f i t  organiza t i ons . 
I n  1 9 8 3 , l oc a l  government owned 2 9  percent o f  a l l  
hosp i t a l s , howeve r ,  t hey repre s ented only 9 percent o f  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons . The se f a c i l i t i e s  were f requent l y  
managed b y  cont ract but were not t a rge t s  f o r  acqu i s i t ion . 
Low cap i t a l iza t ion , h i gh l eve l s  o f  cha r i ty care , and cont ro l 
by gove rnment author i t i e s  made t hem una t t ract ive for 
acqu i s i t ion ( Bogue e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 5 ) . 
P f e f f e r  and Nowak ( 1 9 7 6 )  f ound that at int erme d i a t e  
l eve l s  o f  i ndus t ry concent rat ion , organizat ions expe r i ence 
h igh l eve l s  of compe t i t ive uncert a i nty and are l i ke ly to 
enter i nt o  j o i nt ventures to  m i t igate t he r i sk . Accord i ng 
to Gul a t i  ( 1 9 9 8 ) , hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons are catalys t s  that 
prov i de t he f i nanc i a l  and human cap i t a l  necess ary to pursue 
new bus i ne s s  opportun i t i e s . H i s  re search a l so found that 
t he re l a t i onship o f  s ize and p e r formance o f  an organizat i on 
i s  a c r i t i c a l  f a c t or in t he acqu i s i t i on dec i s i on . 
The Post BBA E nvironment of Hospital Acquisitions 
Mature i ndu s t r i e s  face s l ower growt h ,  and mus t  f i nd 
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f i nanc i ng f rom a w i de range o f  source s .  I n  part i cu l a r ,  when 
organizat ions are in vul nerabl e  s t ra t egi c pos i t ions due t o  
i nc reased compe t i t ion or i nve s t ment i n  p i onee r i ng 
t e chnol ogy , t hey deve l op a l l i ances ( E i senhardt and 
Schoonhoven , 1 9 9 6 ; Burns , Bazzol i ,  Dyan , and Who l ey ,  20 0 0 )  
I n  such s i tuat i ons , resources are s c a rce , pro f i t s  are 
s t re s s ed and surviva l  i s  threatened . Organ iza t i ons are 
t hemse lves bund l e s  o f  resources ( e . g .  f i nanc i a l  a s se t s ,  
techno l ogy , reputat i on ,  manage r i a l  s ki l l s ) , and so 
acqu i s i t i ons a re driven by some organ iza t i ons s t ra t e g i c  
resource needs and other ' s  corre sponding re source 
opportun i t i e s . 
As reported by Ki rchhe i me r  ( 2 0 0 1 ) , for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  
sys t ems a re purcha s i ng ag i ng hosp i t a l s  and turning t hem into 
s t a t e - o f - t he - art f a c i l i t i e s . The f or - pro f i t s  cha ins t arge t 
commun i t i e s  w i t h  growing popu l a t i ons and under - ut i l ized 
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hosp i t a l s . S i nce not - f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  have l im i t e d  cash 
and s u f f e r  f rom l owe r c red i t  ra t i ngs , they are a t  an 
i nherent d i s advantage i n  compe t i ng for f i nanc i a l  re sources . 
For - pro f i t  cha ins have f unds f rom s tock o f f e ri ngs , bond 
i s sue s and l i nes of c red i t  that are ava i l ab l e  f o r  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i ons . I n  acqu i r i ng hosp i t al s t hat l ac k  the 
resources to  f und cap i t a l  improvement s ,  the f o r - p ro f i t  
cha ins a s sert  t hat t hey are prov i d i ng a commun i t y  servi ce . 
As marke t compe t i t i on increases , hospi t a l s  embark on 
acqu i s i t i ons to  reduce cost s ,  share r i sks , and enhance the i r  
reput a t i ons . There i s  a l so evidence that acqu i s i t ion can 
increase an organizat i on ' s market share by comb i n i ng t he two 
organ izat i ons barga i n i ng powe r and d i s t r i bu t i on channe l s  
( Gu l a t i ,  1 9 9 8 )  
Gol dberg ( 1 9 9 9 )  a l so f ound that hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions 
increased because o f  gre a t e r  compe t i t ion i n  t he market 
pl ace . As managed care i nc reas i ngly dominated t he market 
and i nsurance companies cont i nued pres sure to cont ro l cos t s , 
hosp i t a l s  were f orced i nto acqu i s i t i ons as a mechani sm to 
i mprove e f f i c i ency . 
Robi nson ( 20 0 0 )  de s c r i bed how reduced hosp i t a l  pro f i t  
marg i ns are ra i s i ng fears o f  i nsolvency and caus i ng the 
downgrade o f  many hosp i t a l s ' bond rat i ngs . The change s i n  
t echnol ogy and t he shi f t  to  managed care a re among the 
reasons for be l i ev i ng t hat the hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry i s  now i n  
t h e  ma t ure pha se o f  the i ndus t ry cyc l e . Rob i nson be l i eve s 
that not - for -pro f i t  organizat ions are a t  t he i r  grea t e s t  
d i sadvantage i n  mat ure i ndus t r i e s , where a c c e s s  to  equ i ty 
f i nanc i ng may be a key to organizat i onal surv i va l . 
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A recent art i c l e  by Ki rchhe imer ( 20 0 0 )  examined t he 
increase i n  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons by for -pro f i t  corporat i ons 
in Pennsylvan i a . The major rea son i dent i f i ed f o r  t h i s  
i ncrease i s  t h e  pres sure to upda te hosp i t a l  f ac i l i t i e s . 
Because f o r - pro f i t  cha ins have access  to  cap i t a l  ma rket s  
t hrough debt f i nanc i ng and s t ockho l der equ i t y ,  t hey c an 
obt a i n  t he money to f i nance renova t i ons . Ki rchhe i me r  a l so 
f ound that t he not- for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s become more cost ­
e f f i c i ent and pro f i t ab l e  a f t er acqu i s i t ion by f o r - p ro f i t  
corpora t i ons . They accomp l i sh that by rec ru i t i ng new 
phys i c i ans , i mpl ement i ng more soph i s t i c ated cash management , 
and acqu i r i ng more i nve s t ment cap i t a l . The i r  cap i t a l  
sourc e s  i n c l ude venture cap i t a l , publ i c  equ i ty , convert i b l e  
bonds , and t axab l e  corpora t e  debt . S i nce not - fo r - prof i t  
hosp i t a l s  are exc l uded f rom vent ure capi t a l  f unds and t he 
stock marke t , t hey are at a compet i t ive d i sadvant age . 
Organ i za t ions i n  dec l i n i ng i ndus t ri e s  red i rect  cash 
f low i nto growth s e c t ors , a s  can be seen i n  hosp i t a l  
i nve s t ments i n  home hea l t h  care and other a l t e rna t ive 
s e rv i c e s . Hosp i t a l s  i n  t h i s  phase a l so l ook t o  
conso l i dat i on o f  f ac i l i t i e s  and technol ogy to achi eve 
gre a t e r  e f f i c i ency and i ncrease t he i r  prof i t s . 
As t echnol ogy and c hang i ng pat t e rns o f  pract i c e  reduce 
t he demand for hosp i t a l  servi ce s ,  f o r - p ro f i t  compani e s  may 
rea l l oc a t e  f unds into areas o f  higher growth such as 
outpa t i ent care , rehab i l i t a t i on servi ce s ,  and l ong t e rm 
c a re . Thus , t he acute c are hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry may be 
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evo l v i ng f rom ma t u r i t y  to decl i ne . As Medi care and other 
payers reduce payment l eve l s  because o f  BBA and managed 
c are , reimbursement l eve l s  for t hese grow t h  areas have been 
reduced . 
Unf ortuna t e l y ,  t he BBA has l i m i t e d  t he prof i t s  not only 
of the hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry ,  but o f  other , growt h - re l ated 
hea l t h  care i ndus t r i e s , such as outpa t i ent care , 
rehab i l i t a t i on s e rvi c e s , and l ong - term c are . Hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions a l so appear to b e  shi f t i ng to t he geographic 
areas where pro f i t s  can be i ncreased by domi nat i ng local  
marke t s . 
According t o  Y a f chak (20 0 0 ) , t he number o f  hospi t a l s  i n  
t he Uni t ed S t a t e s  dec l i ned 1 8 %  f rom 1 9 8 9  to  1 9 9 7 . Th i s  drop 
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was caused by increased compet i t ion and reduced pro f i t  
marg i ns . H i s  re search i dent i f i e s  f i ve f a c t ors t hat can 
f orce an i ndus t ry to consol i date : regu l a t o ry change , 
t echno l og i ca l  deve l opment , f l uctuat ions i n  f i nanc i a l  
marke t s ,  l eade rship and t en s i on between s c a l e  and 
s i mpl i f i c at ion . The se f a c t ors are seen i n  t he pas sage o f  
t he BBA , changes i n  t he use i n  t echno l ogy i ncreas i ng t he u s e  
o f  outpa t i ent s e rv i c e s , drops i n  t he cred i t  rat i ng o f  many 
i ndividual hosp i t a l s  and a t t empt s  to reach an economi cal l y  
e f f i c i ent l eve l o f  produc t i on a l l  have cont r i buted to 
conso l i dat i on in  t he hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry .  Hosp i t a l  
consol i dat i on i s  expec t ed to cont i nue at a rap i d  pace even 
as t he u . s .  Depa rtment of Jus t i ce l ooks more c l osely at t he 
ant i - t rust  i s sues i t  ra i se s . 
Summary of Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 i s  a review o f  pert i nent l i t e rature re l a t ed 
t o  t he present s t udy . The ma j or ca tegor i e s  o f  t he 
l i t erature revi ewed a re : recent t rends i n  hospi t a l  
acqu i s i t ions , t he Bal anced Budge t A c t  o f  1 9 9 7 , d i f f erences 
be tween me rgers and acqu i s i t ions , and hosp i t a l  conve r s i ons 
f rom not - fo r - pro f i t  ( NFP ) to  for -prof i t . T h i s  chapter a l so 
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revi ews emp i r i c a l  research t ha t  a s s i s t ed i n  t he deve l opment 
of t he s t udy . 
L i t erat ure on recent t rends i n  hospi t a l  acqu i s i t i on 
support s t he present s tudy by addre s s i ng hos p i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions i n  t he context o f  an incre a s i ngly comp l ex 
market . Thi s  l i t e rat ure f i nds t ha t  hosp i t a l s are 
i nc reas i ng l y  i nvol ved in acqu i s i t i ons due to  t he highly 
compe t i t ive market envi ronment . Hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on i s  
a l so r e l a t ed to ope ra t i ona l factors such a s  f ac i l i ty age and 
debt as we l l  as organi zat i onal f a c tors such as s i ze and f o r ­
pro f i t  ownershi p . 
The Bal anced Budget Act l i t e rature s hows t he i mpact on 
hosp i t a l s  of l eg i s l a t ive e f fort s to  reduce Medicare 
expend i t ures . The BBA l i t e rature sugge s t s  t hat hosp i t a l s  
are exper i e nc i ng l ower pro f i t  marg i n s  and reduced access  t o  
f i nanc i a l  capi t a l . Th i s  wi l l  a f f e c t  ma rket f a c t ors and 
organ i zat i ona l performance as we l l  a s  t he i r  a s soc i a t ion w i t h  
hospi t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
The l i t era ture on the di f f e renc e s  between merger and 
acqu i s i t i on d i s t i ng u i s he s  between t he s e  forms o f  
organi zat i ona l consol i dat i on . By under s t and i ng the 
advant ages and d i s advantages o f  each , t he s t udy is able to  
more e f f ec t ive l y  addre s s  i s sues r e l a t e d  t o  marke t 
compet i t ion and operat i ona l performance . 
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F i na l l y ,  t he hosp i t a l  conve r s i on l i t e rat ure highl ight s 
i s sues re l a t ed to not - fo r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s be i ng acqui red by 
for - pro f i t  hospi t a l s . The l i t e rat ure revea l s  that for ­
pro f i t  hosp i t a l s have an i nherent advant age acce s s i ng t he 
f i nanc i a l  marke t s  and may a f f e c t  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . 
The ma j or l im i t a t ion o f  t he l i t e rature revi ewed i s  t hat 
t here is no known mul t ivari a t e  s t udy that has examined t he 
assoc i at ion between hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and market f ac t ors 
or ope rat i ng perf ormance s ince t he BBA . The pre s ent s tudy 
i s  i nt ended to bu i l d on t he exi s t i ng l i t erature and a s s i s t  
i n  further unde r s t anding the impact o f  t he BBA o n  hosp i t a l  
acqui s i t i on .  
Chapter 3 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence t heory argue s that organ i z a t i onal 
survival depends on t he acqu i s i t ion of  necessary resources 
f rom the envi ronment . S i nce hosp i t a l s are open sys t ems , they 
a re subj e c t  to  the i n f l uence of  organi zat i ons out s i de the i r  
bounda r i e s  ( Levine and Whi t e ,  1 9 6 1 ;  P f e f f e r and S a l anc i k ,  
1 9 7 8 )  . I n  t h i s context , a key concern i s  l ocat i ng the 
boundar i e s  of  an organi z a t ion and bui l d i ng a s t ruct ure for 
boundi ng t ransac t i ons t hat wi l l  support act ivi t i e s  of  
vary i ng complexity and i nt e rdependence . The t heory sugge s t s  
that organ i zat ions manage i nt e rdependency b y  ba l anc i ng 
resources comp l ementary to t he i r  econom i c  needs ( R i chardson , 
1 9 72 ) . 
The l eve l of  re source scarc i ty wi l l  i n f l uence an 
organ i z a t i on ' s wi l l ingne s s  to  give up aut onomy . Accord i ng 
to Scot t ( 1 9 9 3 ) , organi zat iona l s t ruc ture f unc t i ons a s  a 
gove rnance system to manage t he exchange of  resourc e s . 
S i nce organi zat ions want to  cont rol t he i nput s  and output s 
ne c e s s a ry for survival , t hey t end to i ncrease gove rnance and 
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b r i ng t ransact ions f u l l y  w i t h i n  the i r  boundari e s . Faced 
w i t h  shortages o f  c r i t i ca l  re sources , organ i za t i ons w i l l  
increase coord i nat ion whi l e  a l so t rying t o  max i m i z e  
organ i z a t i ona l power and aut onomy . 
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The t heory s t a t e s  that an organi zat ion re sponds to the 
i n t e rac t i on between ext ernal re source requ i rement s and 
changes in the env i ronment . Acute care hosp i t a l s f ace a 
comp l ex and chang i ng env i ronment created by compe t i t i on , t he 
BBA ' s reduc t i ons i n  Med i c are reimbursement and increased HMO 
pene t ra t ion . Under these pre s sure s , many organi zat i ons 
c annot gene rate a l l  the resources nec e s sa ry to accomp l i sh 
t he i r  mi s s i on and so mus t  i nt eract w i t h  t he env i ronment to  
generate add i t i onal re sourc e s . The more i mport ant the 
re sources a re to  a hosp i t a l ' s  mi s s ion and t he gre a t e r  the i r  
s c a rc i t y ,  the more l i ke ly the hosp i t a l  i s  to  sacri f i ce 
autonomy to obt a i n  re sources ( Cook et  a l . ,  1 9 8 3 ; Al exander 
and Morri sey , 1 9 8 9 ) . S i nce organi zat ions de s i re to  rema i n  
aut onomous and a r e  reluctant to e n t e r  i nto i nt e r ­
organ i za t i ona l re l a t ionships , t hey mus t  care fu l l y  we igh the 
advantage s g a i ned through acqu i s i t ion aga i n s t  t he i r  l os s  o f  
i ndependence . 
Ac cord i ng to the viewpoint o f  re source dependency , to  
i mprove an acute care hosp i t al ' s  chances for surviva l , t he 
hosp i t a l  can t ry to dominate a market through i n t e r -
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organi zat i ona l re l a t i onships , whi ch w i l l  improve e f f i c iency , 
cont a i n  cos t s  and promote access to re sources ( Kogut , 1 9 9 1 ) 
Such r e l a t ionships provi de tang i b l e  re sources : pat ient s , 
t echnol ogy , personne l ,  and capi tal ; and intang i b l e  
re source s : reputat ion and managerial sk i l l s . Thus , 
cooperat ive r e l a t ionships are driven by t he need for 
s t rateg i c  resourc e s  and t he opportun i t i e s  to  obt a i n  t hem . 
I nt e r - organ i zat i ona l re l a t i onships a l so buf f e r  envi ronment a l  
uncerta inty and a l low f o r  future expans i on ( E i senhardt and 
Schoonhoven ,  1 9 9 6 ) . 
G iven that re source dependence theory presume s t hat 
organi zat i ons seek an opt i mum f i t  with t he envi ronment , i t  
i s  rea sonabl e  to  expec t  that a n  envi ronment characteri zed by 
high uncert a i nty coul d  resu l t  in chang i ng i nt e r -
organ i zat i ona l re l a t i onships . The hosp i t a l  i ndus t ry ,  f a c i ng 
a dynami c and chang i ng envi ronment , mus t  cont i nua l l y  bal ance 
i nt e rna l organ i z a t i ona l f a c t ors w i t h  the requ i rements for 
ext e rna l re sources . 
Corporate Financial Theory 
Corpora t e  f i nanc i a l  t heory i dent i f i e s  several 
mot iva t i ng f a c t ors that wou l d  cause one organi z at i on to 
acqu i re another : i ne f f i c ient management t heory , s t rengthened 
4 1  
marke t pos i t ion , e conomi es o f  s c a l e , i nf orma t ion t heor i e s , 
agency probl ems , reduced dependence on one bus iness segment , 
i nve stment o f  exc e s s  c a s h ,  and t ax cons i derat ions 
and We s t on , 1 9 8 8 ; Ll oyd , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
( Cope l and 
Hea l t h  c are acqu i s i t i on l i t e ra ture sugge s t s  that 
management i ne f f i c i ency , market powe r ,  and economies o f  
s c a l e  may t hems e l ve s  l ead t o  hospi t a l  acqu i s i t i ons ( McCue , 
1 9 8 6 ; Al exande r and Morri sey , 1 9 8 8 ; Bogue e t  al . ,  1 9 9 5 ) . 
Thi s  was further supported i n  research by Ba z zol i and Ande s ,  
( 1 9 9 5 ) , whi c h  a l so f ound t hat hea l t h  syst ems seek to acqu i re 
hosp i t a l s t ha t  need management enhancement and i mprovement s 
i n  ope ra t i ng e f f i c i ency . 
Management Inefficiency 
As d i s cussed by Scot t ( 1 9 9 3 ) , he ight ened compe t i t ion , 
comp l ex regu l atory requi rement s and addi t i ona l f i scal  
cont ro l s  have forced management s t a f f  to  deve l op spe c i a l i zed 
knowl edge . Accord i ng t o  Cope l and and We s t on ( 1 9 8 8 ) , 
organ i za t i ons need t o  compete for the be s t  manage r i a l  t a l ent 
and growt h through acqu i s i t ion re su l t s  in broader 
re spons i b i l i t i e s . Fa i l ure to ma i nt a i n  a cont i nued i n f l ow o f  
abl e execut ives i s  l i ke l y  to re sul t i n  reduced opera t i ng 
e f f i c i ency and a decl i ne i n  organi zat i ona l value . 
Management i ne f f i c i ency assumes t hat manager i a l  
performance i s  not opt i mal  and that management of  t he 
acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l  i s  operat i ng more e f f i c i ent ly t han t he 
acqu i red hospi t a l . Thus , by purcha s i ng t he acqui red 
hosp i t a l  t he management of  t he acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l  can ra i se 
t he e f f i c i ency o f  t he acqui red hosp i t a l  ( Ermann and Gabe l , 
1 9 8 4 ) . Hos p i t a l  research supported t h i s  t heory and found 
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t hat mul t i - hosp i t a l s  syst ems were purcha s i ng i ne f f i c i ent 
hosp i t a l s  ( McCue , 1 9 8 6 ; McCue , 1 9 8 8 ; Al exander and Morri sey , 
1 9 8 8 )  . 
Other f i nanc i a l  d i s t re s s  s t ud i e s  have found that 
i ne f f i c i ent hosp i t a l s  seek acqu i s i t ion by a f i nanc i a l l y  
s t ronger hosp i t a l  i n  order to ma i n t a i n  t he i r  operat i ons . The 
i nab i l i ty to be acqu i red by another hosp i t a l may cause t he s e  
f ac i l i t i es  to  rema i n  i ndependent t hrough bankruptcy 
prot ect ion , or  t o  cease operat i ons ( Cameron , Kim and 
Whe t t en ,  1 9 8 7 ; Ba z zo l i  and C l eve r l y ,  1 9 9 4 ) . Research s hows 
that hosp i t a l s  i nvo lved in acqu i s i t ions or mergers have 
i mproved product iv i ty and have more f avorabl e  indi cators o f  
f i nanc i a l  per formance . 
W i t h  t he i nc reased economi c powe r created t hrough 
acqu i s i t ion , t he acqui red hosp i t a l  i s  ab l e  to fund 
replacement f ac i l i t i es  ( C l eve r l ey , 1 9 8 1 ; Levi t z ,  1 9 8 5 ; 
Fri edman and Short e l l ,  1 9 8 8 ) . A repl acement f ac i l i t y  
provides t echnol ogy f or new c l i n i c a l  servi ces , enhance s t he 
organi za t i on ' s  image , and enab l e s  improvement s i n  
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opera t i ona l e f f i c i ency . The se bene f i t s  may be o f f se t  by t he 
cost o f  new debt to  f i nance t he acqu i s i t i on and by t he r i s k  
a s soc i at ed w i t h  i nc reased f i nanc i a l  l eve rage ( Coyne , 1 9 8 3 ) 
Research on f i nanc i a l l y  d i s t re s sed hospi t a l s  has f ound 
negat ive c a s h  f l ows , l ower occupancy rate s ,  h igher l eve l s  o f  
debt and nega t ive pro f i t ab i l i ty ( R i z zo ,  1 9 9 0 ; McCue , 1 9 9 1 ;  
Harma t t a  and Bogue , 1 9 9 7 ) . I n  add i t ion , f inanc i a l l y  
d i s t re s sed hosp i t a l s  a re more highly l everaged , and have 
o l de r  phys i c a l  p l ant s and s igni f i cant l y  h igher rates o f  
acqui s i t ion and hospi t a l  c l o s i ngs ( Ba z zol i and Andes , 1 9 9 5 )  
M arket Power 
The acqu i s i t i on of a f i rm i mp l i e s  i ncreased s i ze ,  
i ncreased marke t powe r and some e l ement s o f  monopol y  cont rol 
( Cope l and and W e s t on , 1 9 8 8 ) . Hosp i t a l  organi zat ions s t r ive 
to i mp rove t he i r  pro f i t s  through not only greater e f f i c i ency 
but a l so increased market share . The key to t h i s  proc e s s  i s  
spreading t he f ixed cos t s  o f  p l ant and equipment ove r l arger 
product i on vo l ume s . Thi s  i s  done by acqu i r i ng fac i l i t i e s  to  
ent er new marke t s  or shi f t i ng product ion to a s i ng l e  
locat i on ( Dranove , 1 9 9 8 ; Gro s sman , 2 0 0 0 ) . According to 
Ki rchhe i me r  ( 2 0 0 1 ) , f o r - p ro f i t  cha i ns acqu i re hospi t a l s  i n  
areas o f  popu l a t ion growth and t hen focus o n  incre a s i ng 
market s hare . 
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Accord i ng to Al exande r & Morr i s ey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , mu l t i ­
hosp i t a l  syst ems acqu i re hospi t a l s  i n  order t o  add spe c i a l ty 
phys i c i ans , expand pat i ent ne tworks , i nc rease service area 
and s t reng t hen marke t share . They found that syst ems pre fe r  
to  acqu i re hosp i t a l s  i n  s t rong market s  w i t h  a growi ng 
popu l a t ion , high per c api t a  i ncome , and l ow Medi care 
popu l a t i ons . I n  t hose s i tuat i ons where cont rol o f  the 
hosp i t a l  market or l oc a t i on is not c r i t i cal , management 
cont ract s can control i nt erna l fac tors , such as s t a f f i ng ,  
p r i c i ng ,  col l e c t ions and management . There f ore , hosp i t a l  
management companies wou l d  t a rge t  hospi t a l s  w i t h  dominant 
market s  po s i t i ons and s t rong paye r mix but poor management . 
As d i scussed by E i senhardt and Schoonhoven ( 1 9 9 6 ) , f i rms 
promi nent in t he l ocal  market enj oy high s t atus and 
repu t a t i on ,  wh i c h  i ncrease t he i r  va l ue as an acqu i s i t i on .  
Th i s  t heory suppor t s  why sys tems woul d  t arget hospi t a l s  
that a r e  not i n  marke t s  w i t h  h i g h  HMO pene t ra t i on . S i nce 
HMO ' s a re ma j or purcha sers of hosp i t a l  servi ces due to t he 
f l ow o f  premium dol l ars , t hey a f f e c t  hospi t a l  compe t i t ion i n  
many market s .  As di scussed by W e i n i c k  and Cohen , ( 2 0 0 0 ) ,  
HMO Pene t ra t i on has a f f e c t e d  hosp i t a l  ut i l i za t i on by 
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res t r i c t i ng hosp i t a l  use a s  a me t hod o f  reduc i ng cos t s  and 
keepi ng premiums compet i t ive . The i r  research documented 
f ewer hosp i t a l  adm i s s ions and shorter l engt h  of s t ays for 
individua l s  enro l l e d  i n  managed care p l ans . Research shows 
reduced hosp i t a l  pro f i t ab i l i t y i n  marke t s  chara c t e r i zed by 
high numbe r  o f  HMOs ( Who l ey ,  Fe l dman , and Chr i s t i ansen , 
1 9 9 5 )  . 
Marke t s  w i t h  h igh numb e r  o f  HMOs reduce hea l t h  care 
premiums by pre s s i ng prov i ders for d i s count s .  The se p r i c i ng 
d i s count s t hen become a s t i mulus for organi zat i ona l c hange 
l eading to gre a t e r  marke t i ng powe r t hrough conso l i dat ion ,  
geograph i c  expans i on and d i vers i f i cat i on ( G i nsburg e t  a l . ,  
2 0 0 0 ) . Al so , hosp i t a l s  may sponsor an HMO organ i za t ion to 
comp e t e  f o r  pat i ent vo l ume and to control t he premium dol l a r  
( McCue , 2 0 0 0 a ) . The barga i n i ng power o f  hosp i t a l s  i s  dr i ven 
by t he l eve l o f  exc e s s  c apac i ty and hosp i t a l  compe t i t ion in 
t he l oc a l  ma rket re l a t i ve t o  a high number o f  HMOs 
( Gros sman , 2 0 0 0 ) . 
A h ighly compet i t ive ma rket increases t he vul nerab i l i t y  
o f  t he f i rm ' s s t ra t eg i c  pos i t i on b y  reduc i ng marg ins and 
maki ng product d i f f e rent i a t ion more d i f f i c u l t  ( Burns et al . ,  
2 0 0 0 )  . As a resul t ,  f i rms engage i n  coope rat i ve act i v i ty to 
reduce cost s ,  share r i sks and deve l op produc t s  a s  market 
compe t i t i on i ncrease s .  Those f i rms mos t  promi nent i n  l ocal  
market s  are more l i ke l y  to enj oy high s t atus and reput at ion 
t hus incre a s i ng t he i r  va l ue as potent i a l  partners 
( E i senhardt and Schoonhoven , 1 9 9 6 ; Gros sman , 2 0 0 0 )  Le s s  
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promi nent f i rms are f requent ly acqu i red and t he i r  acut e c are 
f unc t i ons a re red i re c t ed to other sub - acute f unct i ons . Thi s  
rest ruc t u r i ng a l l ows f o r  hori zont a l  growth spanni ng l arger 
geographi c areas ( Bogue e t . al . ,  1 9 9 5 ) . 
Economies of Scale 
The number o f  acute care hospi t a l s  i n  the Uni t ed S t a t e s  
dec l i ned 1 8  percent f rom 1 9 8 9  to 1 9 9 7 . For - pro f i t  chains 
keep acqu i r i ng and conso l idat i ng hosp i t a l s  i n  order to 
create opera t i ng e f f i c i en c i e s  and s t reng t hen managed care 
cont rac t i ng ( Y a f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . 
Acqu i s i t i ons can prov i de economies o f  s c a l e  by 
concent rat i ng produc t ive a s s e t s  and reduc i ng admi n i s t ra t ive 
overhead and the cost of cap i t a l . I ncreased marke t share , 
c aused by acqu i s i t ion , a l so reduces operat i ng cos t s  and 
i mprove brand awarene s s  among consumers ( S t a rkweather , 1 9 8 1 ; 
E rmann and Gabe l , 1 9 8 4 ) . Accord i ng to Bogue e t  a l . ( 1 9 9 5 ) , 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on l eads to  a reduct ion i n  c l i ni c a l  
s e rv i c e s  at t he acqu i red f ac i l i ty .  Thi s  reduc t i on i n  
serv i c e s  a l l ows for greater opera t i ng e f f i c i enc i e s , 
consol i da t ion o f  serv i c e s  and i mproved f inanc i a l  cond i t i on . 
Cope l and and We ston ( 1 9 8 8 )  po int out t hat a hosp i t a l 
woul d  be acqu i red because i t  l acks economies o f  s c a l e  i n  
such areas a s  ma rket i ng ,  f i nance o r  s t rategic p l ann i ng . 
Acqu i s i t i on a l l ows for more e f f i c i ent f l ow o f  i n f ormat i on 
and i mproved met hods o f  conduc t i ng t ransa c t i ons . I t  a l so 
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provides add i t i onal management s ki l l s  to augment i t s  present 
capab i l i t i e s . There fore , one wou l d  expec t  sma l l e r  hosp i t al s 
t hat l ac k  t he s e  department s to  have a gre a t e r  l i k e l i hood o f  
b e i ng acqu i re d . 
Accord i ng t o  Copel and and We s t on ( 1 9 8 8 ) , the cost o f  
cap i t a l  and organi za t i ona l s t ru c t ure o f  t he f i rm are l inked . 
I n  t he a rea o f  cap i t a l  f i nanc i ng ,  economi es o f  s c a l e  c an be 
achieved by i s s u i ng gre a t e r  amount s o f  debt and equ i ty . 
F inanc i a l  syne rgy resul t s  f rom a sma l l e r  percentage o f  
f l ot a t i on cos t s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  l a rger bond i s sues and a 
l ower cost o f  cap i t a l  due to  reduced r i sk o f  bankrup t cy . By 
acqu i r i ng the t a rget hospi t a l , t he acqu i r i ng organ i zat i on 
wi l l  i ncrease i t s  a s s e t  s i ze ,  t hus a l lowing access  t o  
greater amount s o f  debt and equ i t y . As a resul t ,  t he 
acqu i red hosp i t a l  can bene f i t  f rom a gre a t e r  access  t o  
capi t a l  a t  a reduced cost . 
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Corporate f i nanc i a l  t heory empha s i ze s  t he i mport ance of 
acqu i s i t i ons re su l t i ng i n  gre a t e r  s i ze ,  i nc reased marke t 
s hare and i mproved opera t iona l e f f i c iency (Andrews , 1 9 7 1 ;  
Yaf chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . The t heory a l so s t re s s e s  t hat t he s t ronger 
a f i rm ' s  compe t i t i on i s , t he more it mus t  enhance i t s  
management s ki l l s  and bus i nes s  s t rengths . A s  a re su l t , a 
f i rm / s s t ra t e g i c  a c t ion i s  t he out come o f  mat c h i ng i t s  
exi s t i ng compet ence and t he ava i l ab i l i ty o f  new 
opportun i t i e s . The l ac k  o f  comp e t ence may prope l a f i rm 
into new a l l i ances ( Andrews , 1 9 7 1 ) . Organ i zat i ons w i t h  
i ne f f i c i ent management and poor ope ra t i ng performance are 
more l i k e l y  t o  be acqu i red ( Mc Cue , 1 9 8 8 ) . Thus corpora t e  
re s t ructuring i s  o f ten a mec hani sm f o r  weak organ i za t i ons to  
survive i n  a highly compe t i t ive envi ronment . Theore t i ca l l y ,  
i ncreas i ng i t s  s i ze through acqu i s i t i on shou l d  enabl e  an 
organi zat ion to increase produc t i v i t y  by coord i na t i ng 
a c t i v i t i e s , spec i a l i z i ng serv i c e s  and improvi ng ope ra t i ng 
e f f i c i ency ( Zuckerman , 1 9 7 9 ;  Copel and and We s t on , 1 9 8 8 ; 
Dranove and Shanl ey , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
For organ i za t i ons i n  f i nanc i al d i s t re s s , corporate 
f i nanc i a l  t heory i dent i f i e s  t he s e  opt ions : seek acqu i s i t i on 
by a f i nanc i a l l y  s t ronger organ i z a t i on ,  rema i n  i ndependent 
t hrough bankrup t cy pro t e c t ion , or  cease opera t i ons ( Came ron , 
Kim and Whe t t e n , 1 9 8 7 ; Ba z z o l i and C l everly , 1 9 9 4 ) . Among 
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these a l t erna t ives , acqu i s i t i on by a more f i nanc i a l l y  secure 
organ i z a t i on i s  pre f e rred . Research shows that hosp i t a l s 
i nvo lved i n  acqu i s i t i ons or me rge rs have i mproved 
product iv i t y  and have more f avorable i nd i cators of f i nanc i a l 
performance . W i t h  the i ncreased econom i c  power , t hey have 
been be t t e r  able to f und rep l acement f ac i l i t i e s  ( C l eve rley , 
1 9 8 1 ; Lev i t z ,  1 9 8 5 ; F r i e dman and Short e l l ,  1 9 8 8 )  
Rep l a cement f a c i l i t i e s  provi de t echnol ogy for new 
c l i n i c a l  servi ce s ,  enhance t he organ i zat i on ' s image , and 
enab l e  i mprovemen t s  in opera t i ona l e f f i c i ency . The se 
bene f i t s  may be o f f s e t  by the cost o f  new debt to  f i nance 
t he acqu i s i t ion and by t he r i s k  associated w i t h  i nc reased 
f i nanc i a l  l everage ( Coyne , 1 9 8 3 ) . 
Hospital Organizations and Profitability 
Accord i ng to C l eve rly ( 1 9 9 5 ) , a f i nanc i a l l y  succ e s s f u l  
organi zat ion i s  one t h a t  c a n  gene rate t he resources needed 
to mee t  i t s  m i s s i on . Re source s  can be f i nanced t hrough 
e i t her debt or equ i t y , and a succe s s f ul organ i zat i on mus t  be 
abl e  to gene ra t e  f unds through bot h . S i nce not - fo r - pro f i t  
hosp i t a l ' s  primary sources o f  equ i ty f unding a re net i ncome 
and cont r i but ions , t hey are e spec i a l l y  vu l nerab l e  to reduced 
opera t i ng margins . 
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As hosp i t a l  organ i za t i ons deal w i t h  the l ower 
r e i mbursement rat e s  under BBA and t he c hang i ng pat t e rns of 
prac t i ce ,  t hey are f orced to i n t e ract w i t h  t he envi ronment 
to obt a i n t he resources for surviva l . From an i nd i v i dua l 
hosp i t a l  perspect ive , such re sources are pat i e nt s ,  
phys i c i ans , hea l t h  care t echno l ogy , and f i nanc i a l  capi tal . 
The analys i s  o f  f i nanc i a l  pe r formance data f rom i ndividua l 
hosp i t a l s  and hea l t h  care sys t ems i s  we l l  supported i n  t he 
l i t erat ure ( Levi t z  and Brooke , 1 9 8 5 ; McCue and Lynch ,  1 9 8 7 )  
Research on f i nanc i a l l y d i s t re s sed hosp i t a l s  has found 
nega t ive cash f l ows , l ower occupancy rat e s , h igher leve l s  o f  
debt and negat ive pro f i tabi l i ty ( R i z zo ,  1 9 9 0 ; McCue , 1 9 9 1 ; 
Harma t t a  and Bogue , 1 9 9 7 ) . I n  add i t ion , f i nanc i a l ly 
d i s t re s sed hospi t a l s  are more h ighly l eve raged , and have 
o l de r  phys i c a l  p l ant s and s i gni f i cant ly h igher ra t e s  of 
acqu i s i t i on and hosp i t a l  c l os i ngs ( B a z zo l i  and Andes , 1 9 9 5 )  
Be tween 1 9 8 0  and 1 9 9 0 , 5 5 8  hosp i t a l s ,  o r  1 0  percent o f  
U . S .  hosp i t a l s ,  c l osed . Factors such as dec l i n i ng f i nanc i a l  
performance , l ow occupancy rat e s , and poor paye r m i x  l ed to  
bankrup t cy and hosp i t a l  c l o s i ngs . Mos t  bankrupt hosp i t a l s  
had negat ive equ i t y pos i t i ons and ag i ng phys i c a l  pl ant s that 
t hey cou l d  not renova t e  because t hey l ac ked c ap i t a l  ( Ba z zol i 
and C l eve r l ey , 1 9 94 ) . Wi l l i ams , Had l ey and Petteng i l l  
( 1 9 9 2 ) , i n  t he i r  mode l o f  hosp i t a l  c l o s i ngs and prof i t s , 
f ound t hat hosp i t a l s  w i t h  poor f i nanc i a l  performance were 
more l i ke ly to c l o s e . 
I n  1 9 9 7 , 3 8  acute care hosp i t a l s c l osed , an i nc rease 
ove r t he previous two years . Ninety percent o f  t he 
hospi t a l s  t hat c l osed had f ewer beds t han the nat i onal 
ave rage of 154 . I n  add i t i on , occupancy rat e s  for c l osed 
hosp i t a l s were we l l  be l ow t he nat i ona l ave rage . The 
research s howed t ha t  hosp i t a l s c l osed because of dec l i ni ng 
occupancy , reduced revenue s and ri s i ng cos t s  ( Department o f  
Hea l t h  and Human S ervi ces , 1 9 9 9 ) . Rural hosp i t a l s  a l so 
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experienced a high rate o f  acqu i s i t ion and c l o s i ng due t o  
t he i r  sma l l  s i ze ,  l ow occupancy , l e s s - int ens ive serv i c e  mix 
and weak l ocal  e conomi e s  ( Harmata and Bogue , 1 9 9 7 ) . The 
weakening of any one f actor may beg i n  a cha i n  rea c t i on 
l eading to acqu i s i t i on or c l o s i ng . 
Hosp i t a l s  t ha t  survived f ive yea r s  o f  f i nanc i a l  losses 
w i t hout c l os i ng underwent ma j or f i nanc i a l  and organ i zat iona l 
re s t ructuring . The se f i nanc i a l l y  d i s t re s sed hosp i t a l s  we re 
sma l l e r , had h i gher un i t  cost s ,  l ower occupancy rat es , o l der 
f ac i l i t i e s , and l ower cap i t a l  i nve s tment . Many d i s t re s sed 
hosp i t a l s were acqu i red ; t hus poor f i nanc i a l  pe r formance i s  
corre l at ed w i t h  both acqu i s i t ions and c l o s i ngs ( Du f fy and 
Fri edman , 1 9 9 3 ; Baz zol i and C l eve r l ey , 1 9 9 4 ) . 
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In add i t ion , hosp i t a l s w i t h  negat i ve pro f i t  marg i n s  a re 
l e s s  t e chno l og i c a l l y  advanced and i nve s t  l e s s  i n  med i c a l  
t echnol ogy or t he i r  phys i c a l  p l ant s ( Du f fy and Fri edman , 
1 9 9 3 ) . F i nanc i a l  ana l ys t s  conc l ude t ha t  hosp i t a l s  need 
pro f i t s  of at l ea s t  5% to  fund i nves t ment s in new t ec hno l ogy 
and c ap i t a l  proj e c t s  ( Jaklevi c ,  2 0 0 1 ) . As s hown i n  t ab l e  3 ,  
overa l l  hos p i t a l  prof i t abi l i ty was 4 . 3 % i n  1 9 9 8  and 2 . 8 % i n  
1 9 9 9 , s t i l l  we l l  be l ow t he 5 percent t hre s ho l d  nec e s sary t o  
support re - i nve s t ment . 
Table 3: Selected Hospital Data 
Year 1 9 9 4  1 9 9 5  1 9 9 6  1 9 9 7  1 9 9 8  1 9 9 9  -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Number of  5 , 3 2 1  5 ,  l l O  4 , 8 5 2  5 , 0 9 3  4 , 8 2 4  4 , 7 5 5  Hosp i t a l s *  
Occupancy* 4 5 . 4 % 4 5 . 1 % 4 3 . 8 % 4 2 . 8 % 4 1 . 8 % 4 2 . 6 % 
For - Pro f i t  
Hosp i t a l s  by 1 2 . 7 % 1 2 . 9 % 1 2 . 7 % 1 2 . 8 % 1 2 . 9 % 1 2 . 5 % 
Percent * 
Ave rage 
Leng t h  o f  6 . 0  5 . 7  5 . 5  5 . 3  5 . 3  5 . 2 
S t ay* 
Pro f i t  5 . 0 % 5 . 8 % 6 . 1 % 5 . 9 % 4 . 3 %  2 . 8 % Marg i n * * 
* Da t a  app l i ed to acute care gene ral hosp i t a l s  and were drawn 
f rom Ame r i can Hosp i t a l  Assoc i at ion 
* * Source : MedPAC ana l ys i s  o f  Med i care Case Report dat a  f rom 
HCFA 
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Hospi t a l  organ i zat i ons s t rive to i mprove t he i r  pro f i t s  
through grea t e r  e f f i c i ency and i ncreased market s ha re . Thi s  
i nvolves spreadi ng t he f i xed c o s t s  o f  pl ant and equ ipment 
over l a rger product i on vo l ume s ( Dranove , 1 9 9 8 ; Gros sman , 
2 0 0 0 )  . T h i s  i s  done by acqu i r i ng f ac i l i t i e s  and s h i f t i ng 
produc t i on t o  a s ingl e  l oc a t i on . S t a rkwe a t her ( 1 9 8 1 )  c l a ims 
that acqu i s i t i ons c an prov i de economies of s c a l e  by 
concent rat i ng produc t i ve a s se t s ,  reduc i ng admin i s t ra t ive 
overhead , and l owe r i ng t he cost of cap i t a l . The resul t i ng 
i ncreased market share may a l so reduce operat i ng cos t s  and 
i mprove brand awarenes s  among consumers . 
Marmor , Schl e s i nge r , and Smi t hey ( 1 9 8 6 )  f ound that 
a l t hough for - pro f i t  hospi t a l s have da i l y expens e s  t ha t  are 
s imi l a r  t o ,  or even higher t han t hose o f  not - f or - pro f i t  
hosp i t a l s ,  t hey a l so have s hor t e r  l engt hs o f  s t ay ,  and 
t herefore g a i n  more revenue per pat ient . Research by 
S i lverman ( 1 9 9 9 )  a l so f ound that Medicare spend i ng was 
h igher in marke t s  dominated by f or - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . 
Med i c are spend i ng rose rap i d l y  i n  market s  where hosp i t a l s  
conve rted t o  f o r - p ro f i t  s t a tus , whi c h  cont r i buted t o  
i mproved hosp i t a l  f i nanc i a l  performance fol l ow i ng 
acqu i s i t i on . 
De sp i t e  d i re pred i c t i ons about t he BBA , t e a c h i ng 
hosp i t a l s  have s i nce pe r f ormed we l l  f i nanc i a l l y .  I n  1 9 9 7 , 
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Med i c a re payment s f or med i c a l  educat i on prov i ded $ 6 . 8  
b i l l ion i n  add i t iona l f und i ng to teaching hosp i t a l s 
( Anderson , 1 9 9 9 ) . The se payment s have a l l owed t eaching 
hospi t a l s  to  ma i nt a i n  higher opera t i ng marg ins t han t hose at 
non - t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s . I n  addi t i on , many s t a t e s  have 
provi ded DSH f undi ng to cover t he high cost  o f  i nd igent 
care . Wh i l e  t e a c h i ng hosp i t a l s had highe r pro f i t s  and more 
cash on hand t han non - t eaching hosp i t a l s  d i d , t hey a l so had 
more l ong - t e rm debt and more a s s e t s  per bed ( Ande rson , 
1 9 9 9 )  . Fortuna t e l y ,  Med i c a re and Med i c a i d  have been a 
s t able source o f  fund i ng t hat has a l l owed t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s 
t o  ma i n t a i n  f inanc i a l  hea l t h  and good a c c e s s  t o  t he cap i t a l  
marke t s . As a resul t ,  teaching hospi t a l s  have not been 
a f f e c t ed a s  drast i c a l l y  as non - t eaching hospi t a l s . 
Cred i t  rat i ng agenc i e s  v i ew hospi t a l  syst ems as more 
f i nanc i a l l y  sound t han i nd i v i dual hosp i t a l s ,  because hea l t h  
syst ems are more a b l e  to  acqu i re debt f i nanc i ng i n  the 
capi t a l  marke t s . As a re sul t ,  individual hosp i t a l s acqu i red 
by a mul t i  hosp i t a l  hea l t h  system can more e f f e c t ive ly 
l everage t he i r  assets  ( Levi t z ,  1 9 8 5 ) . As d i s cussed by Coyne 
( 1 9 8 3 ) , f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  use such f i nanc i a l  l everage 
more aggre s s ive l y  and therefore t hey have higher ret urns on 
equ i ty and h igher pro f i t  marg ins t han not - fo r - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l s  do . 
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Acquisitions in Corporate Finance 
The cont emporary hosp i t a l  i ndu s t ry c l early i s  conducted 
a s  an econom i c  a c t i v i t y ;  howeve r ,  it  cont i nues to  be vi ewed 
as a soc i a l  s e rvi c e . Th i s  d i chotomy i s  evident i n  both 
f edera l and s t a t e  regu l a t i ons a f f ec t i ng hos p i t a l  
acqui s i t i ons . 
As Wh i t e s e l l and Whi t e se l l  ( 1 9 9 5 )  exp l a i n , f edera l 
ant i t rust  regu l a t i on o f  acqu i s i t i ons i s  based upon Sect ion 1 
o f  t he Sherman Ac t . Thi s proh i b i t s  contrac t s ,  comb i nat i ons 
and consp i ra c i e s  in re s t ra i nt of t rade . S e c t ion 7 o f  t he 
C l ayton Act , a l so prohi b i t s  acqu i s i t i ons t ha t  may 
subs t ant i a l l y l e s s e n  compe t i t ion or create a monopol y . 
Trad i t i ona l f edera l ant i t rust  enforcement re l i e s  on a 
compe t i t ive marke t p l ace to  produce opt ima l prices . I n  1 9 8 2  
and 1 9 8 4 , t h e  Department o f  Jus t i ce announced new merger 
gui de l ines and adopted t he He r f i ndahl I ndex as a mea sure o f  
market concent rat ion . The use o f  t h i s  mea sure shows gre a t e r  
concern about t he high market share o f  one or more f i rms and 
h i gh ma rket concent ra t i on l eading to monopol i s t i c  returns 
( Cope l and and We s t on , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Al t hough re searc h  has not shown t hat i nc reased s i ze 
corre l a t e s  w i t h  i mp roved e f f i c i ency i n  t he hospi t a l  i ndus t ry 
( C l ement e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) , t here i s  an i mpre s s i on among 
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regul ators t ha t  i nc reased s i ze doe s enhance e f f i c i ency . 
Hence the pos s ib l e  exi s t ence o f  econom i e s  o f  s c a l e  i n  t he 
hospi t a l  i ndus t ry has been an e f f e c t i ve de fense for 
expand i ng hos p i t a l  syst ems i n  cases concern i ng acqu i s i t i ons . 
Moreove r ,  i f  an acqu i red hosp i t a l  i s  i n  f i nanc i a l  d i s t re s s , 
t he f a i l i ng f i rm d e f ense can be pre sented a s  a re sponse to 
a l l egat i ons o f  compe t i t ive harm created by an acqu i s i t ion . 
I n  1 9 9 2 , t he Department o f  Jus t i c e  publ i shed further 
gu i de l ines on hosp i t a l acqu i s i t i ons and set  forth " sa f ety 
zone s "  o f  pre suma b l e  approva l . Chi e f  among t he s a f e t y  zones 
were acqu i s i t i ons i nvo l v i ng hospi t a l s  w i t h  f ewer t han 1 0 0  
beds and an average i npa t i ent census be l ow 4 0  ( Ba z zol i ,  
1 9 9 5 ; Bogue , 1 9 9 5 ; De l o i t t e  and Touche , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
S t a t e  regu l a t ors have been concerned w i t h  t he l o s s  o f  
publ i c  bene f i t  when f o r - p ro f i t - chains acqu i re not - f o r - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l s . The Ame r i can Hosp i t a l  Assoc i a t ion t akes t he 
pos i t i on t ha t  hosp i t a l s  s hou l d  col l abora t e  in ways that w i l l  
reduce cos t s  and i mprove re source a l locat i on yet ma i n t a i n  
h i g h  qua l i ty hosp i t a l  serv i ces . The Assoc i at i on i n c l udes 
hospi t a l  acqu i s i t ion among t hose ways , a s  we l l  a s  other 
met hods o f  hosp i t a l  conso l i da t ion . 
Hosp i t a l  organ i za t i ons , l i ke o t he r  i ns t i tut ions , react 
to  t he envi ronme n t s  i n  whi c h  t hey opera t e . I n  t he 1 9 8 0 s , 
t he hea l t h  care envi ronment had i nc reased pol i t i c a l  and 
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publ i c  pres sures to  cont a i n  cost s ,  as we l l  as to cove r the 
uni nsured and i mprove the qua l i ty o f  care . The se pre s s ures 
c reated a great deal o f  unc e r t a i nty and turbul ence for 
hea l t h  care providers . 
Dur i ng t h i s  peri od , t he hea l t h  care l i t e ra t ure f ocused 
on e f f i c i ency a s  a rea son f or hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons 
(Al exander and Morr i sey , 1 9 8 7 ; Ermann and Gabe l , 1 9 8 4 ) 
The i r  s tu d i e s  found that a c c e s s  t o  admi n i s t rat ive s t a f f ,  
re f e rral networks , and l ow cost  cap i t a l  were key to 
succe s s f u l  f i nanc i a l  performance . Accord i ng t o  Al exander et  
a l . ( 1 9 8 5 ) , hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons are based on a care fu l  
ana l ys i s  o f  t he l o c a l  marke t cond i t i ons and t he pre sence o f  
unfavorabl e  ma rke t f a c t o r s  f requent ly resu l t s  i n  a dec i s i on 
not to  acqu i r e  the hosp i t a l . 
From 1 9 8 9  to 1 9 9 7 , hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions increased 
under the pres sures o f  l ower reimbursement s ,  reduced 
ut i l i zat ion and shi f t s  toward ambulatory care . The average 
l engt h  of s t ay dur i ng that period dropped f rom 6 . 4 days to 
5 . 3  days , and hosp i t a l  occupancy rates dropped f rom 4 8  
percent t o  4 2  percent ( Y a f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . Research showed that 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on l eads to  l ower prices and cost 
increase s , and that it put s  more pres sure on t hose hosp i t a l s  
t ha t  rema i n  unal igned ( Lynk , 1 9 9 5 ; Connor et  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . 
As s hown by We s t pha l , Gul a t i and Short e l l  ( 1 9 9 7 ) , 
merger s  and acqu i s i t i ons have encouraged i nnovat i on among 
hospi t a l s . The i r  research f ound that acqu i red hosp i t a l s  
deve l op new programs , i mprove int ernal pro c e s s e s  and adopt 
new med i c a l  t echnology . Thi s  mat c h  between acqu i s i t i on and 
the app l i ca t i on of techno l ogy i mproves e f f i c i ency in t he 
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provi s ion of heal t h  care . Other a reas o f  ga i n  i dent i f i ed by 
t he authors were s t a f f  t r a i n i ng , c l i n i c a l  e f f e c t ivene s s , 
best p rac t i ce s , and i nf orma t ion t echnol ogy . 
Accord i ng to P f e f f e r  & S a l anc i k  ( 1 9 7 8 ) , i n t e r ­
organi za t i ona l re l a t ionsh i ps make key resources ava i l ab l e  
whi l e  a l l ow i ng some autonomy . I n  addi t i on , acqu i s i t ion 
serve s a s  a met hod o f  reduc i ng compe t i t i on and expand i ng t he 
geograph i c  ba se o f  serv i c e  o f f e r i ngs . I f  managed correct ly , 
such re l a t ionships can i ncrease t he market powe r o f  
part i c ipat i ng hospi t a l s and t h u s  support t he i r  survival . 
Sma l l  rural hospi t a l s  are part i cu l a r l y  vul ne rab l e  to  
acqu i s i t ion and c l o s i ng w i t h  a 1 4 . 4  percent reduct ion i n  t he 
number o f  rural hosp i t a l s  between 1 9 8 0  and 1 9 9 0  versus only 
a 1 . 0 percent reduc t i on in urban hosp i t a l s  dur i ng t he same 
period ( Bogue , 1 9 9 5 ) . I n  add i t ion , sma l l  rural hosp i t a l s  
t ha t  have been acqui red have i nc reased e f f i c i ency and 
pro f i t ab i l i t y  ( S i nay , 1 9 9 8 ) . 
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Conceptual Model 
The concept ual model i s  a graphi c  repre s entat i on o f  t he 
s tudy and t e s t s  t he a s s o c i a t i on o f  market f a c t ors , 
operat iona l performance f ac t ors , and organi za t i onal fac tors 
a s  t hey re l a t e  to  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons . The s t udy w i l l  
a l so i nc l ude measurement o f  t he for-pro f i t  s t at u s  and not -
f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus subsequent to  acqu i s i t i on .  F igure 1 





R e l a t ionship t e s ted in s tudy 
- :  Re l a t ionship not t e s ted 
Organizational 
Factors 
Figure 1 .  Conceptual Mode l : The R e l a t i onship o f  Marke t 
Factors , Ope r a t i onal P e r f ormanc e  Fac t o r s  and 
Organ i z at ional Factors to Hosp i t a l  Ac qu i s i t i on 
60 
Hypotheses 
Th i s  s t udy pre sent s s i x  hypot he ses t o  eva l ua t e  the 
a s s o c i a t i on of  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions w i t h  market fac tors , 
ope ra t i ng performance fac tors , and organi zat i onal f actors . 
The mos t  l i ke l y  d e t e rm i nant of  a hospi t a l ' s  acqu i s i t i on i s  
i t s  overa l l  f i nanc i a l  performance . 
From a resource dependence perspe c t ive , t he 
i ndependence o f  a hosp i t a l  i s  threatene d  i f  i t  i s  not 
perform i ng f i nanc i a l l y to market s t andards . I n  addi t i on , 
corporate f i nanc i a l  t heory addre s s e s  i s sues re l at ed to 
i ne f f i c i ent management , gre a t e r  market powe r ,  and t he 
potent i a l  for achieving economies of  s c a l e . I n  s i tuat i ons 
when a hosp i t a l  is not genera t i ng the resources neces sary 
for organ i zat i ona l viabi l i t y ,  organ i za t i onal change i s  
l i ke l y  ( Ba z zo l i and C l eve r l y ,  1 9 9 4 ) . The s i tua t i on may l ead 
to acqu i s i t i on and a l o s s  o f  i ndependence ( Du f fy and 
Fri edman , 1 9 9 3 ; B a z zo l i and Andes , 1 9 9 5 ) . I n  addi t i on ,  
i ne f f i c i ent management t heory sugge s t s  that acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  may be opera t i ng i ne f f i c ient ly ( Cope l and and 
We s ton , 1 9 8 8 ) . Research shows that acqu i red hosp i t a l s  have 
a l ower occupancy rate and higher expens e s  ( McCue , 1 9 8 6 ; 
R i z z o ,  1 9 9 0 ; McCue , 1 9 9 1 ; Harma t t a  and Bogue , 1 9 9 7 ) . 
There fore , t he s tudy predi c t s  the fol l ow i ng : 
H1 :  G iven exi s t i ng market and organi zat ional fac tors , 
those hosp i t a l s  w i t h  poor operat ing pe rformance 
( l owe r ret urn on a s s e t s  and l ower occupancy rat e )  
a re more l i ke ly t o  be acqu i red t han other 
hospi t a l s . 
Accordi ng t o  corpora t e  f i nanc i a l  t heory , access to  
cap i t a l  i s  c r i t i ca l  t o  a hospi t a l ' s  survival including the 
repl acement o f  exi s t i ng pl ant and equ ipment and t he 
f i nanc i ng o f  new s e rvi c e s . The economi e s  o f  s c a l e  t heory 
woul d  propose t ha t  acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l s t arget f ac i l i t i e s  
that l ack t he cap i t a l  to  f i nance t he s e  cap i t a l  i nve s t ment s ,  
part i c u l a r l y  hosp i t a l s  t ha t  have a l im i t  on t he i r  debt 
capac i t y . S i nce a l a rge pe rcentage o f  exi s t i ng hospi t a l  
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beds were added w i t h  funds f rom t he H i l l - Burton A c t  o f  1 9 4 6 , 
i t  i s  ant i c ipated t hat t hey soon mus t  be repl aced . Hosp i t a l s 
wi l l  have to f und t he s e  cap i t a l  i mprovement s t hrough 
ope rat i ng resources or capi t a l  reserve s . I n  t h i s  s i tuat ion 
and f a c i ng reduced prof i t ab i l i ty part ly due to  t he BBA and 
t he incre a s i ng cost  of capi t a l , hospi t a l s  w i t h  ag i ng 
f ac i l i t i e s  a re more l i ke ly t han others to  be acqui red ( Ernst 
and Young , 1 9 9 9 ; Ki rchh e i me r , 2 0 0 1 a and 2 0 0 1 b )  . 
t he second hypo t he s i s  o f  t he s t udy i s : 
There fore , 
H2 a : Given exi s t i ng ma rke t and organi zat ional f a c t ors , 
t hose hosp i t a l s w i t h  l im i t e d  debt capac i t y  ( i . e  
higher debt pos i t ion)  are more l i ke ly to be 
acqui red t han other hospi t a l s . 
H2b : G i ven exi s t i ng ma rket and organ i z at ional fac tors , 
t ho s e  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  an ag i ng pl ant are more 
l i k e l y  to be acqui red t han other hospi t a l s . 
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The market power t heory w i t h i n  corporate f i nance i s  
another unde r l y i ng reason for acqu i r i ng a n  organi zat ion . 
From t he acqu i re r ' s  perspe c t ive , hosp i t a l s  may be purchased 
i n  marke t s  w i t h  dominant pos i t i ons in order to improve t he i r  
overa l l  ma rke t s t rengt h .  Accord i ng t o  Al exander & Morri sey 
( 1 9 8 8 )  mu l t i - hosp i t a l  syst ems a re acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l s  i n  
s t rong marke t s  w i t h  i ne f f e c t ive management . S i nce t he 
acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l  cannot d i re c t l y  con t ro l  external market 
fact ors o f : popu l a t i on ,  per cap i t a  i ncome , paye r mi x ,  and 
t he number of  HMOs ; it focuses on t he fol l owing l oc a l  
hospi t a l  a t t r i but e s : s t a f f i ng , p r i c i ng ,  and t he number o f  
servi ces . From the acqu i rer ' s  perspe c t ive , t he potent i a l  
for improvement i n  these management f a c tors may support a 
hosp i t a l ' s  acqu i s i t ion i n  s i tuat i ons where marke t f a c t ors 
are less de s i rab l e . 
Thus , t he t h i rd and fourt h hypo t he s e s  are as f o l l ows : 
H3 : Given ope ra t i ona l performance and organ i za t i onal 
factors , t hose hospi t a l s  l ocated i n  l e s s  
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compe t i t ive market s  ( high Her f i ndahl - Hi rs chman 
I ndex ) are more l i kely t han others to  be acqui red . 
H4 : G i ven operat ional performance and organi zat ional 
f ac t ors , t hose hosp i t a l s  located i n  marke t s  w i t h  
f ewer HMOs are more l ike l y  than others to  be 
a cqui red . 
Re source dependence t heory s t a t e s  that because 
organi za t ions pre f er to  rema i n  autonomous , t hey w i l l  mod i fy 
the i r  i n t e rna l cores b e f ore be i ng acqu i red . S i nce l a rge 
hosp i t a l s have more resources in t he i r  i n t e rna l core s , t hey 
can adapt more f l ex i b l y  to a chang i ng env i ronment . I t  
fol l ows that sma l l e r  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l im i t ed i n t e rna l cores 
are more l i ke ly to be acqu i red ( Needl eman et a l . ,  1 9 9 9 )  
A l so , the economy o f  s c a l e  t heory proposes that t he 
acqu i s i t i on o f  sma l l e r  hosp i t a l s may gene rate i nt ernal 
opera t i ng e f f i c i enc i e s . There f ore , t he study ' s f i f t h  
hypot he s i s  i s : 
Hs : G iven exi s t i ng ma rket f a c t ors and operat iona l 
performance , t hose hosp i t a l s  w i t h  f ewer beds and 
f ewer t o t a l  servi c e s  are more l i ke l y  t han others 
to  be acqu i red . 
The t heory o f  economi e s  o f  s c a l e  i n  t e rms o f  greater 
a c c e s s  to  cap i t al  may be an unde r l y i ng mot ive why not - for -
pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  have a gre a t e r  l i kel i hood to be acqui red 
t han for - pro f i t s . S i nce not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  do not 
have a c c e s s  to s tock equ i t y cap i t a l , t hey are at a 
d i s advant age when compared to f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s . 
There f ore , t he gre a t e r  rep l acement needs o f  t he not - f or­
pro f i t  hosp i t a l  to  f i nance f uture renovat ion t he greater 
l i ke l i hood o f  i t ' s  be ing acqu i red . 
There f ore , the s t udy ' s f i nal  hypothe s i s  i s : 
H6 : G iven exi s t i ng ma rket f ac t ors and opera t i ng 
perf ormance , t hose hosp i t a l s  w i t h  not - fo r - p ro f i t  
owne rship are more l i ke ly t han others to  be 
acqui red . 
Summary of Chapter 3 
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Thi s  chapt er has exami ned t heoret i c a l  and empi r i cal  
l i t e rature on t he acqu i s i t ion o f  hosp i t a l  organ i z a t ions , and 
has presented t he conceptual mode l  for the s t udy research . 
Drawi ng upon re source depende nce t heory , the s t udy assume s 
that organ i zat ions t ry to rema i n  autonomous unt i l  t hey must 
cope wi t h  scarce re source s .  The scarc i ty o f  resources 
occurs t h rough dynami c i n t e ract i on w i t h  t he ext e rnal 
envi ronment . Resource dependence t heory s t a t e s  t hat 
hosp i t a l s  agree to be acqui red in orde r t o  g a i n  es sent i a l  
resources f rom t he ext ernal envi ronment . 
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Th i s  s t udy a l so uses corporate f i nance t heory to 
address t he f o l l owing i s sues related to hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ion : i ne f f i c i ent management t heory , s t rengt hened 
market pos i t ion , e conomi e s  of sca l e , i n f orma t ion t heor i e s , 
agency prob l ems , reduced dependence on one bus i ne s s  segment , 
i nve s t ment o f  exc e s s  c a s h ,  and tax cons idera t i ons . 
F i nanc i a l  t heory a l so recogn i zes an organi zat i on ' s abi l i ty 
t o  succeed by ensuring access to  cap i t a l  through 
pro f i t ab i l i t y ,  s t rong bond rat i ngs , l i ne s  of credi t ,  and 
equ i t y  f i nanc i ng as appropr i a t e . 
To addre s s  t he re l a t i onships between hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on and marke t , operat ional , and organ i zat i ona l 
chara c t e r i s t i c s , t he f o l l owing hypotheses w i l l  be t e s t e d . As 
d i s cussed by Al exander and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , t he acqu i r i ng 
organ i z a t i o n ,  whe t he r  for - pro f i t  or not - f or - prof i t , i s  
expe c t ed t o  have s im i l a r  expected d i rec t i ons i n  t he 
hypot he s i s . Cons i s t ent w i t h  Al exander and Morri sey ,  t he 
only except ion i s  not - fo r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons are more 
l i ke l y  to acqu i re hospi t a l s  in unf avorabl e  marke t s  because 
o f  t he i r  m i s s i on be i ng d i f f e rent t hen f o r - p ro f i t  
organ i zat i ons . Due to  t he i r  chari t ab l e  m i s s i on ,  not - f or-
pro f i t  organ i zat i ons a re wi l l ing to acqu i re hospi t a l s w i t h  
negat i ve pro f i t abi l i ty . 
H1 : G iven exi s t i ng market and organi zat i ona l f ac t ors , 
t hose hosp i t a l s  w i t h  poor operat i ng performance 
( l ower re t urn on a s s e t s  and l ower occupancy rat e )  
a re more l i k e l y  to be acqu i red t han other 
hosp i t a l s . 
H2a : Given exi s t i ng market and organ i zat iona l f ac t ors , 
t hose hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l im i t ed debt capac i t y  ( i . e  
h i gher debt pos i t ion ) are more l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i re d  t han other hosp i t a l s . 
H2b : G iven exi s t i ng market and organ i zat iona l f ac tors , 
t hose hospi t a l s  w i t h  an aging f ac i l i ty are more 
l i ke ly to be acqui red t han other hospi t a l s . 
H3 : G iven ope ra t i ona l pe rformance and organi zat i ona l 
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f actors , t hose hospi tal s located i n  l e s s  
compe t i t ive marke t s  ( high He r f i ndah l - H i rschman 
I ndex ) are more l i ke l y  t han others to be acqu i red . 
H4 : Given opera t i onal performance and organi zat i ona l 
factors , t hose hosp i t a l s  l oc a t ed i n  market s  w i t h  
fewe r  HMOs a re more l i ke l y  t han others to  be 
acqu i re d . 
Hs : G iven market fact ors and operat iona l performance , 
those hosp i t a l s  w i t h  f ewer beds and f ewe r t o t a l  
serv i c e s  are more l i ke l y  t han others to  be 
acqu i re d . 
H6 : G iven exi s t i ng market f a c t ors and opera t i ng 
pe r formance , t hose hosp i t a l s  w i t h  not - f or - pro f i t  
owner s h i p  a re more l i ke l y  t han others to  be 
acqu i red . 
Chap t e r  4 pre sent s t he s t udy de s i gn , dat a  sources and 
data used to t e s t  t he hypot he s e s . Chapter 5 present s t he 




Thi s  c hap t e r  exp l a ins t he study de s ign , dat a  sourc e s  
and d a t a  u s e d  i n  t he research . The measurement o f  va r i ab l e s  
and source s  o f  d a t a  f o r  each va r i ab l e  are d i s cus sed . The 
me t hods used to t e s t  t he proposed hypotheses and s t a t i s t i c a l  
procedure s used f o r  mode l e s t imat ion a r e  desc r i bed . 
Research Design 
The s t udy u s e s  a c ros s - sect i onal de s ign t hat examines 
hospi t a l s  acqu i re d  i n  1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  subsequent to  t he BBA 
and compare s t hem to hosp i t a l s  t hat were not acqu i red dur i ng 
t hose t ime pe r i ods . The s t udy examines t he relat ionship 
be tween hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons and o t hers f a c tors . 
The hosp i t a l  i s  t he uni t o f  ana l ys i s  i n  t he s t udy . The 
s tudy popu l a t ion cons i s t s  of non f edera l acute care hosp i t a l s  
i n  t he Un i t ed S t a t e s  i n  1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0 . Hosp i t a l s  owned by 
t he f edera l gove rnment such as t he Vet e rans Admi n i s t rat ion 
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and t he Depa rtment o f  De f ense were omi t ted . The 
i nve s t igat i on a l so omi t t ed spec i a l ty hospi tal s such a s  
psych i a t r i c  hospi t a l s . Hosp i t a l s  mee t i ng t hose c r i t e r i a  i n  
1 9 9 9  were t he 1 9 9 9  observa t ions . Hosp i t a l s  mee t i ng t hose 
c r i t e r i a  in 2 0 0 0  were t he 2 0 0 0  observa t i ons . 
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The f i rs t  ana lys i s  was a c ros s - se c t i ona l s t udy o f  t he 
1 9 9 9  s t udy per iod , wh i ch used l og i s t i c  regres s ion to 
det e rm i ne t he market , opera t i onal and organi za t ion f ac tors 
that a re r e l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . Al l t he 
i ndependent var i ab l e s  were l agged one year to i mp l y  a causal 
d i re c t ion between the i ndependent and dependent va r i ab l e .  
To t e s t  t h i s  re l a t i onshi p ,  t he f o l lowing expre s s ion i s  used : 
ACQUI RED 1 9 9 9  = f ( MKT1 999 , OPER1 999 , ORG1 9 9 9 )  
The f o l l ow i ng de f i n i t i ons appl y :  Acqu i s i t i on ( ACQUI RED 
1 9 9 9 )  i s  de f i ned by t hose hosp i t a l s  acqui red dur i ng 1 9 9 9  
re l a t e d  t o  t hose hospi t a l s t ha t  were not acqu i red . The 
market f actors ( MKT ) are : per c api t a  i ncome , percent age o f  
e l derl y ,  unempl oyment ra t e ,  numb e r  o f  HMOs , He r f i ndahl -
H i rs c hman I ndex . The operat i ona l f a c t ors ( OPER ) are : 
hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons , occupancy rat e , return on a s se t s , 
operat i ng marg i n ,  ope rat i ng expenses per d i s charge , f ac i l i ty 
age and l ong t e rm debt to  equ i t y . The organi z a t i ona l 
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f actors ( ORG ) a re : s i ze ,  number of  serv i c e s ,  for - pro f i t  
s t atus , and not - f or - pro f i t  s t a t us . 
The 1 9 9 9  acqui red f ac i l i t i e s , whi c h  numbered 6 2 , were 
ana l yzed to determine d i f f e rences f rom the nat i ona l norms . 
Us i ng a random s amp l e  of  hosp i t a l s not acqu i red dur i ng t he 
1 9 9 9  s t udy period as a base l i ne , the coe f f i c i e n t s  o f  t he 
i ndependent va r i ab l e s  were i n t e rpreted for s ign i f i cance and 
d i rec t i on of e f f ec t  on hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . The se t e s t s  
addre s se d  a l l  s i x  hypothese s . A second ve r s i on o f  t h i s  
mode l w i l l  a l so e s t ima t e  two separa t e  regre s s ion mode l s  by 
t he owne rship c a t egory of t he acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l , f or - prof i t  
or not - fo r - prof i t . Thi s  mode l w i l l  examine the a s so c i a t ion 
o f  t he s e  marke t , opera t iona l performance and organi zat ional 
factors w i t h  respect to  the hosp i t a l s  acqu i red by e i ther a 
f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  or not - f o r - pro f i t  hospi t a l . 
and o t he r  ana l ys i s  are i nc l uded i n  Chapter 5 .  
The resul t s  
The se cond analys i s  was a c ros s - sect i onal s tudy of  the 
2 0 0 0  s tudy period , wh i c h  used l og i s t i c  regre s s ion to 
de t e rmine t he market , ope rat i onal and organi za t ion fac tors 
that a re r e l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ions . Al l t he 
i ndependent va riables  were l agged one year t o  i mp l y  a causal 
d i re c t ion between t he i ndependent and dependent var i ab l e .  
To t e s t  t h i s  re l a t ionship the f o l l ow i ng expre s s i on i s  used : 
ACQUI RED2 000  = f ( MKT2000 , OPER2 000 , ORG2 0 0 0 ) 
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A s  be f ore , the f o l l ow i ng de f i n i t i ons apply : 
Acqu i s i t ion ( ACQUI RED2 0 0 0 ) i s  de f i ned by those hosp i t a l s  
acqu i red dur ing 2 0 0 0  re l a ted to those hosp i t a l s that were 
not a cqu i red . The ma rket f a c t ors ( MKT ) a re : per cap i t a  
i ncome , percentage o f  e l derl y ,  unempl oyment rat e , numb e r  o f  
HMOs , HMO pene t rat ion , and He r f i ndahl - Hi rs chman I ndex . The 
ope rat i ona l factors ( OPER ) are : hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons , return 
on a s s e t s ,  occupancy ra t e , operat i ng marg i n ,  ope rat i ng 
expense s  per d i s charge , f ac i l i t y age and l ong t e rm debt to  
equ i ty . The organi zat i ona l f a c t ors ( ORG ) are : s i ze , number 
o f  s e rv i ce s ,  f o r - p ro f i t  s t a tus , and not - fo r - p ro f i t  s t a t us . 
A se cond ve r s i on o f  t h i s  mode l wi l l  a l so e s t ima t e  two 
separate regre s s ion mode l s  by the ownership cat egory o f  t he 
acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l , for - pro f i t  or not - for - p ro f i t . Th i s  
model  w i l l  examine t h e  a s so c i a t ion o f  these market , 
opera t i ona l performance and organ i zat iona l f a c t ors w i t h  
re spe c t  to t he hosp i t a l s  acqui red by e i t he r  a f o r - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l  o r  not - f or - p ro f i t  hospi t a l . 
The 2 0 0 0  acqu i re d  f ac i l i t i e s , whi c h  numb e red 6 3 , were 
ana l y z ed to det ermine d i f f e rences f rom t he nat i ona l norms . 
Us i ng a random s amp l e  o f  hosp i t a l s  not acqu i red duri ng the 
2 0 0 0  s tudy period a s  a ba se l i ne , t he coe f f i c i e n t s  o f  the 
i ndependent va r i ab l e s  were interpre t ed for s ign i f i cance and 
d i re c t i on of e f f e c t  on hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ion . Once aga i n ,  
t he s e  t e s t s  addre s se d  a l l  s i x  hypot he s e s . Thi s  mode l w i l l  
a l so examine the a s soc i a t i on o f  t hese marke t , ope ra t iona l 
performance and organ i za t i onal fact ors w i t h  respect t o  the 
hosp i t a l s  acqu i red by e i t he r  a f or - pro f i t  hospi t a l  or not ­
f o r - p ro f i t  hospi t a l . The re su l t s  and other ana lys i s  are 
i n c l uded in Chap t e r  5 .  
The t h i rd ana lys i s  was a comb i ned mode l us i ng 1 9 9 9  and 
2 0 0 0 . Thi s  ana l ys i s  poo l ed t he dat a  f rom both periods and 
t hus c reat e s  a poo l ed mode l . The c ros s - se c t i ona l s t udy o f  
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t he pool e d  1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  dat a  uses l og i s t i c  regre s s i on t o  
d e t e rmine t he marke t , operat ional and organ i zat ion f ac t ors 
t ha t  are re l a t e d  t o  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . All t he 
i ndependent vari ab l e s  were l agged one year to imply a causal 
d i re c t ion between t he i ndependent and dependent variabl e .  To 
t e s t  t h i s  re l a t i on s h i p  t he fol lowing expre s s ion is  used : 
ACQUI RED 1 9 99&2 0 0 0  = f ( MKT 1 9 9 9&200 0 , OPER 1 9 99&200 0 , ORG 1 9 9 9&2 0 0 0 )  
A s  s t a t e d  previ ous l y ,  t he fol lowing de f i n i t i ons app l y : 
The marke t f actors ( MKT ) are : per cap i t a  i ncome , percent age 
of e l de r l y , unempl oyment rate , numb e r  of HMOs , HMO 
pene t ra t i on , He r f i ndah l - H i rschman I ndex . The opera t i ona l 
f ac tors ( OPER ) are : hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons , return on a s s et s ,  
occupancy rat e , opera t i ng marg i n ,  ope ra t i ng expense s per 
d i s charge , f ac i l i t y  age and l ong t e rm debt to  equ i t y . The 
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organi zat iona l f a c tors ( ORG ) are : s i ze ,  number o f  servi ces , 
f or - pro f i t  s t a t u s , and not - fo r - p ro f i t  s t atus . 
The 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  acqu i red f ac i l i t i e s , wh ich numbered 
1 2 5 / we re ana l yzed to det ermine d i f f e rences f rom t he 
nat i ona l norms . Us i ng t he combi ned random samp l e s  o f  not 
acqui red hosp i t a l s  dur i ng the 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  s t udy period a s  
a base l i ne ,  the coe f f i c i ent s o f  t he i ndependent var i ab l e s  
were i n t e rpre t ed f o r  s i gn i f i c ance and d i rect ion o f  e f f e c t  on 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . Once aga i n ,  these t e s t s  addre s sed a l l  
s i x  hypot he s e s . A second ve r s i on o f  t h i s  mode l wi l l  a l so 
e s t i ma t e  two separat e  regre s s ion mode l s  by t he owne rship 
cat egory o f  t he acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l , for - pro f i t  or not - for ­
prof i t . Thi s  model  w i l l  examine t he a s s o c i a t i on o f  t he s e  
ma rket , ope ra t i ona l pe r f o rmance and organ i zat ional f ac tors 
with respect  t o  t he hosp i t a l s acqui red by e i ther a f o r -
pro f i t  hosp i t a l  or not - f o r - p ro f i t  hospi t a l . 
other ana l ys i s  are i nc l uded i n  Chap t e r  5 .  
Data Sources and Sampling Process 
The resul t s  and 
Four sources of da t a  were used to measure t he 
indicators for t h i s  s t udy . Based upon t he nature o f  t he 
indicator , t he source s were a s  f o l l ows : Mode rn Heal t hcare 
( MHC)  / t he Ame r i can Hosp i t a l  As soc i a t ion Annua l Survey o f  
Hosp i t a l s ( AHA ) , t he HCFA M i n i mum Cost Data F i l e s  ( HCFA ) , 
and t he Area Re source F i l e  (ARF ) . 
dat a  sources i s  as fol l ows : 
The det a i l ed l i s t i ng of  
Mode rn Hea l t hcare ( MHC ) , 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  
AHA Annua l Hosp i t a l  Survey dat a , 1 9 9 8  and 1 9 9 9  
HCFA M i n i mum Cost Dat a  F i l e s , 1 9 9 8  and 1 9 9 9  
Area Resources F i l e  ( ARF ) , 1 9 9 8  and 1 9 9 9  
Mode rn Hea l t hcare was used t o  i dent i fy hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i ons . These dat a  are drawn f rom l egal f i l i ng s  by 
hospi t a l  organ i z at i ons and a re comp i l e d  i n  MHC ' s annua l 
a rt i c l e  on hosp i t a l  me rge rs and acqui s i t i ons . The use o f  
t h i s  da t a  source i s  cons i s tent w i t h  other hosp i t a l  s t ud i e s  
o n  me rge r and acqu i s i t i ons ( Ermann and Gabe l , 1 9 8 4 ; McCue 
and Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ; McCue , 1 9 8 8 ; McCue et  al . 1 9 8 8 ; Kr i shnan , 
2 0 0 0 )  . The Ame r i can Hosp i t a l  Assoc i a t i ons (AHA ) Annua l 
Survey a l so i nd i c a t e s  hosp i t a l  owne rship and was used to 
ve r i fy MHC dat a . 
The Ame r i c an Hosp i t a l  Assoc i a t i on Annua l Survey o f  
Hosp i t a l s  col l e c t s  det a i l e d  i n f orma t ion annua l l y f o r  a l l 
hosp i t a l s i n  the Uni t ed S t a t e s . The AHA survey provides 
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ext ens ive organ i za t i ona l dat a  on i ndividual hospi t a l s 
including : s t a f f i ng , ope ra t i onal perf ormance , market a rea , 
owne rship and other organ i zat ional f e ature s . The AHA dat a  
h a s  been u s e d  ext ensively i n  researc h  about hospi t a l  f i nance 
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and acqu i s i t i ons ( E rmann and Gabe l , 1 9 8 4 ; Levi t z  and Brooke , 
1 9 8 5 ; Al exande r and Morr i sey , 1 9 8 8 ; Al exande r and Morri sey , 
1 9 8 9 ;  McCue , 1 9 9 1 a ; Cl ement e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ; Connor et  al . ,  
1 9 9 7 ; Needl eman et  a l . ,  1 9 9 9 ) . 
The Area Resource F i l e  ( AR F )  has ext ens ive i nf orma t ion 
r e l a t e d  t o  hosp i t a l  marke t s t ruc ture i n c l ud i ng : 
demographi c s , economi c s , and o t her mea sures o f  the hosp i t a l  
envi ronment . The dat a  a re comp l ied by t he Bureau o f  Hea l t h  
Pro f e s s i ons and has been used i n  previous hea l t h  c are 
research ( Ba z zo l i and Ande s , 1 9 9 5 ; Burns et a l . ,  2 0 0 0 ; 
McCue , 2 0 0 0 ; McCue e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 0 )  and research on hosp i t a l  
me rgers and acqu i s i t ions (Al exander and Morr i sey , 1 9 8 8 ; 
Al exander and Mor r i sey , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
The Hea l t h  Care F i nanc i ng Admi n i s t rat ion ' s  Medi care 
Cost Report i s  comp l e ted annua l l y and i s  a requ i rement to  
part i c ipate i n  t he Medicare program . As a resul t ,  it  is  one 
of t he mo s t  comprehens ive data s e t s  ava i l ab l e  for hosp i t a l s  
i n  t h e  Uni t ed S t a t e s  that s e e  Medi c a re pa t i ent s . The 
Med i care Cos t  Report provi des i nf orma t ion f rom t he hosp i t a l  
f i nanc i a l  s t a tements a s  we l l  a s  de t a i l e d  da t a  o n  s t a f f ing ,  
hosp i t a l  ut i l i zat i on , and opera t i ng e f f i c i ency . S i nce the 
Med i c are Cost Report i s  comparabl e  across t he hosp i t a l  
i ndus t ry ,  i t  i s  used extens i ve l y i n  hosp i t a l  research ( Du f fy 
and F r i edma n ,  1 9 9 3 ; Ba z zo l i  and C l eve r l ey , 1 9 9 4 ; C l ement et 
a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ; McCue , 2 0 0 0 ; McCue et  a l . ,  2 0 0 0 ; Ya f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . 
The dat a  were drawn f rom t he Ame ri can Hospi t a l  As soc i a t ion 
Da t a  F i l e s  for a l l  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  serv i c e  code 1 0  
repre sent i ng non - f edera l acute care hospi t a l s . 
Exam i n i ng hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions i n  cont rast to  t he 
cont rol g roup o f  approxi ma t e l y  4 , 0 0 0  non - f ederal acute care 
hosp i t a l s  c reat e s  a probl em i n  e s t imat i on e f f i c i ency . To 
ove rcome t h i s  prob l e m ,  a cho i c e  based sampl i ng s t rat egy was 
ut i l i zed wh i c h  i nvolved drawi ng a l l  hosp i t a l s  acqui red i n  
t he s tudy yea r  p l u s  a random s ampl e  o f  non - acqu i re d  
hosp i t a l s  numbe r i ng t hree t i me s the number o f  hosp i t a l s  
acqu i red i n  t he respe c t ive s tudy yea r  as t he cont rol group . 
S ince 6 2  hosp i t a l s  were acqu i red i n  1 9 9 9 , t he 1 9 9 9  
cont rol group o f  non - acqu i red hosp i t a l s ba sed o n  a random 
s amp l e  of t hree t ime s t he number of hosp i t a l s  acqui red i n  
1 9 9 9  re s u l t s  i n  a cont rol group o f  1 8 6 . S i nce 6 3  hosp i t a l s  
were acqu i red i n  2 0 0 0 , t he 2 0 0 0  con t rol group o f  non ­
acqu i re d  hosp i t a l s  based on a random samp l e  o f  t hree t ime s 
t he number o f  hosp i t a l s  acqu i red i n  2 0 0 0  re su l t s  i n  a 
con t ro l  group o f  1 8 9 . The 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  poo l e d  s t udy 
con t ro l  group o f  non - acqu i red hosp i t a l s cons i s t s  o f  the 
comb i ned control groups f rom 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  and re sul t s  i n  a 
cont rol group o f  3 7 5 . Thi s s ampl i ng approach i s  supported 
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w i t h i n  t he hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on l i tera ture (Al exander and 
Morr i s ey , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Measurement of Dependent Variables 
A dependent v a r i a b l e  i s  de f i ned a s  t he cho i ce va r i ab l e  
t h a t  an event w i l l  t ake p l ace . I n  cont ras t ,  i ndependent 
var i a b l e s  a re i n t e rpre t ed as cont r i but ors to t he cho i c e  
var i ab l e  or event occur r i ng . Va r i ab l e s  were s e l e c t ed f rom 
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the data f i l e s  based upon t he l i t e rature rev i e w ,  t heoret i ca l  
re l evance and f a c e  val i d i ty . 
s e l e c t i on i s  descr i bed b e l ow . 
The rat i ona l e  for var i ab l e  
The dependent vari able o f  interest i n  t h i s s tudy i s  
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  A number o f  previous s t ud i e s  have 
exami ned mergers and acqu i s i t ions among hosp i t a l s  ( Levi t z  
and B rooke , 1 9 8 5 ; McCue and Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ;  Morr i sey and 
Al exande r ,  1 9 8 7 ;  Connor et a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ; Kr i shnan , 2 0 0 0 ;  
Y a f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . The se s t ud i e s  eva luated a w i de range o f  
i s sues i nc l ud i ng econom i e s  o f  sca l e ,  i mproved opera t i ng 
performance , market change s ,  access to c ap i t a l  and 
organ i zat i ona l cont rol . The const ruc t s ,  var i abl e s , 
measurement s  and data sources are prov i ded i n  Tabl e  4 .  
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Table 4 :  Constructs, Variables, Measu res and Data Sources 
Con s t ruct Va r i a b l e  Measure Source 
Acqui red Depen den t 1 ,  i f  Acqu i red , 0 i f  1 9 9 9 , 
Va ri abl e :  Not Acqu i red 2 0 0 0  MHC 
Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Market Indepen den t Per Cap i t a  I ncome i n  1 9 9 8 , 
Va ri abl es : Per t he Market Area 1 9 9 9  ARF 
Cap i t a  I ncome 
Market Percent age o f  Popu l a t ion Age 6 5  1 9 9 8 , 
E l de r l y  and H igher 1 9 9 9  ARF 
Market Unemp l oyment Rat e  Unemp l oyment Ra t e  i n  1 9 9 8 , 
Market Area 1 9 9 9  ARF 
Market Numbe r  o f  HMOs Number of HMOs 1 9 9 8 , 
1 9 9 9  ARF 
Market HMO Pene t ra t i on HMO Pene t ra t i on 1 9 9 8 , 
1 9 9 9  ARF 
Market He r f i ndah l - He r f i ndahl - H i rs chman 1 9 9 8 , 
H i rs chman I ndex I ndex 1 9 9 9  AHA 
OPER Hosp i t a l  Tot a l  Fac i l i t y  1 9 9 8 , 
Admi s s ions Admi s s i ons per Bed 1 9 9 9  AHA 
OPER Return on A s s e t s  Revenue/ Tot a l  1 9 9 8 , 
Assets  1 9 9 9  HCFA 
OPER Occupancy Rate Fac i l i ty Occupancy 1 9 9 8 , 
Rate 1 9 9 9  AHA 
OPER Ope ra t i ng Marg i n  Operat i ng I ncome / 1 9 9 8 , 
Opera t i ng Revenue 1 9 9 9  HCFA 
OPER Ope rat i ng Operat i ng Expenses 1 9 9 8 , 
Expens e / D i s charge per D i s charge 1 9 9 9  HCFA 
OPER Fac i l i ty Age Age of  P l ant Ra t i o 1 9 9 8 , 
1 9 9 9  HCFA 
OPER Long - Te rm Debt to Long - t e rm Deb t / Fund 1 9 9 8 , 
Equ i t y  Bal ance 1 9 9 9  HCFA 
ORG S i ze : S t a f f e d  S t a f fed Beds 1 9 9 8 , 
Beds 1 9 9 9  AHA 
ORG Number of  Tot al  Number of 1 9 9 8 , 
S e rv i c e s  Servi ces Of f e red by 1 9 9 9  AHA 
Hosp i t a l 
ORG For - pro f i t  1 ,  i f  Fo r - pro f i t ; 0 ,  1 9 9 8 , 
otherw i s e  1 9 9 9  AHA 
ORG Not - f or - prof i t  1 ,  i f  Not - fo r - 1 9 9 8 , 
pro f i t ; 0 ,  otherw i s e  1 9 9 9  AHA 
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Measurement of Independent Variables 
I ndependent va r i ab l e s  are de f i ned as cont ri butors t o  a 
cho i c e  va r i ab l e or event occurr i ng . As noted previou s l y ,  
t he cons t ruc t s ,  va r i abl es , measurement s and data source s  for 
t he i ndependent var i ab l e s  are prov i ded in Tab l e  4 .  Al l t he 
i ndependent var i a b l e s  were l agged one year to i mply a causal 
di rect i on between the i ndependent and dependent var i ab l e .  
The t heore t i ca l  cons t ruc t s  and i ndependent va r i a b l e s  re l a t e d  
t o  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on a re we l l  supported i n  t he l i t e ra ture 
and are d i scus sed b e l ow . 
Market Factors 
The Market con s t ruct re f l e c t s  the demand for hosp i t a l  
serv i c e s  and i n c l udes t he f o l l ow i ng var i ab l e s : i ncome per 
cap i t a ,  percent o f  t he popu l a t i on age 65 and older , t he 
unemp l oyment rate , the Number o f  HMOs , HMO Pene t ra t i on ,  and 
the Herf i ndah l - H i r s c hman i ndex . S i nce the market i s  ext erna l 
to  t he hosp i t a l , i t  i s  measured a t  the County l eve l . The 
use of County as a de f i n i t ion of hospi t a l marke t s  has been 
used ext ens ive l y  in hosp i t a l  research (Al exande r and 
Morri sey , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
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High pe r cap i t a  i ncome re f l e c t s  a sound economi c 
communi ty where individua l s  ho l d  we l l  payi ng j obs . T h i s  i s  
expe c t e d  t o  i ncrease demand for hosp i t al  serv i c e s  and have a 
pos i t i ve e f f e c t  on hosp i t a l pro f i t ab i l i ty .  Improved 
pro f i tabi l i t y  i s  caused by gre a t e r  hea l t h  i nsurance 
cove rage , an  i ncreased abi l i ty to pay for care , and reduced 
i nd igent care . Thus , h igher i ncome per cap i t a  shou l d  reduce 
envi ronment a l  uncert a inty and l ower the rate of acqu i s i t ion 
( Fr i edman and Short e l l ,  1 9 8 8 ; McCue e t  al , 1 9 8 8 ; Al exander 
and Mor r i s e y ,  1 9 8 9 ) . I n  add i t ion , acqu i r i ng organi zat i ons 
are wi l l i ng to pay a h igher p r i c e  per bed for f ac i l i t i e s  
located i n  h i gh - income commun i t i e s  ( McCue et  a l , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Due t o  reduc t i ons i n  t he Medi ca re reimbursement rates , 
a high percent age o f  Medicare pa t i ent s ,  aged 6 5  and o l der , 
may re sul t i n  an i nab i l i ty t o  cove r opera t i ng expens e s . 
Thi s  poor paye r mix weakens prof i t ab i l i ty ,  c rea t e s  f i nanc i a l  
d i s t re s s  and may l ead to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion ( Ba z zo l i ,  
1 9 9 4 ) . A h i gh percentage o f  Medi care pat ient s make a 
f ac i l i ty l e s s  de s i rabl e  for acqu i s i t i on because o f  l ower and 
s l ower Med i care payments ( McCue , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
The unemp l oyment rate serve s a s  a proxy measure o f  a 
commun i ty ' s f i nanc i a l  ab i l i ty to purchase hea l t h  insurance 
and pay for hea l t h  care serv i c e s  ( McCue et  a l . ,  2 0 0 0 )  
Reduc t i ons i n  a commun i ty ' s unempl oyment rat e  shou l d  
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generate add i t i ona l demand for hosp i t a l  serv i c e s  and 
i ncrease the probabi l i ty of hos p i t a l  acqu i s i t ion (Al exande r 
and Mor r i sey , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
The number o f  HMO ' s i s  d e f i ned as the number o f  HMOs 
ope ra t i ng w i t h i n  t he respe c t i ve county . Thi s var i a b l e  i s  a 
mea sure o f  managed care w i t h i n  the communi ty .  The va r i ab l e ,  
HMO pene t ra t i on , i s  def i ned a s  t o t a l  HMO enro l l ment d i v i ded 
by t o t a l  popu l a t ion i n  the county ( Bureau o f  t he Census , 
1 9 9 9 ; Burns et  a l . ,  2 0 0 0 )  I n  1 9 8 7 , 1 5  percent o f  Ame r i cans 
unde r the age o f  6 5  were enrol l ed in managed care p l ans . By 
1 9 9 6 , 5 4  percent of t h i s  popu l a t i on was enro l l ed i n  managed 
care ( We i n i ck and Cohen , 2 0 0 0 ) . The i r  research showed t hat 
both the number o f  hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons and l eng th o f  
hosp i t a l  s t ay are l ower for managed care enro l l ee s , 
t here fore reduc i ng hosp i t a l  pro f i tabi l i t y . 
The He r f i ndahl - H i rschman i ndex ( HH I ) i s  de f i ned a s  t he 
sum o f  squares o f  the marke t mea sured as a percentage o f  t he 
f i rms operat i ng i n  the marke t . Thi s  i ndex a l l ows 
measurement o f  the ext ent o f  concent ra t ion i n  the l ocal  
hosp i t a l  market . Thus , a hosp i t a l  w i t h  a sma l l ma rket share 
l ocated in a highly concentrated market may have l i t t l e  
i n f l uence o n  i t s  compet i t ive envi ronment . The higher t he 
He r f i ndahl - H i rschman i ndex ( HH I ) , the more concent rated the 
marke t ; an HHI o f  1 0 , 0 0 0  i s  a monopol y . The Herf i ndahl -
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H i rschman i ndex ( HH I ) has been used ext ens i ve l y  ln hosp i t a l  
research ( C l ement et  a I , 1 9 9 7 ; Kri shnan , 2 0 0 1 ) . Al exander & 
Morri sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) f ound that syst ems t arget hosp i t a l s  in  
s t rong marke t s . 
I n  t hose s i tuat i ons whe re acqu i s i t ion creates  a l arge 
increase in ma rket concent ra t i on , as measured by HHI , t he 
Department o f  Jus t i c e  and Federal Trade Commi s s i on may r a i s e  
ant i - t ru s t  obj ect i ons ( Copel and and Weston , 1 9 8 8 ) . Research 
shows that hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons a re more l i ke l y  in market s  
w i t h  l ow concent rat i on a s  shown by a n  HHI b e l ow 1 , 6 6 5  
( Connor e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ; Burns e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 0 ) . 
Operating Performance Factors 
The operat i ng p e r formance const ruc t  i s  mea sured at t he 
i nd i v i du a l  hosp i t a l  l eve l and i nc l udes t he fol l ow i ng 
var i ab l e s : hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons , return on a s se t s ,  oc cupancy 
rat e , operat i ng marg i n ,  operat ing expense pe r d i s charge , 
f ac i l i ty age and long - t e rm debt to  equ i t y . Hosp i t a l  
admi s s ions a s  measured b y  t he number o f  admi s s ions pe r bed 
i s  an i nd i c a t or o f  revenue potent i a l . Hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons 
have been used in previous he a l t hcare research ( Gi nn and 
Young , 1 9 9 2 ) . 
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Hosp i t a l  occupancy is de f i ned a s  t he t o t a l  numbe r of 
i npa t i ent days d i v i ded by t he beds i n  serv i c e  ( De l o i t t e  and 
Touc he , 1 9 9 7 ; Ya f chak , 2 0 0 0 ) . Accord i ng to Yaf chak , ( 2 0 0 0 ) , 
occupancy has been dropp i ng a s  care shi f t s  away f rom 
i npa t i ent acute care to outpa t i ent servi ces , w i t h  l e s s  t han 
5 0  percent of a l l  beds in operat ion occup i e d . Hosp i t a l s  
w i t h  h i gh occupancy rates i nd i cate a s t rong market demand 
for s e rv i c e s  and may generate h ighe r acqu i s i t i on p r i c e s  
( McCue e t  a l . ,  1 9 8 8 ) . As d i scussed by t he Department o f  
Hea l t h  and Human S e rv i c e s  ( 1 9 9 9 ) , t he occupancy rat e s  f o r  
rural hosp i t a l s  ave raged 3 2 %  na t iona l l y  i n  1 9 7 7 . The 
occupancy rate for urban hosp i t a l s  ave raged 4 8 %  nat i ona l l y . 
Hosp i t a l s  w i t h  occupancy rat es l ower t han t he nat iona l 
average have an i ncreased l i ke l i hood o f  acqu i s i t i on ( Bogue 
et a l . ,  1 9 9 5 ; Burns et a l . ,  2 0 0 0 ) . Hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ow 
occupancy rat e s  a l so gene rated gre a t e r  post acqu i s i t i on 
e f f i c i e nc i e s  due to  the conver s i on o f  por t i ons o f  t hose 
f ac i l i t i e s  to  non - i npat i ent servi ces ( Harma t a  and Bogue , 
1 9 9 7 ; Connor e t  a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . 
Opera t i ng Marg i n  i s  me asured by opera t i ng i ncome 
d i v i ded by operat i ng revenue ( Levi t z  and Brooke , 1 9 8 5 ;  McCue 
and Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ; De l o i t t e  and Touche , 1 9 9 7 ) . Ope ra t i ng 
marg i n  i s  i nc l uded because i t  measures t he operat i ng 
p e r formance o f  t he hospi t a l . 
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Age o f  phys i c a l  p l ant i s  de f i ned a s  ac cumulated 
depre c i a t ion d i v i de d  by depre c i a t i on expense ( Levi t z  and 
Brooke , 1 9 8 5 ; De l o i t t e  and Touche , 1 9 9 7 ; McCue et a l . ,  
1 9 9 8 ) . The age o f  phys i c a l  pl ant i s  a measure o f  t he 
phys i c a l  s t at ure o f  t he hosp i t a l  w i t h  a mode rn f ac i l i ty 
represent i ng h ighe r qua l i t y  o f  c l i n i c a l  care . I t  i s  a l so an 
indicator of an organ i zat i on ' s cap i t a l  needs , w i t h  h igher 
values i nd i c a t i ng an o l de r  f ac i l i t y . 
As d i s cussed by Ki rchheime r  ( 2 0 0 1 )  many commun i ty 
hosp i t a l s were con s t ru c t ed i n  1 9 4 6  us i ng f edera l f unding 
f rom t he H i l l - Burton Act . The funds resul t e d  i n  a 4 0 %  
i ncrease i n  the number o f  hosp i t a l  beds f rom 1 9 5 0  t o  1 9 6 0 . 
S i nce many o f  these f ac i l i t i e s  are now over 5 0  years o l d , 
t hey requ i re repl ac ement . Unfortuna t e l y ,  an ag i ng hosp i t a l  
f ac i l i ty i ncreases opera t i ng cos t s  and many organi zat i ons 
l ack t he cap i t a l  t o  f und renova t i on (Al exande r ,  Lewi s ,  and 
Morr i sey , 1 9 8 5 ;  F r i edman and S horte l l , 1 9 8 8 ) . A 
deteriora t i ng hosp i t a l  f ac i l i t y  comb i ned w i t h  l ow 
pro f i t ab i l i ty and an i nabi l i ty to f u l ly f und i t s  cap i t a l  
re s e rve i s  a prima ry reason f o r  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on ( McCue 
and Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ; Department o f  Hea l t h  and Human Servi ces , 
1 9 9 9 )  . S ince many hosp i t a l s  have no equ i ty cap i t a l  and are 
unable t o  obt a i n  l oans or bond f i nanc i ng t o  renova t e  an 
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ag i ng phy s i c a l  p l ant , they are cand i da t e s  for acqu i s i t ion or 
bankrup t cy ( Ba z zo l i ,  1 9 9 4 ) . 
Accord i ng t o  Jakl evi ck ( 2 0 0 1 ) , mos t  hosp i t a l s  need 
operat i ng marg i n s  of at l e a s t  5 %  to  i nves t  in cap i t a l 
proj ec t s . Operat i ng margins sub s t ant i a l l y  be l ow 5 %  may 
force an organ i z a t i on to merge or c l o s e  unl e s s  i t  has 
s ign i f i cant r e s e rve s . I nd i v i dua l hosp i t a l s i n  need o f  
renovat ion a re h a r d  pre s sed to gene rate t he cap i t a l  t o  
rep l a c e  aging phys i ca l  p l ant s . As a resul t ,  t hey are 
cand i dat e s  f or acqu i s i t ion by l a rge for - pro f i t  cha i n s  t ha t  
have grea t e r  a c ce s s i bi l i ty t o  t he c ap i t a l  marke t s  ( McCue , 
1 9 8 8 ; McCue , 1 9 9 1 ) . Research s hows t ha t  acqu i r i ng 
organi za t i ons pa i d  l e s s  for ag i ng f a c i l i t i es  because t hey 
requ i re ma j or cap i t a l  improvement s a f t e r  purchase ( McCue e t  
a l . ,  1 9 9 8 ) . 
Long - t e rm debt t o  equ i ty i s  de f i ned a s  l ong - t erm debt 
d i v i ded by f und b a l ance ( Levi t z  and Brooke , 1 9 8 5 ; McCue and 
Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ; D e l o i t t e  and Touche , 1 9 9 7 ) . Ac cord i ng to 
Levi t z  and Brooke ( 1 9 8 5 ) , t he i ndu s t ry benchmark for l ong ­
t erm debt to  equ i t y  i s  . 5 7 .  Cl eve r l y  ( 1 9 8 1 )  found that a 
l ong - t e rm debt t o  equ i ty ra t i o o f  2 . 0  i s  a maxi mum beyond 
whi c h  add i t i ona l debt woul d  not be grant ed . Subsequent 
research shows that t he h igher an organi z at i ons l eve l o f  
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debt , the more l i ke ly a f ac i l i ty w i l l  be acqu i red ( McCue and 
Furs t , 1 9 8 6 ; McCue , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Organizational Factors 
The organ i z a t i ona l const ruct i s  mea sured at t he 
i nd i v i dual hospi t a l  l eve l and i n c l udes t he fol l ow i ng 
variabl e s : s i ze ( s t a f f ed beds ) , number o f  c l i n i c a l  
servi c e s , f o r - p ro f i t  ownershi p ,  and not - for - pro f i t  
ownership . The number o f  s t a f f e d  beds i s  a measure o f  t he 
s i ze and comp l e x i t y  o f  acute care hosp i t a l s . Accord i ng t o  
Al exande r and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 9 ) , l a rger hosp i t a l s  a r e  a b l e  t o  
adapt to  envi ronment a l  unc e r t a i nty and are l e s s  l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i red . I n  addi t i on ,  t he numbe r o f  s t a f fed beds i s  
pos i t ively a s so c i a t e d  w i t h  revenue , expenses and cash f l ow 
( C l ement et a l . ,  1 9 9 7 ) . 
I n  1 9 9 7 , the average number o f  hosp i t a l  beds i n  t he 
Uni t ed S t a t e s  was 1 5 4  ( Department o f  Hea l t h  and Human 
S e rvi c e s , 1 9 9 9 ) . The i r  re search showed that 9 0 %  o f  c l o sed 
hosp i t a l s  had f ewer beds than the nat i ona l ave rage and 5 0 %  
o f  a l l  c l osed hosp i t a l s  had f ewer t han 1 0 0  beds . 
Accordi ng to C a s t rey ( 1 9 9 8 ) , HMO ' s are s t e e r i ng 
priva t e l y  i nsured pa t i ent s to  l arge t e r t i ary care hosp i t a l s . 
Thi s  comb i ned w i t h  reduced payme n t s  under BBA i s  p l a c i ng 
increased f i nanc i a l  pres sure on sma l l e r  hospi t a l s . 
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The number of hospi t a l  s e rv i c e s  i s  an i nd i cator o f  the 
comp l ex i ty o f  acute care hosp i t a l s  and i s  mea sured by sum of 
a l l  the s e rv i ce s  prov i ded by t he hosp i t al a s  l i st e d  i n  t he 
AHA annu a l  survey . S ince a broad range o f  c l i ni c a l  serv i ces 
i ncreases ma rket potent i a l , it  has a pos i t i ve corre l a t ion 
w i t h  hosp i t a l  f i nanc i a l  pe r f o rmance ( Fr i e dman and Shorte l l ,  
1 9 8 8 ) . I n  cont ras t , a l e s s  i n t ens ive range o f  s e rvi ces i s  a 
predi c t or o f  hospi t a l  conve r s i on or c l osure ( Ha rma t a  and 
Bogue , 1 9 9 7 ) . Accord i ng to Bogue e t  a l . ( 1 9 9 5 ) , acqu i s i t ion 
can re su l t  i n  t he di scon t i nua t i on o f  some serv i ce s  t hrough 
conso l i da t ion and may l ead to i nc reased economi e s  of s c a l e  
and i mp roved f i nanc i a l  pos i t i on .  
Ownership was measured a t  t he hosp i t a l  l eve l by t he 
f o l l ow i ng va r i abl e s : f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus and not - fo r - p ro f i t  
s t a t u s . The d i s t inct i on between f o r -pro f i t  and not - f or-
prof i t  ownership is  a l egal  one and has t axat i on 
consequenc e s . I t  i s  a l so reasonable to  expect t ha t  
d i f f e rences i n  owne rship s t ruc t ure cou l d  a f f e c t  a hosp i t a l ' s  
w i l l i ngne s s  to  be acqu i red . According to Al exander and 
Mor r i sey ( 1 9 8 7 ) , 96 percent of f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  were 
acqu i re d  by f o r - p ro f i t  organ i z a t i ons , whi l e  8 0  percent o f  
re l i g i ous hosp i t a l s  were acqu i red by not - fo r - pro f i t  
organ i z a t ions . S i nce f or - pro f i t  hea l t hcare organ i zat ions 
have g reat e r  access  to  equ i t y funding , they are pos i t ively 
corre l a t ed w i t h  acqu i s i t ion ( Ba zol l i ,  1 9 9 4 ) . 
Based upon t he l i t e rat ure review and t he hypothe ses 
deve l opment o f  Chapter 3 ,  Tab l e  5 shows t he expe c t e d  
r e l a t i onship o f  the i ndependent var i ab l e s  to  t he dependent 
var i ab l e ,  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  
Table 5 :  Expected Direction of  Relationships of  I ndependent Variables with 
Dependent Variables in the Model 
Var i a b l e  Deeendent Va r i a b l e  Expected 
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D i rect ion 
Per Cap i t a  I ncome Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion -
Percent age o f  E l de r l y  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion -
Unemp l oyment Rate Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion + 
Number o f  HMOs Hosp i t a l  Acqui s i t i on -
HMO Pene t rat i on Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on -
Herf i ndahl - H i rschman 
I ndex Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion -
Hosp i t a l  Admi s s i ons Hosp i t a l  Acqui s i t i on -
Return on As s e t s  Hosp i t a l  Acqui s i t i on -
Occupancy Rat e  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on -
Ope ra t i ng Marg i n  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on -
Ope ra t i ng Expenses pe r Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on + 
D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on + 
Long - Te rm Debt to Equ i ty Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on + 
S i ze Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on -
Number o f  S e rv i ces Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on -
For - pro f i t  Organi zat ional S t atus + 
Not - f o r - p ro f i t  Organi zat ional S t a t u s  + 
Analytical Methods: Descriptive and Multivariate 
The ana lyt i c  approach f or t h i s  s t udy i s  to  use 
univa r i a t e  and mul t ivari a t e  analys i s  to  a s s e s s  the fac tors 
a s soc i a t ed w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  Univa r i a t e  ana lys i s  
Corre l a t i on i s  used to examine each va r i ab l e  i n  i so l a t ion . 
ana l ys i s  was comp l e t e d  to i dent i fy potent i a l  
mul t i co l l i ne a r i t y  among t he i ndependent var i ab l e s . 
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I n  mu l t i vari a t e  ana l ys i s , t he mode l s imul t aneou s l y  
analyzes t he i ndependent variables  to  i dent i fy r e l a t i onships 
t o  t he dependent var i ab l e .  The mul t ivar i a t e  model a l l ows 
t he re l at ionships between t he dependent va r i ab l e  and 
exp l anat ory var i ab l e s  to be exami ned . Thi s  i so l a t e s  t he 
e s t i ma t e d  e f f e c t  o f  t he exp l ana tory var i a b l e  a f t er 
s t a t i st i ca l ly adj u s t i ng for t he d i s t r i but ion and e f f e c t  o f  
t he o t h e r  i ndependent var i ab l e s  i n  t he mode l . Thus , i t  can 
be det erm i ned i f  t he cova r i a t e s  have a pos i t ive , negat ive , 
or neut ral e f f e c t  on , t he probab i l i t y o f  a hosp i t a l  b e i ng 
a cqu i red . 
Regre s s ion ana l ys i s  i s  a powe r f u l  mu l t i va ri a t e  
t e chnique t h a t  h e l p s  summar i ze t he re l a t i onship between 
these var i ab l e s . Though l i near regre s s ion works we l l  w i t h  
cont i nuous var i ab l e s , probl ems emerge when dependent 
var i ab l e s  are d i chotomous . When t h i s  occurs , i n s t ead o f  a 
norma l d i st r i bu t i on ,  l i near regre s s ion produces a bimoda l 
d i s t r i but i on t ha t  l eads to  unre l i a b l e  s t andard errors and 
e s t imators . A l so , w i t h  a d i c hot omous dependent variabl e ,  
t he nume r i c a l  value o f  the variable  i s  arb i t rary and i s  not 
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int r i ns i ca l l y  i nt e re s t i ng . I ns t ead o f  t ry i ng to pre d i c t  t he 
a rb i t rary va l ue w i t h  l i near regre s s ion , i t  i s  more i mportant 
t o  pred i c t  whe t he r  t he case wi l l  f a l l  into one or t he other 
cat egory o f  the dependent var i ab l e  u s i ng l og i s t i c  regre s s i on 
( Menard , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Log i s t i c  regre s s ion i s  used to f i t  a mode l to  a b i nary 
dependent var i ab l e  and is an approp r i a t e  s t a t i s t i c a l  
t e chni que t h a t  produces cons i s tent e s t ima t ors regard l e s s  o f  
how t he dependent va r i ab l e s  are d i s t r i but ed . When work i ng 
w i t h  d i c hotomous dependent va r i abl e s  t he l og i s t i c  regre s s ion 
mode l prov i de s  be t t e r  predi c t i ons t han t he l i near regre s s ion 
mode l . S i nce a l l  s i x  hypotheses for t he present s t udy have 
t he d i c hotomous dependent va riable  of hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on 
a s  t he event o f  i n t e re s t , t he pre f e rred ana l yt i c a l  procedure 
to mode l t he re l a t i onship is l og i s t i c  regre s s i on . 
Log i s t i c  regres s ion i s  w i dely used i n  med i c a l  research 
and is accepted in hos p i t a l  re l a ted s t udi e s . For examp l e , 
Al exande r and Mor r i sey ( 1 9 8 9 )  used l og i s t i c  regre s s i on to 
e s t i mate t he a s soc i a t ion o f  market cond i t i ons , regu l a t ory 
c l ima t e  and management e f f e c t ivene s s  w i t h  cont ract 
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management . Friedman and Short e l l  ( 1 9 8 8 )  used l og i s t i c  
regre s s ion to e s t i ma t e  t he i n f l uence o f  organi zat iona l and 
market f ac t ors on t he f i nanc i a l  performance in  hosp i t a l s 
be fore and a f t e r  i mpl ement at ion o f  t he Med i care Prospec t i ve 
Payment Sys tem . 
Add i t i ona l l y ,  Cl ement et  a l . ( 1 9 9 7 )  used l og i s t i c  
regre s s ion to e s t i ma t e  the a s s o c i a t i on o f  market and 
envi ronment a l  f ac tors , w i t h  the f i nanc i a l  performance o f  
s t rategic  hosp i t a l  a l l i ances . More recent l y ,  McCue e t  a l . 
( 2 0 0 0 b )  used l og i s t i c  regre s s i on t o  e s t i ma t e  t he a s soc i a t i on 
o f  market , m i s s i on ,  and f i nanc i a l  factors w i t h  hosp i t a l  cash 
re serve s . 
Seve ral s t ud i e s  ana l y z i ng hosp i t a l  me rgers and 
acqu i s i t ion have been conducted u s i ng l og i s t i c  regre s s i on . 
McCue and Furst ( 1 9 8 6 )  used l og i s t i c  regre s s ion to e s t i ma t e  
t he a s soc i a t ion o f  f i nanc i a l  pe r f o rmance and organi za t i on 
fact ors w i t h  hos p i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons by f o r - p ro f i t - hosp i t a l  
chains . Al exander and Morr i sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) used log i s t i c  
regre s s i on to a s s e s s  the rol e  o f  market and m i s s ion on 
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  F i na l l y ,  Kr i shnan ( 2 0 0 0 )  used 
l og i s t i c  regre s s ion to det ermine the i mpact o f  hosp i t al 
mergers and acqu i s i t ion on t he pri c i ng o f  hosp i t al  c l i n i c a l  
serv i ces . 
Log i s t i c  regre s s i on provi des an e s t i ma t e  o f  t he 
rel a t i onship be t ween the dependent and i ndependent 
var i abl e s . The probab i l i ty func t ion i s  a s  f o l l ows : 
P ( event ) = 1 /  ( l +e BO + BiXi ) 
whe re : 
P i s  t he probab i l i ty o f  Hosp i t a l  Acqui s i t i on ; 
Bo and Bi  a re coe f f i c ient s e s t i ma t ed f rom t he dat a ; 
Xi i s  the charac t e r i s t i c  o f  the i th hospi t a l ; and 
e i s  the base of t he nat ura l l oga r i t hms , or 
approx i ma t e l y  2 . 7 1 8 . 
I n  l og i s t i c  regre s s i on ,  the l og - l i ke l i hood i s  t he 
c r i t e r i on for s e l ect i ng parame t ers i n  t he l og i s t i c  
regre s s ion mode l . Because t he l og - l ikel i hood i s  negat ive , 
t he - 2 LL s t at i s t i c  i s  pos i t ive , and l a rger va l ue s  i nd i c a t e  
worse pred i c t ion o f  t he dependent var i abl e .  The l og -
l i ke l i hood t e s t  shows how we l l  the mode l f i t s  t he dat a  and 
t e s t s  for s t a t i s t i ca l  s igni f i cance ( Menard , 1 9 9 5 ) . 
To t e s t  hypothe s e s  Hl through H6 , l og i s t i c  regre s s i on 
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uses max i mum - l i ke l i hood e s t i ma t ion t o  det ermine t he re l a t ive 
odds that a hosp i t a l  wi l l  be acqu i red , given vari ous 
comb i nat i ons of i ndependent var i ab l e s . The maximum-
l i ke l i hood e s t i mat ion works best for l arge samp l e s , whe re i t  
t ends to  produce e s t imators w i t h  t he sma l l e s t  pos s ib l e  
vari ance . 
The s t a t i s t i c a l  s igni f i cance o f  t he coe f f i c i ent 
e s t i ma t e  is t e s t ed us i ng the l i ke l i hood ra t i o  chi - square 
t e s t . I f  t he l i ke l i hood rat i o  chi - square i s  s t a t i s t i cal ly 
s i gn i f i cant ( p  l e s s  t han . 1 0 )  we  concl ude that i nf orma t i on 
about t he i ndependent variabl e s  a l l ows t he mode l to  make 
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be t t e r  p redi c t i ons . The Ps eudo R Square i s  a mea sure o f  t he 
pre d i c t ive powe r o f  t he mode l . 
Summary of Chapter 4 
Chap t e r  4 de scribed the research des ign , da t a  sources , 
var i ab l e s , and ana lyt i c  me t hods used i n  t he s tudy . 
Univar i a t e  and mul t ivar i a t e  ana l ys i s  was used to det ermine 
t he a s soc i a t ion o f  hosp i t a l acqu i s i t ion w i t h  t he i ndependent 
var i abl e s . 
The s t udy de s ign i s  a c ros s - sect iona l ana l ys i s  o f  
hosp i t a l s  acqui red i n  1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0 . I t  a l so i n c l ude s a n  
anal y s i s  w i t h  a comb i ned model  u s i ng 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0 . Thi s  
comb i ned ana lys i s  poo l s  t he data f rom bot h  periods and t hus 
creat e s  a poo l e d  mode l . S i nce t he s t udy uses a d i chotomous 
dependent var i abl e ,  l ogi s t i c  regre s s i on i s  chosen as t he 
s t a t i s t i c a l  tool for mu l t ivar i a t e  ana l ys i s . Log i s t i c  
regre s s i on i s  used to t e s t  a l l  s i x  o f  t he hypotheses and t he 
assoc i at i on w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  
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Chap t e r  5 pre s ent s t he resu l t s  of t he s tudy and Chapter 
6 presents t he f i nd i ngs , imp l i ca t ions , and areas for f uture 
s t udy . 
Chapter 5 
Results 
Th i s  c hapt e r  present s t he resu l t s  o f  t he emp i r i cal  
ana lys i s  used to eva l ua t e  the hypotheses and research 
que s t i ons . I t  beg i ns w i t h  a compari son o f  s e l ec t ed 
charac t e ri s t i c s  o f  acqu i red hospi t a l s and not - acqu i red 
hospi t a l s . 
period . 
I t  fol l ows w i t h  an ana l ys i s  o f  each s t udy 
The desc ript i ve s t a t i s t i c s  i n c l ude the mean , s t andard 
dev i a t ion and f requency for t he i ndependent vari abl e s . 
Mul t ivar i a t e  ana l yses t hat t e s t e d  t he hypotheses and 
researc h  que s t i ons u s i ng l og i s t i c  regre s s i on ,  are pre sented , 
ana l yzed , and d i scussed . 
Re sul t s  w i t h  P - va lues between . 0 5 and . 1 0 l eve l wi l l  be 
v i ewed as ma rg i nal ly s i gni f i cant . Resul t s  w i t h  P - va l ues o f  
. 0 5  and . 0 1 l eve l a r e  s t a t i s t i ca l l y  s igni f i cant . The 
s t a t i s t i c a l  s ign i f i cance of t he resu l t s  i s  d i scussed . The 
chap t e r  conc l udes w i t h  t he resul t s  pert a i n i ng to whe ther a 
hosp i t a l  i s  acqui red by a f o r - p ro f i t  organi z a t ion or a not ­
for - p ro f i t  organi zat ion . 
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1999 Hospital Acquisition Study Period 
Descriptive Findings 
The samp l e  for the 1 9 9 9  hosp i t al  acqu i s i t i on s t udy 
per i od o r i g i na l l y i nc l uded 6 2  acqui s i t i ons . Howeve r ,  4 
acqu i red f ac i l i t i e s  had m i s s i ng dat a  and were e l i m i na t ed . 
As a resul t ,  the s amp l e  for the 1 9 9 9  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on 
s t udy period i nc l uded 5 8  acqui red hosp i t a l s  and a cont rol 
group of 1 7 4 . Pre l iminary ana l ys i s  o f  t he var i abl e s  o f  
i nt e re s t  u s e d  t h e  univa r i a t e  measures o f  mean and s t andard 
devi a t ion f or each variabl e .  The se were revi ewed t o  a s s e s s  
t he d i s t r i but ion o f  the da t a  and see i f  any va lues appeared 
unusual or i nd i ca t e d  pos s ib l e  probl ems w i t h  t he da t a . The 
de s c r ipt ive s t a t i s t i c s  were revi ewed for acqu i red and non ­
acqu i red hosp i t a l s ,  and then compared to t he same s t a t i s t i c s  
f o r  t h e  subsequent st udy periods . 
Descript ive s t a t i s t i c s  o f  cont i nuous vari abl e s  for t he 
1 9 9 9  s tudy period are shown i n  Tab l e  6 .  From a market 
perspe c t ive , acqui red hosp i t a l s  had higher per cap i t a  i ncome 
and higher number of HMO ' s .  From an opera t i onal performance 
perspe c t i ve , acqui red hosp i t a l s  had lower occupancy rat e s  
and h igher l ong - t e rm debt . 
Table 6 :  Descriptive Statistics of  Continuous Variables for the 1 999 Study Period 
(N = 232) 
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Acgui red Hos:ei t a l s  Not Acgu i red Hos:ei t a l s 
N 
Var i ab l e  Mean --
Marke t  
Per Cap i t a  $ 2 4 , 3 9 8 *  
I ncome 
Percent age of  1 2 . 7 8 9 %  E l derly 
Unemp l oyment 4 . 7 4 8  Rat e  
Numb e r  o f  HMOs 1 1 . 7 2 *  
Compe t i t ion : 
He r f i ndahl -
H i r s c hman . 4 6  
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Performance - . 0 4 9  
Return On 
As s e t s  
Occupancy Rate . 4 5 3 * *  
Operat i ng 
Expen s e s  p e r  $ 1 0 , 6 6 2  
D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age 1 0 . 0 7 
Long - Te rm Debt . 6 6 2 * *  
to  Equ i t y  
Organi za t i onal 
Fa c t ors 1 5 6  
S i ze 
Numbe r  o f  2 1 . 6 6 
S e rv i c e s  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s igni f i cant at p 
s igni f i cant at p 
s igni f i cant a t  p 
= 5 8  
S t andard 
Deviat ion 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
$ 6 , 5 6 0  
3 . 6 0 9  
2 . 3 7 1  
6 . 9 7 4  
. 3 6 
. 3 7 9  
. 1 4 4  
$ 3 , 4 4 9  
6 . 0 0 
. 7 5 1  
1 8 7  
1 6 . 3 6 
N = 1 7 4  
Mean S t anda rd --
Dev i a t i on 
$ 2 1 , 8 1 8 *  $ 5 , 6 7 4  
1 4 . 0 3 1 %  4 . 0 1 7  
5 . 3 4 2  2 . 8 7 3  
7 . 6 9 *  6 . 0 8 2  
. 6 1 . 3 5 
- . 0 0 6  . 2 2 2  
. 4 8 2 * *  . 1 9 6  
$ 1 1 , 4 1 0 $ 6 , 2 0 2  
9 . 1 5 4 . 7 0 
. 3 5 8 * *  . 5 2 4  
1 3 7  1 5 7  
2 5 . 0 7 1 6 . 7 8 
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An ana lys i s  of f requency was comp l e t e d  for the 
c a t egori cal  var i abl e s  concerning ownership . The re su l t s  are 
presented in Tab l e  7 ,  De s c r ipt ive S t a t i s t i c s  o f  Ca tegorical 
Var i ab l e s  for the 1 9 9 9  S t udy Per iod . 
Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for the 1 999 Study Period 
(N = 232) 
Acgui red HosEi t a l s  Not Acgu i red 
N = 5 8  HosEi t a l s 
Var i ab l e  Cat egory Freguency Percent age 
For - pro f i t  Organi za t i on 
3 6 * *  6 2 %  
Not - fo r - Organi zat ion 
prof i t  1 7  2 9 %  
Government a l  Organ i zat ion 
5 9 %  
Note : a l l  variables were measured at the hospItal level. 
* * *  
* *  
* 
s igni f i cant a t  p 
s i gni f i cant a t  p 
s i gni f i cant at p 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 




2 7 * *  
1 0 3 
4 4  
As not ed i n  Tab l e  7 ,  f o r - p ro f i t hosp i t a l s are more 
l i ke ly than t he not - fo r - p ro f i t  or gove rnment owned to be 
acqu i red . I n  t he 1 9 9 9  s tudy peri od , 6 2 %  o f  t he acqu i red 
1 7 4  
Perce -
nt age 
1 6 %  
6 0 %  
2 4 %  
hosp i t a l s  were f o r - p ro f i t , whereas they are a s ign i f i cant ly 
sma l l e r  pe rcent age o f  t he overa l l  hosp i t a l  popu l a t ion . 
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Correlation Analysis 
Corre l a t i on i s  t he l i near a s soc iat ion be tween t wo 
random vari abl e s . To t e s t  f o r  mul t i co l l i neari t y ,  Pearson ' s  
corre l a t ion coe f f i c i ent s ,  r ,  were examined for comb i nat i ons 
of i ndependent cont i nuous var i abl e s . Mul t i co l l i nea r i ty among 
i ndependent va r i abl e s  i n  regre s s i on ana lys i s  resul t s  i n  
paramet ers t ha t  a re unre l i abl e ,  weakeni ng t he pred i c t ive 
val ue of t he ana l ys i s . 
Pearson ' s  corre l a t ion coe f f i c i ents  range f rom - 1  t o  1 .  
A pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent means t ha t  t he a s soc i a t i on i s  
pos i t ive ; a nega t ive va l ue means i t  i s  negat ive . The 
gre a t e r  t he abso l u t e  va l ue of the coe f f i c i ent , the s t ronge r 
t he l i near a s soc i a t ion . Among t he var i ab l e s  i nc l uded i n  t he 
ana lys i s ,  mos t  had l ow corre l at i ons , sugge s t i ng no 
col l i ne a r i t y  prob l em . Howeve r ,  t he corre l a t i on da t a  
reve a l e d  t he f o l l owing corre l a t i ons t hat i ndi cated 
mu l t i co l l i ne a r i t y  probl ems : 
• Hosp i t a l  s i ze w i t h  hosp i t a l  adm i s s i ons ( . 8 9 )  
• Number o f  HMOs w i t h  HMO pene t ra t ion ( . 7 3 )  
• Ret urn on a s s e t s  w i t h  ope rat i ng marg i n  ( . 6 3 )  
On t he ba s i s  o f  t h i s  i n f orma t ion , t hree var i ab l e s : 
hosp i t a l  admi s s i ons , HMO pene t rat ion and opera t i ng marg i n  
were de l e t ed f rom t he ana lys i s . 
M ultivariate Findings 
Mu l t i va r i a t e  l og i s t i c  regre s s ion i s  the pre f erred 
analyt i c  t echn i que when t he dependent var i ab l e  i s  
d i chot omous . A f t er de l e t i ng t he highly corre l at e d  
var i abl e s , logi s t i c  regre s s ion w a s  u s e d  to model the data 
and i dent i fy s i gn i f i c ant re l a t i onships between t he 
i ndependent vari abl e s  and t he dependent vari abl e ,  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on .  
Tab l e  8 provides the va r i abl e ,  be t a  coe f f i c i ent s ,  
parame t e r  e s t i mat e s , s t andard error and probab i l i t y  va lues 
for t he l og i s t i c  regre s s ion mode l . The s i gns o f  t he mode l 
coe f f i c i ent s a re i n t e rpreted a s  fol l ows : 
• When coe f f i c i ent s a re negat ive , a lower va l ue o f  t he 
var i able increases the probab i l i t y  o f  hosp i t a l  
acqui s i t i on .  
• When coe f f i c i ent s a re pos i t ive , a higher va l ue o f  t he 
va r i ab l e  i ncreases t he probab i l i t y  o f  hosp i t a l  
acqui s i t i on . 
As not ed i n  Tab l e  8 ,  two o f  t he f ive ope ra t i ona l 
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var i abl e s , occupancy rate and l ong - term debt to  equ i t y ,  are 
r e l a t e d  t o  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . Both occupancy ra t e  and 
l ong - t e rm debt to equ i t y  are marg i nal ly s igni f i cant at t he 
. 1 0 l eve l . 
Table 8 :  Logistic Analysis o f  Acquisition for t h e  1 999 Study Period (dependent 
variable: I = acquired; 0 = not acquired) (N = 232) 
Va ri abl e Parame t e r  
Est ima t e  
Marke t  
Per Cap i t a  I ncome 
Percentage o f  
E l derly 
Unempl oyment Ra t e  
Number of HMOs 
He r f i ndahl -
H i rschman 
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Performanc e  
Ret urn on A s s e t s  
Oc cupancy R a t e  
Operat i ng Expenses 
per Di s c harge 
Fac i l i t y  Age 
Long - Term Debt t o  
Equ i t y 
Organ i za t i on a l  
Fa c tors 
S i ze 
Number o f  S e rv i c e s  
For - pro f i t  
Not - fa r - p ro f i t  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s igni f i cant at p 
s i gni f i cant a t  p 
s igni f i cant a t  p 
. 0 0 0  
- . 0 5 7  
. 0 0 0  
. 0 3 0  
- 1 . 1 6 
- . 0 7 9  
- 2 . 7 5 0  
. 0 0 0  
. 0 5 8  
. 5 5 2  
. 0 0 0  
- . 0 2 4  
2 . 8 2 4  
1 . 0 5 8  
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
• Model  c h i - square = 7 1 . 6 8 0  
• - 2  Log l i ke l i hood = 1 8 9 . 2 4 
• Pseudo R Square = . 3 9 4  
Standard Probab i l i ty 
Error ---
. 0 0 0  . 4 0 3  
. 0 4 8  . 2 3 5  
. 0 8 6  . 9 9 6  
. 0 4 3  . 4 8 5  
. 8 1 1  . 1 5 0  
. 7 5 7  . 9 1 7  
1 . 4 2 3  . 0 5 3 *  
. 0 0 0  . 7 8 0  
. 0 3 9  . 1 3 2  
. 3 1 5  . 0 7 9 *  
. 0 0 1  . 7 2 3  
. 0 1 2  . 0 4 7 * *  
. 6 9 1  . 0 0 0 * * *  
. 6 6 0  . 1 0 9  
1 0 1  
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S i nce occupancy rate has a negat ive coe f f i c i ent , 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower occupancy have a gre a t e r  l i ke l i hood o f  
be i ng acqui red . S i nce long - t e rm debt has a pos i t ive 
coe f f i c i ent , t he grea t e r  t he l ong - t e rm debt , t he more l i ke ly 
a hosp i t a l  i s  to  be acqu i re d . 
Two o f  t he f our organ i zat ional variabl e s , numbe r o f  
servi c e s  and f o r - p ro f i t  ownership , are re l a t e d  t o  hospi t a l  
acqu i s i t i on . S i nce t he numbe r o f  serv i c e s  has a negat ive 
coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s w i t h  f ewer serv i c e s  a re more l i ke l y  
to be acqu i red . The number o f  serv i c e s  i s  s ign i f i cant a t  
t he . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce t he f o r - p ro f i t  owne rship var i ab l e  has 
a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  for - pro f i t  ownership 
are more l i ke l y  t o  be acqu i red . 
s i gn i f i cant a t  t he . 0 1 l eve l . 
For - pro f i t  owne rship i s  
The ps eudo R squared o f  . 3 9 4  i nd i c a t e s  a mode rate 
pred i c t ive power f o r  t he 1 9 9 9  l og i s t i c  regre s s ion mode l . I n  
summary , hosp i t a l s w i t h  l ower oc cupancy rates , h igher debt , 
f ewer servi ces , and f o r - pro f i t  owne rship are more l i ke l y  to 
be acqu i red . 
The 1 9 9 9  s t udy examines t he as soc i a t ion o f  marke t , 
ope rat i ona l performance and organ i zat iona l f ac t ors w i t h  
whe t her t he hospi t a l s  were acqu i red by f o r - p ro f i t  
organ i zat i ons o r  not - fo r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons . I t  i nc l udes 
a t o t a l  samp l e  of 5 8  acqu i red hospi t a l s and 1 7 4  non - acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  dur i ng the 1 9 9 9  s tudy per i od . The study 
repre s ent s 2 7  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions by for - pro f i t  
organ i zat i ons , and t ab l e  9B  repre sent s 3 1  acqu i s i t ions by 
not - f or - pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . 
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Tab l e  9 reve a l s  t hat the f i nd i ng s  d i f f e r  cons i derably 
for acqu i s i t i ons by for - p ro f i t  organi z a t i ons and t hose by 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  organ i za t i ons dur i ng the 1 9 9 9  s t udy period . 
The col umns marked a s  for - pro f i t  9A exp l a i n  t he acqu i s i t i on 
behavior o f  f o r - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons . Dur i ng t he 1 9 9 9  s tudy 
p e r i od , f o r - pro f i t  s t a tus was t he only s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i gn i f i cant var i ab l e  f o r  pred i c t i ng acqu i s i t ions . For -
pro f i t  s t atus i s  s igni f i c ant at the . 0 1 l eve l . S i nce the 
for - pro f i t  owne r s h i p  va r i ab l e  has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , 
for - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons are more l i ke l y  to acqui re 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  for - pro f i t  ownership . 
The col umns ma rked a s  not - f or - pro f i t  9B exp l a i n  t he 
acqu i s i t i on behavior o f  not - fo r - pro f i t  organi zat ions . The 
f o l l ow i ng variabl e s  a re s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s igni f i cant for 
hosp i t a l s  acqu i red by not - for - pro f i t  organ i zat ions : number 
o f  HMOs , occupancy rate and l ong - t e rm debt . 
One o f  t he f ive market var i abl e s , the number o f  HMOs , 
i s  re l at e d  t o  acqu i s i t i ons by not - f or - p ro f i t  organi zat ions . 
The number o f  HMOs has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent and i s  
s igni f i cant a t  t he . 0 5 l eve l . 
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Table 9 :  Logistic Analysis Results: Hospital Acquisition b y  For-Profit or Not-For­
Profit Organizations for the 1 999 Study Period (N = 232) 
For - Pro f i t  
Var i a b l e  Para ----
me t e r  
Es t i ----
ma t e  
Mark e t  
Per Cap i t a  . 0 0 0  
I ncome 
Percentage - . 0 5 8  o f  E l de r l y  
Unemp l oyment . 0 6 9  
Number HMOs - . 0 9 5  
Her f i ndahl -
H i rs chman - 1 . 6 6 7  
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Return on . 8 2 2  
Asset s 
Occupancy - . 5 4 7  Rat e  
Ope ra t i ng 
Expense s  per . 0 0 0  
D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age . 0 5 7  
Long - Te rm 
Debt t o  . 1 0 1 
Equ i ty 
Organ i z a -
t i onal - . 0 0 2  
S i ze 
Number o f  - . 0 2 6  S e rv i c e s  
For - p ro f i t 3 . 8 4 7  
Not - f or - 1 . 7 4 2  p ro f i t  
* * *  
* *  
S I g n I f I c a n t  a t  p 
s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  p 
s ig n i f i c a n t  at p 
9A: Model chi-square = 39.34.  
-2  Log likelihood = 1 27 . 643.  




. 0 0 0  
. 0 6 9  
. 1 1 2  
. 0 6 0  
1 . 0 6 0  
. 8 5 0  
1 . 7 2 1  
. 0 0 0  
. 0 4 4  
. 3 2 6  
. 0 0 3  
. 0 1 6  
1 . 2 5 7  
1 . 2 3 1  
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
98:  
( 9A )  Not - For- Pro f i t  ( 9B )  
Proba - Param Stan----
b i l i ty e t e r  dard -- --
E s t i m  Error --- ---
a t e  
. 2 9 0  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  
. 4 0 2  - . 0 2 8  . 0 5 4  
. 5 4 0  - . 0 3 4  . 1 1 0  
. 1 1 1  . 1 1 4  . 0 5 0  
. 1 1 6  - . 1 8 1  1 . 0 0 7  
. 3 3 3  - . 6 4 7  . 8 1 6  
. 7 5 1  - 3 . 3 4 1 . 7 2 6  
. 6 8 8  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  
. 1 9 4  . 0 2 1  . 0 4 1  
. 7 5 6  . 5 7 0  . 3 2 2  
. 5 2 3  . 0 0 1  . 0 0 1  
. 1 0 3  - . 0 0 8  . 0 1 4  
. 0 0 2 * * *  1 . 1 8 0  . 7 4 0  
. 1 5 7  . 5 8 1  . 7 4 9  
Model chi-square = 33 .490. 
-2 Log likelihood = 1 48 .96. 
Pseudo R Square = . 247 .  
Proba -
b i 1 i ty 
. 9 8 2  
. 6 0 1  
. 7 5 5  
. 0 2 3 * *  
. 8 5 7  
. 4 2 8  
. 0 5 2 * 
. 7 8 8  
. 6 1 3  
. 0 7 7 *  
. 3 8 0  
. 5 5 1  
. 1 1 1  
. 4 3 7  
Two o f  t he f ive opera t i ng performance variabl e s , 
occupancy rate and l ong - term debt , a re re l ated to hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions b y  not - f o r - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons . Hosp i t a l s  
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w i t h  l ower occupancy rates are more l i ke l y  t o  be acqui red by 
non - pro f i t  syst ems . The occupancy rate i s  marg i na l l y  
s i gn i f i cant a t  t h e  . 1 0 l evel . Hosp i t a l s  w i t h  h igher long ­
t e rm debt are more l i ke l y  to b e  a cqui red by non -pro f i t  
syst ems . The l ong - term debt i s  marg i na l l y  s ign i f i cant at 
t he . 1 0 l eve l . 
The equa t ion dep i c t i ng acqu i s i t i ons by not - fo r - prof i t  
organi za t ions shows three o f  t he f ourteen i ndependent 
var i abl e s  are s ign i f i cant w i t h  a ps eudo R square of . 2 4 7 . 
I n  summary , hosp i t a l s  i n  marke t s  w i t h  many HMOs , those w i t h  
l ower occupancy rates , o r  t hose w i t h  high debt are more 
l i ke l y  t han others to  be acqu i red by not - f or - pro f i t  
organ i z a t i ons . 
2000 Hospital Acquisition Study Period 
Descriptive Findings 
The 2 0 0 0  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion s t udy period o r i g i na l l y  
i n c l uded 6 3  acqu i s i t i ons . Howeve r ,  4 acqui red f ac i l i t i e s  
had mi s s i ng da t a  and were e l i m i na t e d . As a resul t ,  t he 
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samp l e  for t he 2 0 0 0  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on s t udy period 
i n c l uded 5 9  acqu i red hosp i t a l s and a cont rol group o f  1 7 7 . 
Tab l e  1 0  s hows t he desc r i pt i ve s t a t i s t i c s . 
Table 1 0 :  Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables for the 2000 Study Period 
(N = 236) 
Acgu i red 
N 
Va r i ab l e  Mean --
Mark e t  
Per Cap i t a  $ 2 4 , 4 4 0  
I ncome 
Percent age o f  1 3 . 2 0 %  Elderly 
Unempl oyment 4 . 8 6 7  Rat e  
Number of  HMOs 1 0 . 8 3 *  
Compe t i t ion : 
Her f i ndah l - . 5 3 9  H i rs chman 
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Return on - . 1 2 9 * * *  
Asse t s  
Occupancy Rate . 4 4 7 *  
Operat i ng 
Expenses per $ 1 0 , 0 1 8  
D i scharge 
Fac i l i ty Age 1 1 . 5 2 * *  
Long - Te rm Debt . 8 2 *  to  Equ i t y  
Organ i za t i on a l  1 1 7 * *  
S i ze 
Number of 2 2 . 9 7 
Serv i c e s  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s igni f i cant at p 
s igni f i cant at p 
s igni f i cant at p 
HosEi t a l s  
= 5 9  
S t a ndard 
Devi a t ion 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
$ 6 , 0 6 1  
3 . 5 0 2  
2 . 9 9 7  
7 . 3 8 2 
. 3 7 7  
. 2 8 5  
. 1 5 3  
$ 4 , 5 4 6 
1 4 . 2 6 
1 . 1 2 2  
9 2  
1 6 . 1 1 
Not Acgu i re d  HosEi t a l s  
N = 1 7 7  
Mean S t andard --
Dev i a t i on 
$ 2 5 , 5 7 2  $ 7 , 4 1 1  
1 3 . 8 8 %  4 . 2 9  
4 . 3 9 1  1 . 7 9 7  
9 . 3 1 *  6 . 5 4 8  
. 5 5 4  . 3 4 7  
. 0 2 3 * * *  . 1 1 5  
. 5 3 5 *  . 1 8 4  
$ 1 1 , 0 9 9  $ 4 , 2 6 0  
9 . 0 7 * *  4 . 9 1 
. 4 8 *  . 5 4 3  
1 7 2 * *  1 5 0  
2 7 . 9 2 1 6 . 5 1 
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As s hown i n  Tab l e  1 0 ,  dur ing t he 2 0 0 0  s tudy period , t he 
f o l l ow i ng descr ipt ive s t a t i s t i c s  were s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i gn i f i cant . From a market pe rspec t ive , acqu i re d  hosp i t a l s 
had h i gher number o f  HMO ' s .  From an operat i ng p e r formance 
perspec t ive ,  acqui red hosp i t a l s  con t i nued to have l ower 
return on a s s e t s ,  l ower occupancy rat e s , h i gher long - t e rm 
debt l eve l s , and o l de r  f ac i l i t i es . 
Tab l e  1 1  s hows t he descript ive s t at i st i c s  o f  
c a t ego r i c a l  vari abl e s  for the 2 0 0 0  study period . 
Table 1 1 :  Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for the 2000 Study Period 
(N = 236) 
Acqu i red Hos,ei t a l s Not Acqui red 
N = 5 9  Hosp i t a l s  
N = 1 7 7  
Var i ab l e  Cat egorz Frequency Percentag:e Frequency Percen-
t age 
For - Organ i -
4 1 %  3 1 * *  1 7 %  pro f i t  zat i on 2 4 * *  
Not - f or - Organ i - 2 8  4 7 %  1 1 3  6 3 %  pro f i t  zat i on 
Gove rn - Organ i -
ment a l , zat i on 7 1 2 %  3 3  2 0 %  non -
federal 
Note: a l l  varIables were measured at the hospItal level 
* * *  s igni f i cant at p . 0 1 
* *  s igni f i cant at p . 0 5 
* s igni f i cant at p . 1  
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As s hown i n  Tab l e  1 1 ,  f or - pro f i t  hospi t a l s are more 
l i ke l y  t han not - fo r - prof i t s  to  be acqu i red . I n  t he 2 0 0 0  
s t udy period , 4 1 %  o f  acqu i red hosp i t a l s  were f or - pro f i t , 
whe reas t hey a re a s ign i f i cant l y  sma l l e r  percent age o f  t he 
overal l  hosp i t a l  popu l a t i on . 
Correlation Analysis 
Corre l a t i on i s  t he l i near a s soc i a t ion between t wo 
random va r i abl e s . To t e s t  for mul t i co l l i ne a r i t y ,  Pearson ' s  
corre l a t i on coe f f i c i e nt s ,  r ,  were examined f or comb i nat i ons 
of i ndependent cont i nuous var i abl e s . Among the var i ab l e s  
s e l e c t e d  for i nc l us ion i n  t he ana l ys i s ,  mos t  had l ow 
corre l at i ons , sugge s t i ng no col l i nea r i t y  prob l em . Howeve r ,  
the corre l at i on dat a  reve a l ed t he fol l ow i ng corre l a t i ons 
t ha t  i ndicated mu l t i co l l i ne a r i t y  probl ems : 
• Hosp i t a l  s i ze w i t h  hosp i t a l  adm i s s i ons ( . 9 5 )  
• Ret urn on a s se t s  w i t h  opera t i ng marg i n  ( . 6 3 )  
• Number o f  HMOs w i t h  HMO pene t rat ion ( . 5 7 )  
On the bas i s  o f  t he i r  high corre l at i ons , t he hosp i t a l  
admi s s i ons var i ab l e  and t he opera t i ng ma rg i n  variable were 
de l e t ed f rom t he ana l ys i s . Because o f  the h i gh corre l a t ion 
a s  we l l  a s  other i nt e rac t i ons , t he HMO pene t ra t ion variab l e  
w a s  a l so de l e t e d  f rom t he analys i s . 
M ultivariate Findings 
Mul t ivar i a t e  logi s t i c  regre s s ion is t he pre f e rred 
ana lyt i c  t echni que when t he dependent var i ab l e  i s  
d i chot omous . A f t e r  de l e t i ng t he highly corre l ated 
variabl e s , l og i s t i c  regre s s i on wa s used to mode l the dat a  
and i dent i fy s ign i f i cant re l a t i onships be t ween the 
i ndependent var i ab l e s  and t he dependent var i abl e ,  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on .  The resu l t s  o f  t he mul t ivar i a t e  l og i s t i c  
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regre s s i on analys i s  f o r  t he 2 0 0 0  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion s tudy 
period are presented i n  Tab l e  1 2 . 
The equat i on f o r  the 2 0 0 0  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion s t udy 
period shows that f i ve o f  t he f ourt een i ndependent variabl e s  
are s igni f i cant . One o f  the f ive market f actors , number o f  
HMOs , i s  related to acqu i s i t ion and i s  marg i na l l y  
s ign i f i cant at t h e  . 1 0 l eve l . The number o f  HMOs has a 
pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , whi c h  i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s i n  
marke t s  w i t h  more HMOs a r e  more l i ke l y  to b e  acqui red . Two 
o f  t he f our organ i zat i ona l var i abl es , s i ze and f or -pro f i t  
ownership , are re l a t ed to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  Hosp i t a l s  
w i t h  sma l l e r  s i ze a r e  more l i ke l y  to b e  acqu i red . S i ze i s  
marg i nal ly s igni f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l . 
l ID 
Table 1 2 :  Logistic Analysis of Acquisitions for the 2000 Study Period (dependent 
variable: 1 = acquired; 0 = not acquired) (N = 236) 
var i a b l e  Parame t e r  S t andard Probab i l i  t Y 
Est imate Error ---
Mark e t  
Per Cap i t a  I ncome . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 4 0 5  
Percent age o f  E l de r l y  
- . 0 6 8  . 0 5 2  . 1 8 7  
Unempl oyment Ra t e  
. 0 0 3  . 1 0 2  . 9 7 6  
Number o f  HMOs . 0 7 5  . 0 4 6  . 1 0 0 *  
Her f i ndah l - H i rschman 
- . 3 0 0  . 7 6 9  . 6 9 7  I ndex 
Opera ting Performance - 4 . 0 0 1  1 . 2 5 3  . 0 0 1 * * *  Return on As s e t s  
Occupancy Ra t e  - 1 . 4 0 7  1 . 3 1 4 . 2 8 4  
Ope rat i ng Expens e s  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 4 2 5  per D i s c harge 
Fac i l i ty Age . 0 8 2  . 0 3 2  . 0 1 0 * *  
Long - Te rm Debt to . 2 4 3  . 3 2 0  . 4 4 6  Equ i t y  
Organ i za t i onal 
Fa c tors - . 0 0 4  . 0 0 2  . 0 8 5 *  
S i ze 
Number of S e rv i c e s  - . 0 0 4 . 0 1 4  . 1 7 7  
For - pro f i t  1 . 3 5 5  . 6 2 9  . 0 3 1 * *  
Not - fa r - p ro f i t  . 2 4 7  . 5 3 9  . 6 4 7  
* * *  s i gni f i cant at p . 0 1 
* *  s ign i f i cant at p . 0 5 
* s igni f i cant at p . 1  
• Model  chi - square 6 6 . 5 2 7 . 
• - 2  Log l i ke l i hood = 1 9 8 . 8 9 5 . 
• Pseudo R Square = . 3 6 4 .  
III 
Two o f  t he f ive operat iona l variabl e s , return on a s s e t s  
and f ac i l i t y  age , a r e  r e l a t ed to hospi t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  
Ret urn on a s s e t s  has a negat ive coe f f i c ient and i s  
s igni f i cant a t  t he . 0 0 1  l eve l . S i nce return on a s s e t s  has a 
negat ive coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower ret urns on a s se t s  
are more l i ke l y  to be acqu i re d . Fac i l i ty age i s  s i gn i f i cant 
at t he . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce f ac i l i t y  age has a pos i t i ve 
coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s w i t h  o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  are more l i ke l y  
to b e  acqu i red . 
The f o r - p ro f i t  var i ab l e  i s  s i gn i f i c ant a t  t he . 0 5 
l eve l . S i nce t he for - pro f i t  ownership vari abl e has a 
pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , hospi t a l s  w i t h  f or - pro f i t  ownership 
are more l i ke ly to be acqui red . The equa t i on dep i c t i ng 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons dur i ng t he 2 0 0 0  s t udy period s hows 
that f ive of t he f ourteen i ndependent var i ab l e s  a re 
s igni f i c ant w i t h  a pseudo R square o f  . 3 6 4 . I n  summary , 
hospi t a l s  t ha t  are i n  marke t s  w i t h  high numbe rs o f  HMOs , or 
that have l ow ret urn on a s s e t s ,  aged phys i c a l  pl ant , sma l l e r  
s i ze , or  for - pro f i t  ownership a re more l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i red . 
Tab l e  1 3  exami nes the assoc i a t i ons o f  market , 
opera t i ona l performance and organi z a t i ona l factors w i t h  
hosp i t a l s  t ha t  were acqu i red b y  f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat ions or 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons dur i ng t he year 2 0 0 0 . 
Table 1 3 :  Logistic Analysis Results: Hospital Acquisition b y  For-Profit and Not­
For-Profit Organizations for the 2000 Study Period (N = 236) 
For- Prof i t  
Var i a b l e  Para -
met er 
Es t i ----
mat e  
Mark e t  
Per Cap i t a  . 0 0 0  
I ncome 
Percent age . 0 0 0  o f  E l de r l y  
Unemp loy- . 0 2 1  ment R a t e  
Number of  . 0 4 1  HMOs 
Herf i ndahl -
H i rs c hman - . 6 1 0  
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Return on - 2 . 2 9 
As s e t s  
Occupancy . 0 8 6  
Operat i ng 
Expens e s /  . 0 0 0  
D i s c ha rge 
Fac i l i ty - . 0 1 9  Age 
Long - Term . 2 4 3  Debt 
Organi za -
t i onal - . 0 0 9  
S i ze 
Numbe r o f  . 0 3 9  
S e rv i c e s  
For - pro f i t  . 1 0 8  
Not - fo r - - . 4 7 6  
pro f i t  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s l g n l f l c a n t  at P 
s i g n i f i c a n t  at P 




. 0 0 0  
. 0 6 2  
. 1 2 1  
. 0 5 8  
1 .  0 0  
1 . 0 9 9  
1 . 7 6 7  
. 0 0 0  
. 0 3 0  
. 3 1 0  
. 0 0 4  
. 0 2 3  
. 7 6 3  
. 7 0 3  
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
1 3 A : Mode l c h i - s q u a r e  = 2 5 . 6 3 5 . 
- 2  Log l i ke l i hood = 12 9 . 5 5 4 . 
P s e udo R Square = . 2 14 .  
( 1 3 A )  Not - Fo r - Prof i t  ( 1 3 B )  
Proba - Para - S t an - Proba ----
b i l i ty me ter dard b i l i ty --
Es t i - Error --- ---
mat e  
. 6 8 3  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 6 4 4  
. 9 9 9  - . 1 1 1  . 0 6 4  . 0 8 0 *  
. 8 6 5  . 0 1 2  . 1 2 2  . 9 2 0  
. 4 7 7  . 0 7 2  . 0 5 5  . 1 9 3  
. 5 4 4  - . 0 4 9  . 9 3 3  . 9 5 8  
. 0 3 7 * *  - 2 . 3 9 2 1 . 0 6 1  . 0 2 4 * *  
. 9 6 1  - 2 . 1 8 8  1 . 5 6 9  . 1 6 3  
. 0 8 9 *  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 4 4 7  
. 5 2 7  . 1 0 6  . 0 3 7  . 0 0 4 * * *  
. 4 3 3  - . 2 4 1  . 3 1 6  . 4 4 6  
. 0 3 7 * *  - . 0 0 2  . 0 0 3  . 4 7 0  
. 0 9 1 *  - . 0 2 3  . 0 1 5  . 1 2 2  
. 8 8 8  1 . 8 3 4  . 8 2 5  . 0 2 6 * *  
. 4 9 8  . 7 2 5  . 7 2 8  . 3 1 9  
1 3 B : Mode l ch i - s q u a r e  = 4 4 . 9 3 .  
- 2  Log l i k e l i hood = 1 5 3 . 1 9 5 . 
P s eudo R Square = . 3 0 5 . 
1 1 2 
Tab l e  1 3  i nc l udes a total  samp l e  o f  5 9  acqui red 
hosp i t a l s and 1 7 7  non - acqu i red hospi t a l s . Tab l e  1 3A 
repre sent s 2 4  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions by f or - pro f i t  
organi z a t i ons , and t ab l e  1 3 8  repre sent s 3 5  acqu i s i t ions by 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  organi z a t ions . 
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Tab l e  1 3  s hows , t he f i nd i ngs f rom t he 2 0 0 0  s t udy period 
d i f f e r  f rom t hose f rom the 1 9 9 9  s tudy period for 
acqu i s i t i ons by f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons and not - f o r - p ro f i t  
organ i zat i ons . The col umns marked a s  for - pro f i t  1 3A exp l a i n  
t he acqu i s i t ion behavior o f  for - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons . The 
f o l lowing va r i ab l e s  are s t a t i s t i c a l ly s igni f i cant for 
acqu i s i t i ons by f o r - p ro f i t  organ i za t i ons : ret urn on a s s e t s ,  
I t  i s  operat i ng expens e s , s i ze ,  and number o f  servi ces . 
i nt ere s t i ng t o  not e  t hat those va r i abl e s  are not 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s igni f i cant for f o r - p ro f i t  acqu i s i t i ons in t he 
1 9 9 9  s t udy period . 
Two o f  t he f ive opera t i ona l vari abl e s , ret urn on a s s e t s  
and operat i ng expenses are re l a ted t o  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons 
by f o r - p ro f i t  organi z a t i ons . The ret urn on a s s e t s  i s  
s igni f i cant a t  t he . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce return o n  a s s e t s  has a 
negat ive coe f f i c i ent , hospi t a l s  w i t h  l ower ret urns on a s s e t s  
a re more l i k e l y  t o  b e  acqu i red . I n  cont ra s t , ope rat i ng 
expenses per d i scha rge has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent and i s  
marg i na l l y  s t a t i s t i ca l l y s igni f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l . 
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S i nce opera t i ng expense s has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent , 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  h ighe r operat i ng expense s are more l i ke l y  to 
be acqu i red . 
Two o f  t he four organ i zat i ona l variabl e s , s i ze and 
numbe r of s e rv i c e s , are r e l a t ed to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
S i ze i s  s i gn i f i cant at t he . 0 5 l eve l . S ince s i ze has a 
negat ive coe f f i c i ent , sma l l e r  hosp i t a l s  are more l i ke l y  to 
be acqu i red . Number o f  serv i ces i s  marg i na l l y  s igni f i cant 
at the . 1 0 l eve l and has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c ient . S i nce 
numbe r o f  s e rv i c e s  has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  
w i t h  more s e rv i c e s  are more l i kely to be acqu i red . The 
equa t ion dep i c t i ng acqu i s i t i ons by f o r - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons 
s hows t hat f our of the fourteen i ndependent var i abl e s  are 
s i gni f i cant w i t h  a pseudo R squared o f  . 2 1 4 . 
The col umns marked as not - fo r - p ro f i t  1 3 8  exp l a i n  t he 
acqu i s i t ion behavior o f  not - f o r - pro f i t  organ i za t ions dur i ng 
the 2 0 0 0  s t udy p e r i od . The fol l ow i ng variables  are 
s t a t i s t i ca l l y s i gni f i cant for acqu i s i t i ons by not - f o r - p ro f i t  
organi z a t i ons : percentage o f  t he e l derly , re turn on a s s e t s ,  
f ac i l i ty age , and f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus . 
One o f  t he f i ve market var i abl e s , percent age o f  
e l de rly , i s  r e l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons by not - f o r -
pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . The percentage o f  e l de rly i s  
marg i na l ly s i gn i f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l . S i nce percent age 
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o f  e l de r l y  has a nega t ive coe f f i c ient , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower 
percentages of e l de rly a re more l i ke l y  than others to  be 
acqu i red by not - f or - pro f i t  organi zat ions . 
Two o f  t he f ive opera t i ng va r i abl e s , return on a s s e t s  
and f ac i l i t y  age , a r e  re l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons by 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons . 
s ign i f i cant a t  t he . 0 5 l eve l . 
Return on a s s e t s  i s  
S i nce return on a s s e t s  has a 
negat ive coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l owe r re turns on a s s e t s  
a r e  more l i k e l y  to b e  acqu i red b y  not - fo r - pro f i t  
organi zat i ons . Fac i l i ty age i s  s igni f i cant at t he . 0 1 
l eve l . S i nc e  f ac i l i t y  age has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  are more l i ke l y  t han 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  newer f ac i l i t i e s  to  be acqui red by not - f or ­
pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . 
One o f  the f our organ i za t i ona l var i abl es , for - pro f i t  
s t atus , i s  re l a t e d  t o  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions by not - fo r -
pro f i t  organi zat i ons . For - pro f i t  s t atus i s  s i gni f i cant at 
t he . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce for - p ro f i t  s t atus has a pos i t i ve 
coe f f i c i ent , f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  are more l i ke l y  t han 
others to  be acqu i red by not - f or - p ro f i t  organ i zat ions . The 
equa t i on dep i c t i ng acqu i s i t i ons by not - for - pro f i t  
organi za t ions s hows that f our o f  t he fourteen i ndependent 
var i ab l e s  are s ign i f i cant and have a pseudo R square o f  
. 3 0 5 . 
1 999 and 2000 Pooled Hospital Acquisition Study 
Descriptive Findings 
The 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  poo l e d  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion s tudy 
combines t he two s t udy periods . The resul t i ng s amp l e  
i nc l uded 1 1 7  acqu i red hosp i t a l s  and a control group o f  3 5 1  
non - a cqu i red hospi t a l s . As i n  t he other t wo s tudi e s , 
pre l i mi nary ana l ys i s  o f  t he vari abl e s  o f  interest  used t he 
mean and s t andard devi a t i on f or each vari abl e .  They were 
revi ewed to a s s e s s  the d i s t r i but ion o f  t he dat a  and to see 
i f  any va l ues appeared unusual or i ndi cated pos s i bl e  
probl ems w i t h  t he dat a . 
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The descr ipt ive s t a t i s t i c s were reviewed for acqu i red 
and for non - acqu i red hospi t a l s , and t hen compared to t he 
same s t a t i s t i c s  for the previous s t udy periods . The re su l t s  
were cons i s t ent w i t h  t he p r i o r  periods . 
As shown i n  Tab l e  1 4 , dur i ng t he poo l ed s t udy , t he 
fol l ow i ng descript ive s t a t i s t i c s  were s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ign i f i c ant . From a market perspect ive , acqu i red hospi t a l s  
h a d  higher number o f  HMO ' s .  From an ope ra t i ng p e r formance 
perspe c t ive , acqui red hosp i t a l s  had l owe r ret urn on asset s ,  
l ower occupancy rat e s , higher l ong - term debt l eve l s ,  and 
o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s . 
Table 1 4 :  Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables for the 1 999 and 2000 
Study (N = 468) 
1 1 7 
Acgu i red Hosei t a l s  Not Acgui red Hosei t a l s  
( N  = 1 1 7 )  
Va r i ab l e  Mean S t andard --
Devi at i on 
Mark e t  
Per Cap i t a  $ 2 4 , 4 1 9  $ 6 , 2 8 6  
I ncome 
Percent age o f  1 2 . 9 9 3 . 5 4 E l de r l y  
Unemp l oyment 4 . 8 0 2 . 6 9 Rate 
Numbe r o f  HMOs 1 1 . 2 7 *  7 . 1 6 
Compe t i t i on : 
He r f i ndah l - . 4 7 3  . 3 7 5  H i rs c hman 
I ndex 
Opera t ing 
Performance - . 0 8 9 * * *  . 3 3 6  
Return on 
As s e t s  
Occupancy Ra t e  
. 4 5 0 * *  . 1 4 8  
Ope ra t i ng 
Expenses per $ 1 0 , 3 3 7  $4 , 0 3 6  
D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age 1 0 . 2 1 * *  6 . 2 3  
Long - Term Debt . 7 6 5 * *  . 94 0  
to  Equ i t y 
Organi za t i onal 
Fa c tors 1 3 6  1 4 8  
S i ze 
Numbe r o f  2 2 . 3 2 1 6 . 1 8 
S e rv i c e s  
* * *  s ign i f i cant a t  p . 0 1 
* *  s igni f i cant a t  p . 0 5 
* s igni f i cant at p . 1  
( N  = 3 5 1  ) 
Mean St andard --
Deviat ion 
$ 2 3 , 7 1 1  $ 6 , 8 6 0  
1 3 . 9 5 4 . 1 5 2  
4 . 8 6 2 . 4 3  
8 . 4 6 *  6 . 3 6 
. 5 8 6  . 3 5 0  
. 0 0 8 * * *  . 1 7 7  
. 5 0 9 * *  . 1 9 2  
$ 1 1 , 2 5 3  $ 5 , 3 0 7  
9 . 1 4 * *  5 . 6 6 
. 4 0 3 * *  . 5 3 5  
1 5 4  1 0 4  
2 7 . 0 1 1 6 . 7 3 
Tab l e  1 5 ,  shows t he des c r ipt ive s t a t i s t i c s  o f  
cat egor i c a l  vari a b l e s  f o r  the poo l e d  s t udy . 
Table 1 5 :  Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables for the 1 999 and 2000 
Pooled Study (N = 468) 
Acgu i red HosI2i t a l s  Not Acgu i red 
HosI2i t a l s  
1 1 8 
Va r i ab l e  Categorz Freguencz Percen- Freguencz Percen-
t age 
Hosp i t a l  Acqu i re 
1 1 7  3 5 1  Acqu i s i t ion 
For - p ro f i t  Organi - 6 0 * * *  5 1 %  5 8 * * *  zat ion 
Not - f or - Organ i - 4 5  3 8 %  2 1 6  p ro f i t  zat i on 
Government a l , Organi -
1 2  1 1 %  7 7  Non - f ederal zat i on 
Note: a l l  vanables were measured at the hospItal level . 
* * *  s igni f i cant at p . 0 1 
* *  s igni f i cant at p . 0 5 
* s igni f i cant a t  p . 1  
As not ed in Tab l e  1 5 ,  for-pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  have an 
t age 
1 7 %  
6 2 %  
2 1 %  
i nc reased l i ke l i hood o f  be i ng acqu i red . I n  t he poo l e d  s tudy 
period , 5 1 %  o f  acqu i red hosp i t a l s were f o r - p ro f i t  and only 
3 8 %  were not - for - pro f i t . 
Correlation Analysis 
Corre l a t i on i s  the l i near a s soc i a t ion be tween two 
random var i abl e s . To t e s t  for mul t i col l i near i t y ,  Pearson ' s  
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corre l a t ion coe f f i c i e nt s , r ,  were examined for comb i nat i ons 
of i ndependent cont i nuous var i abl es . Among t he va r i ab l e s  
s e l ec t ed for i n c l u s ion i n  t he ana lys i s ,  mos t  had l ow 
corre l a t i ons , i nd i cat i ng no co l l i ne a r i t y  probl em . Howeve r ,  
the corre l a t i on data f or t he poo l ed ana l ys i s  reve a l ed the 
f o l l ow i ng corre l a t i ons , whi c h  i nd i c a t e  mul t i col l inear i ty 
p robl ems : 
• Hosp i t a l  s i ze w i t h  hosp i t a l  adm i s s i ons ( . 9 2 )  
• Return on a s s e t s  w i t h  operat i ng marg i n  ( . 6 1 )  
• Number o f  HMOs w i t h  HMO pene t ra t i on ( . 5 8 )  
Because o f  t he i r  high corre l a t i ons , t he hosp i t a l  
admi s s i ons va r i ab l e  and t he operat i ng marg i n  var i ab l e  were 
de l e t ed f rom t he ana lys i s . Due to  h igh corre l a t i on and 
probl ems w i t h  i nt e rac t i ons , t he HMO pene t rat i on va r i ab l e  was 
de l e t e d  f rom t he ana lys i s . 
M ultivariate Findings 
Mu l t i va r i a t e  l og i s t i c  regre s s ion i s  t he pre f e rred 
ana l yt i c  t e c hn i que when t he dependent va r i ab l e  i s  
d i chot omous . A f t er d e l e t i ng t he h ighly corre l at ed 
vari abl e s , logi s t i c  regre s s ion was used to mode l t he da t a  
and det ermi ne s igni f i cant re l a t ionsh i p s  between t he 
i ndependent var i abl e s  and t he dependent variabl e ,  hosp i t a l  
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acqu i s i t ion . The resu l t s  o f  t he mu l t iva r i a t e  l og i s t i c  
regre s s ion ana l ys i s  f o r  t he poo l e d  s t udy are presented i n  
Tab l e  1 6 . 
Table 1 6 :  Logistic Analysis o f  Acquisitions for t h e  1 999 a n d  2000 Pooled Study 
(dependent variable: 1 = acquired; 0 = not acquired) (N = 468) 
Var i ab l e  
Market 
Per Cap i t a  I ncome 
Percent age o f  E l de r l y  
Unemp l oyment Rat e 
Number o f  HMOs 
Her f i ndah l - H i r s c hman 
I ndex 
Opera ting Performan ce 
Return on As s e t s  
Occupancy Rat e  
Operat i ng Expenses per 
Di scharge 
Fac i l i t y  Age 
Long - Te rm Debt t o  
Equ i t y  
Organi za t i on a l  Fa c t ors 
S i ze 
Number o f  S e rv i c e s  
For - prof i t  
Not - for - pro f i t  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s l gn l f l c ant at p 
s i gn i f i c a n t  at p 
s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
Parame t e r  
Est i ma t e  
. 0 0 0  
- . 0 5 7  
- . 0 0 7  
. 0 5 0  
- . 5 3 0  
- 1 . 3 5 2  
- 2 . 4 2 
. 0 0 0  
. 0 5 8  
. 4 3 7  
- . 0 0 1  
- . 0 1 3  
1 . 9 9 8  
. 6 8 6  
• Mode l c h i - s q u a r e  1 1 0 . 6 0 6 . 
• - 2  Log l i k e l i hood = 4 1 5 . 7 4 0 .  
• P s e udo R Square = . 3 1 2 . 
St anda rd Probab i l i ty 
Error ---
. 0 0 0  . 9 0 1  
. 0 3 3  . 0 8 1 *  
. 0 6 2  . 9 0 9  
. 0 2 9  . 0 8 5 *  
. 5 2 6  . 3 1 3  
. 5 3 5  . 0 1 2 * *  
. 9 2 7  . 0 0 9 * *  
. 0 0 0  . 4 1 2  
. 0 1 9  . 0 0 2 * * *  
. 1 9 5  . 0 2 5 * *  
. 0 0 1  . 6 1 6  
. 0 0 8  . 1 2 4  
. 4 3 0  . 0 0 0 * * *  
. 4 0 5  . 1 1 
The equa t i on for t he poo l e d  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on s t udy 
s hows t ha t  s even o f  t he fourteen i ndependent var i ab l e s  are 
s i gni f i cant . Two o f  t he s i x  market variabl e s , percentage o f  
1 2 1  
the e l de r l y  and t he number o f  HMOs , are related to hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ion . Percentage of  t he e l derly i s  negat i ve l y  
re l a t e d  to acqu i s i t i on and i s  marg i na l l y  s igni f i cant at the 
. 1 0 l eve l . S i nce t he percentage o f  e l derly has a negat ive 
coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  f ewer e l derly are more l i ke l y  to 
be acqu i red . Number o f  HMOs i s  pos i t ive ly re l a t e d  t o  
acqu i s i t ion and i s  marg i na l l y  s i gn i f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l . 
S ince t he number o f  HMOs has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , 
hosp i t a l s  i n  market s  w i t h  a greater number of  HMOs are more 
l i ke l y  to be acqu i re d . 
Four of  the f ive ope ra t iona l va r i ab l e s , return on 
a s s e t s ,  occupancy ra t e ,  f a c i l i ty age , and l ong - t e rm debt a re 
re l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  As i n  both t he 1 9 9 9  and 
t he 2 0 0 0  s t udy pe r i ods , ret urn on a s s e t s  has a nega t i ve 
coe f f i c i ent . I n  the poo l e d  s tudy , i t  i s  s i gn i f i cant at t he 
. 0 5 l eve l . S i nce ret urn on a s s e t s  has a negat i ve 
coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower return on a s s e t s  a re more 
l i ke l y  to be acqu i red . 
As i n  both t he 1 9 9 9  and t he 2 0 0 0  s t udy periods , 
occupancy has a negat ive coe f f i c ient . I n  the poo l e d  s t udy , 
occupancy i s  s ign i f i cant at the . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce occupancy 
has a negat ive coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  lower occupancy 
are more l i ke ly to be acqu i red . 
1 22 
As i n  bot h  t he 1 9 9 9  and t he 2 0 0 0  study per iods , 
f ac i l i ty age has a pos i t ive coe f f i c ient . I n  the poo led 
s tudy period , f ac i l i t y  age is  s i gni f i cant a t  t he . 0 1 l eve l . 
S i nce f ac i l i ty age has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s 
w i t h  o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  a re more l i ke l y  to be acqu i red . 
As i n  both the 1 9 9 9 and t he 2 0 0 0  s tudy period , l ong -
t e rm debt to  equ i t y  has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent . I n  t he 
pool e d  s tudy period , long - t e rm debt to  equ i t y  i s  s igni f i cant 
a t  the . 0 5 l eve l . S i nce l ong - t e rm debt to  equ i ty has a 
pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  highe r l ong - t e rm debt 
to  equ i t y are more l i kely to be acqu i red . 
One o f  t he f our organ i z a t i onal variabl e s , f o r - p ro f i t  
ownersh i p , i s  re l a t e d  to hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  A s  i n  bot h  
t he 1 9 9 9  and t he 2 0 0 0  s t udy periods , for - pro f i t  owne rship 
has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent . I n  t he poo l ed s t udy , f o r - p ro f i t  
ownership i s  s igni f i cant a t  t he . 0 1 l eve l . S i nce t he for -
pro f i t  owne rship var i ab l e  has a pos i t ive coe f f i c ient , 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  f or - pro f i t  owne rship are more l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i red . 
I n  summary , i n  t he poo l ed s t udy , hosp i t a l s  i n  marke t s  
w i t h  a l ow percent age o f  e l derly o r  many HMOs , o r  t hat have 
l ower returns on a s se t s ,  l ower occupancy ra t e s , o l de r  
f a c i l i t i e s , h ighe r l ong - t e rm debt to equ i t y  or f o r - p ro f i t  
s t atus are more l i ke l y  t o  b e  acqu i red . The equat i on shows 
t ha t  seven o f  t he f ourt een i ndependent var i ab l e s  are 
s ign i f i cant w i t h  a pseudo R square of . 3 1 2 .  
Tab l e  1 7  exami nes the a s soc iat ion o f  market , 
opera t i onal perf ormance and organ i zat iona l f a c t ors w i t h  
whe t her t h e  hosp i t a l s  we re acqui red by for - p ro f i t  
orga n i zat i ons o r  not - fo r - pro f i t  organi zat i ons dur i ng t he 
poo l e d  s t udy . I t  i n c l udes a t o t a l  s amp l e  o f  1 1 7  acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  and 3 5 1  non - acqu i red hosp i t a l s  dur i ng the pool ed 
s tudy . Tab l e  1 7A repre sent s 5 1  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions by 
f o r - pro f i t  organi z a t i ons , and Tab l e  1 7B repre s ent s 6 6  
acqu i s i t ions by not - f or - pro f i t  organi z a t i ons . 
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As shown i n  Tab l e  1 7 , i n  t he poo l e d  s tudy t he f i nd i ngs 
d i f f e r  for acqu i s i t ions by for - pro f i t  organ i zat ions and 
t hose by not - f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat ions . The columns marked 
as f or - pro f i t  1 7A expl a i n  t he acqu i s i t ion behavior of f o r -
pro f i t  organi zat ions . The columns marked a s  for - pro f i t  1 7 B 
exp l a i n  t he acqu i s i t ion behavior o f  not - f or - p ro f i t  
organ i zat ions . 
I n  the pool e d  s t udy , the fol lowing var i ab l e s  are 
s t a t i s t i ca l l y  s igni f i c ant for acqu i s i t i ons by for - pro f i t  
organ i zat ions : He r f i ndah l - Herschman i ndex and f o r - p ro f i t  
s t a t u s . One o f  the f ive ma rke t var i abl e s , Herf i ndahl ­
Herschman I ndex ,  i s  re l at e d  to acqu i s i t ion and i s  marg i na l l y  
s igni f i cant at the . 1 0 l eve l . 
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Table 1 7 : Logistic Analysis Results: Hospital Acquisition by For-Profit and Not­
For-Profit Organizations for the Pooled Study Period (N = 468) 
For - Pro f i t  
Var i ab l e  Para ----
met e r  
Est i ----
mat e  
Marke t 
Per Cap i t a  . 0 0 0  
I ncome 
Percent age - . 0 3 2  o f  Elderly 
Unemp l oyment . 0 1 6  Rate 
Number of  - . 0 2 7  HMOs 
Herf i ndahl -
H i rsc hman - 1 .  2 6  
I ndex 
Opera ting 
Return on - . 6 1 9  
Asset s 
Occupancy - . 7 4 0  
Ope rat i ng 
Expens e s /  . 0 0 0  
Di scharge 
Fac i l i t y  Age . 0 0 0  
Long - Te rm . 2 6 6  Debt 
Organ i z a -
t i onal - . 0 0 3  
S i ze 
Number o f  - . 0 0 2  Serv i c e s  
For - pro f i t  1 . 5 2 3  
Not - f or - . 3 3 3  pro f i t  
* * *  
* *  
* 
s l gn l f l c ant at P 
s i g ni f i c ant at P 




. 0 0 0  
. 0 4 3  
. 0 8 0  
. 0 3 7  
. 6 7 2  
. 6 0 0  
1 . 1 9 4 
. 0 0 0  
. 0 2 0  
. 1 8 5  
. 0 0 2  
. 0 1 2  
. 5 5 9  
. 5 6 0  
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
1 7 A :  Mode l ch i - square = 4 1 . 5 0 .  
- 2  Log l i ke l i hood = 2 8 0 . 8 2 .  
P s e udo R Square = . 1 7 0 . 
( 1 7A )  Not - For - Prof i t  ( 1 7 8 )  
Proba - Para - Stand Proba ---- ---
b i l i ty met e r  ard -- b i l i ty 
Est i - Error --- ---
mat e  
. 8 4 7  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 8 3 4  
. 4 5 5  - . 0 5 5  . 0 3 9  . 1 5 1  
. 8 4 4  - . 0 1 6  . 0 7 6  . 8 2 8  
. 4 7 5  . 0 9 1  . 0 3 5  . 0 0 9 * * *  
. 0 6 0 *  . 2 9 0  . 6 3 5  . 6 4 8  
. 3 0 2  - 1 . 0 9 8  . 5 8 6  . 0 6 1 *  
. 5 3 5  - 2 . 7 1 3  1 .  0 9  . 0 1 3 * *  
. 2 0 5  . 0 0 0  . 0 0 0  . 7 5 4  
. 9 9 7  . 0 6 2  . 0 1 8  . 0 0 1 * * *  
. 1 5 2  . 1 1 7  . 1 8 5  . 5 2 8  
. 1 3 3  . 0 0 1  . 0 0 1  . 5 4 3  
. 8 9 0  - . 0 1 6  . 0 1 0  . 0 9 9 *  
. 0 0 6 * * *  1 . 6 0 4  . 5 3 2  . 0 0 3 * * *  
. 5 5 2  . 8 0 9  . 5 1 4  . 1 1 6  
1 7 B : Mode l c h i - s qu a r e  = 6 2 . 2 9 .  
- 2  Log l i ke l i hood = 3 1 8 . 4 9 1 . 
P s eudo R Square = . 2 2 4 . 
The Herf i ndah l - H i rschman I ndex has a negat ive 
coe f f i c i ent , whi c h  i nd i c a t e s  that i n  marke t s  w i t h  l e s s  
concent rat i on ,  i . e .  more compet i t ors , hosp i t a l s  are more 
l i ke l y  to be a cqui red . One o f  t he f our organi zat i ona l 
var iabl e s , f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus , i s  r e l ated to hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i ons b y  for - pro f i t  organi za t i ons . 
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For - pro f i t  s t atus i s  s ign i f i cant at t he . 0 1 l eve l . As 
in t he 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  study periods , for -pro f i t  owne rship has 
a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent , whi c h  i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s w i t h  
f o r - p ro f i t  owne rship are more l i ke l y  t han others t o  be 
acqu i re d  by for - p ro f i t  organi z a t i ons . The equa t i on shows 
that two of t he f ourteen i ndependent vari abl e s  are 
s igni f i c ant w i t h  a pseudo R squared of . 1 7 0 . 
The col umns marked as not - for - pro f i t  1 7B exp l a i n  t he 
acqu i s i t ion behavior o f  not - f o r - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons duri ng 
t he poo l e d  s tudy . The fol l ow i ng vari abl es are s t a t i s t i c a l ly 
s i gn i f i c ant f o r  acqui s i t ions by not - for - pro f i t  
organ i z a t i ons : number o f  HMOs , return on asset s ,  oc cupancy 
rat e , f ac i l i ty age , number of s e rv i ce s ,  and f o r - p ro f i t  
s t atus . 
One o f  the f ive market var i abl e s , the numbe r o f  HMOs , 
i s  re l a t e d  t o  acqu i s i t i on .  The number o f  HMOs i s  
s i gn i f i cant at t he . 0 1 l eve l . As i n  both t he 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  
s tudy periods , t he number o f  HMOs has a pos i t ive 
coe f f i c i ent . The pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent i nd i c a t e s  that 
hosp i t a l s  i n  marke t s  with more HMOs are more l i ke l y  t han 
others t o  be acqu i red by a not - f o r - pro f i t  organ i zat ion . 
Three o f  the f ive opera t i onal variabl e s , return on 
a s s e t s ,  occupancy rat e ,  and f ac i l i t y  age , are re l a t e d  to 
hospi t a l  acqu i s i t ion . As i n  both the 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  s t udy 
1 26 
periods , re turn on a s s e t s  has a negat ive coe f f i c i ent . Th i s  
i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower ret urns o n  a s se t s  a re 
more l i k e l y  to be acqu i red by not - f o r - pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . 
I n  the poo l e d  s t udy , return on a s s e t s  i s  marg i na l ly 
s ign i f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l . 
As i n  bot h  t he 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  s t udy pe r i ods , occupancy 
rate has a nega t i ve coe f f i c i ent . There f ore , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
l ower occupancy rat e s  a r e  more l i ke l y  than others t o  be 
acqu i red by not - f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons . I n  t he poo l e d  
s t udy , occupancy r a t e  i s  s igni f i cant at t he . 0 5 l eve l . 
As i n  both the 1 9 9 9  and 2 0 0 0  s t udy periods , t he 
f ac i l i ty age variable has a pos i t ive coe f f i c i ent . The 
pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  o l de r  
f ac i l i t i e s  a re more l i ke l y  t han others to  b e  acqu i red by 
not - fo r - pro f i t  organi zat i ons . I n  t he poo l e d  s tudy , f ac i l i ty 
age i s  s igni f i cant at t he . 0 1 l evel . 
Two o f  t he f our organi zat i onal vari abl e s , number o f  
serv i c e s  and f or - pro f i t  s t a tus , a r e  r e l a t ed to hos p i t a l  
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acqu i s i t ion by not - f or - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . As i n  t he 1 9 9 9  
and 2 0 0 0  s t udy periods , t he number o f  serv i c e s  has a 
negat i ve coe f f i c ient . Thi s i nd i cates that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
f ewe r s e rv i c e s  a r e  more l i ke l y  t han others t o  be acqu i red by 
not - f o r - p ro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . I n  the poo l e d  s t udy , t he 
number o f  serv i ces i s  marg i na l ly s ign i f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 
l eve l . 
For - p ro f i t  ownership has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent . Thi s  
i n d i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  for-pro f i t  owne rship a re more 
l i ke l y  t han others to be acqu i red by not - f or - pro f i t  
organ i z a t ions . I n  the poo l e d  s t udy , the f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus 
is s igni f i cant at t he . 0 1 l eve l . The equat ion shows t hat s ix 
o f  the fourteen i ndependent var i ab l e s  are s igni f i cant w i t h  a 
pseudo R square of  . 2 2 4 . 
Summary of Findings of the Three Analytical Models 
The fol l ow i ng t ab l e s summa r i ze the expected 
hypothe s i zed d i rect i on a s  compared with t he actual  d i rect ion 
o f  t he a s soc i a t i on of  t he i ndependent va r i ab l e s w i t h  the 
dependent var i ab l e , acqu i s i t i on .  Chapter 6 w i l l  d i scuss the 
compari son i n  det a i l . Tab l e  1 8  pre s en t s  the expec t e d  
d i re c t i on a n d  a c t u a l  d i re c t i ons of  re l a t ionships o f  
i ndependent var i ab l e s  w i t h  t h e  dependent var i ab l e s . 
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Table 1 8 :  Expected Directions a n d  Actual Directions o f  Relationships of 
Independent Variables with Dependent Variables in the Acquisition 
Model 
Va r i ab l e  Dependent 
Var i ab l e  
Marke t  
Hosp i t a l  Per Cap i t a  
I ncome Acqui s i t i on 
Percentage of Hosp i t a l  
Elderly Acqu i s i t ion 
Unemp l oyment Hosp i t a l  
Rat e  Acqu i s i t i on 
Numbe r  of  HMOs Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
He r f i ndahl -
Hosp i t a l  H i rschman 
I ndex Acqu i s i t i on 
Opera ting 
Performance Hospi t a l  
Return on Acqu i s i t ion 
As s e t s  
Occupancy Rat e  Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Operat i ng Hosp i t a l  Expenses per Acqu i s i t i on D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Long - Term Debt Hosp i t a l  
t o  Equ i ty Acqu i s i t i on 
Organi za t i onal 
Hosp i t a l  
Fa c t ors 
S i ze 
Acqu i s i t ion 
Number of Hosp i t a l  
Serv i c e s  Acqu i s i t ion 
For - p ro f i t  Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Not - fo r - p ro f i t  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion 
* * *  
* *  
* 
S l gnl f l c ant a t  p 
S i gn i f i c a n t  at p 
S i gn i f i c ant at p 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
Expec t  AI ' -
ed -








- - *  
+ + 
+ + 
+ + * 
- + 
- - * *  
+ + * * *  
+ + 
a Ana l y s l s  1 :  
b Ana l y s i s  2 :  
c Ana l y s i s  3 :  
A2 b A3 c Actual - -
Di rec -
t i on -
+ + 
- - * -
+ -
+ * + * + 
- -
- * * *  - * *  -
- - * *  -
+ + 
+ * *  + * * *  + 
+ + * *  + 
- * -
- - -
+ * *  + * * *  + 
+ + 
1 9 9 9  s t udy p e r l od 
2 0 0 0  s tudy p e r i od 
Poo l e d  mode l 
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Table 1 8  shows t he f o l l owing s t a t i s t i c a l ly sign i f i cant 
re l a t ionships w i t h i n  t he variables  for t he acqu i s i t i on 
mode l . The market va riable  of  number of  HMOs i s  pos i t ive l y  
a s sociated w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  The market var i ab l e  
o f  pe rcent age o f  t he e l derly i s  nega t ively a s soc i at ed w i t h  
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ion . 
The operat i ng performance vari abl e s  o f  re turn on a s s e t s  
and occupancy rate a r e  negat ive l y  a s soc i at e d  w i t h  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on .  The ope ra t i ng per formance var i ab l e s  of  
f ac i l i ty age and l ong - t e rm debt t o  equ i ty a re pos i t ive l y  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  
The organ i za t i ona l va riable  o f  number of  serv i c e s  i s  
nega t ive l y  a s soc i a t e d  w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  I n  a l l  
t hree s t udi e s , the organ i za t i ona l var i ab l e  o f  for-pro f i t  
s t atus i s  pos i t ive l y  a s soc i a t ed w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion 
and i s  s i gn i f i c ant a t  t he . 0 5 l eve l or highe r . 
Tab l e  1 9 ,  pre s e n t s  t he expec t ed d i rec t i ons and actual 
d i rec t i ons o f  re l a t i onships of  i ndependent va riab l e s  w i t h  
dependent var i ab l e s  i n  the for - pro f i t  acqu i s i t ion model  for 
t he 1 9 9 9 , the 2 0 0 0 , and poo l ed s tudi e s . Chapter 6 w i l l  
d i scuss the compari son i n  de t a i l .  The re l a t i onships that 
are marg i na l l y  s i gni f i cant a t  t he . 1 0 l eve l and 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s igni f i cant at t he . 0 5 ,  and . 0 1 l eve l are 
s t a rred . 
Table 1 9 :  Expected Directions and Actual Directions o f  Relationships of 
Independent Variables with Dependent Variables in the For-Profit 
Acquisition Model 
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Var i a b l e  Dependent Expec t  Al ' A2 b A3 ' Actual 
Va r i ab l e  
Mark e t  
Per Capi t a  Hosp i t a l  
I ncome Acqu i s i t i on 
Percent age o f  Hosp i t a l  
E l de r l y  Acqu i s i t i on 
Unemp l oyment Hosp i t a l  
Rat e  Acqu i s i t i on 
Number of  HMOs Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t ion 
He r f i ndahl -
Hosp i t a l  H i r s chman 
I ndex Acqu i s i t ion 
Opera ting 
Performance Hosp i t a l  
Return on Acqu i s i t i on 
As s e t s  
Occupancy Rate Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on 
Ope rat i ng 
Hosp i t al Expens e s  per Acqu i s i t i on D i s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Long - Term Debt Hosp i t a l  
to  Equ i t y Acqu i s i t i on 
Organi za t i onal 
Hosp i t a l  
Fac t ors 
S i ze 
Acqu i s i t i on 
Number of Hosp i t a l  
S e rv i c e s  Acqu i s i t ion 
For - pro f i t  Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Not - f o r - p ro f i t  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t i on 
* * *  
* *  
* 
S l g n l f l c a n t  at p 
S i g n i f i c a n t  at p 
S i g n i f i c a n t  at p 
. 0 1 
. 0 5 
. 1  
-
ed -














+ + * * *  
+ + 
a Ana l y s l s  1 :  
b Ana l y s i s  2 :  
c Ana l y s i s  3 :  
- -





- - *  
- * *  -
+ -
+ * + 
- + 
+ + 
- * *  -
+ * -
+ + * * *  
- + 
1 9 9 9  s t udy pe r I od 
2 0 0 0  s t udy p e r iod 





As seen i n  Tab l e  1 9 ,  t he fol l ow i ng re l a t i onships are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s igni f i cant in the for - pro f i t  acqu i s i t ion 
mode l . I n  the mode l ,  the ma rket var i a b l e  He r f i ndahl ­
H i rschman i ndex i s  negat ive ly as soc i at ed w i t h  for - pro f i t  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion .  
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The opera t i ng perf ormance var i ab l e  re t urn on a s s e t s  i s  
s i gn i f i cant a t  the . 0 5 l eve l i n  the 2 0 0 0  s t udy pe r i od . 
Cons i s t ent ly w i t h  t he re su l t s  f rom t he acqu i s i t i on mode l ,  
the opera t i ng performance var i able of  ret urn on a s s e t s  i s  
nega t ive ly a s soc i a t e d  w i t h  for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
The organi zat i ona l var i a b l e  s i ze i s  nega t i ve l y  as soc i a t e d  
w i t h  f o r - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . Cons i s tent ly w i t h  t he 
re su l t s  f rom the acqu i s i t ion mode l ,  the organ i zat ional 
var i ab l e  of  f o r - p ro f i t  s t a t u s  is pos i t ive ly a s s o c i a t e d  wi th 
f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and is  s igni f i cant at t he 
. 0 0 1  l eve l . 
Tab l e  2 0  pre s e n t s  t he expec t e d  d i re c t i ons and actual 
d i re c t i ons of  re l a t ionships of  i ndependent va r i abl e s  w i t h  
dependent var i a b l e s  i n  t he not - fo r - p ro f i t  acqu i s i t ion mode l 
for t he 1 9 9 9 , t he 2 0 0 0 , and the poo l e d  s tudi e s . The 
re l a t ionships that a re marg i nal ly s igni f i cant at the . 1 0 
l eve l and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i gn i f i cant at the . 0 5 ,  and . 0 1 
l eve l a re s t arred . 
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Table 20:  Expected Directions and Actual Directions of Relationships of 
I ndependent Variables with Dependent Variables in the Not-for-Profit 
Acquisition Model 
Va riable  Dependent 
Var i ab l e  
Marke t 
Per Cap i t a  Hosp i t a l  
I ncome Acqu i s i t i on 
Percentage of Hosp i t a l  
E l de r l y  Acqu i s i t ion 
Unempl oyment Hosp i t a l  
Rate Acqu i s i t ion 
Number of HMOs Hos p i t a l  
Acqu i s i t ion 
He r f i ndahl - Hos p i t a l  H i rschman 
I ndex Acqu i s i t ion 
Opera t ing 
Performance Hosp i t a l  
Return on Acqu i s i t ion 
Asset s 
Occupancy Rat e  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion 
Ope rat i ng Hosp i t a l  Expens e s  p e r  Acqu i s i t i on Di s charge 
Fac i l i ty Age Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t i on 
Long - Te rm Debt Hosp i t a l  
t o  Equ i ty Acqu i s i t i on 
Organ i za t i onal Hosp i t a l  
Fa c t ors 
S i ze 
Acqu i s i t i on 
Number of Hospi t a l  
Serv i c e s  Acqu i s i t ion 
For - prof i t  Hosp i t a l  
Acqu i s i t ion 
Not - fo r - p ro f i t  Hosp i t a l  Acqu i s i t ion 
* * *  S l g n l f l c a n t  a t  p 
S i gn i f i c a n t  a t  p 
S i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p 
. 01 
. 0 5 
. 1  
Expe c t ed A I ' -




- + * *  
- -
- -
- - * 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + * 
- + 
- -
+ + * * *  
+ + 
a Ana l y s l s  1 :  
b Ana l y s i s  2 :  
c Ana l ys i s  3 :  




- * - -
+ -
+ + * * *  + 
- + 
- * *  - * -
- - * *  -
+ + 
+ * * *  + * * *  + 
- + 
- + 
- - * -
+ * *  + * * *  + 
+ + 
1999 s t udy p e r lod 
2 0 0 0  s t udy p e r i od 
Poo l e d  mode l 
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A s  s e e n  i n  Tabl e  2 0 ,  the fol l ow i ng re l a t i onships are 
s t a t i s t i ca l ly s igni f i cant i n  the not - f or - prof i t  mode l . 
Cons i s tent w i t h  the resul t s  f rom the acqu i s i t i on mode l , t he 
market var i a b l e  numbe r  of  HMOs i s  pos i t i ve l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
not - fo r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and i s  s ign i f i cant a t  
t he . 0 1 l eve l . I n  addi t i on , t he market var i ab l e  percent age 
of t he e l de r l y  i s  nega t i ve l y  a s soc i at e d  w i t h  not - f or - prof i t  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and i s  marg i na l l y  s igni f i cant a t  t he 
. 1 0 l eve l . 
The opera t i ng performance var i ab l e ret urn on a s s e t s  i s  
nega t i ve l y  a s soc i a t e d  w i t h  not - for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l 
acqu i s i t i on and i s  s ign i f i cant i n  bot h  t he 2 0 0 0  and t he 
poo l e d  s t udy p e r i ods at t he . 0 5 l eve l . Al so , cons i s t ent l y  
w i t h  t he resu l t s  f rom the acqu i s i t ion mode l , the operat i ng 
pe r formance var i ab l e  occupancy rate i s  negat ive l y  a s soc i a ted 
w i t h  not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and is  s igni f i cant 
at t he . 0 5 l eve l . Fac i l i ty age has a pos i t i ve coe f f i c i ent 
and is s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ign i f i cant at t he . 0 1 l eve l . 
The number of  serv i c e s  i s  nega t i ve l y  a s so c i a t e d  w i t h  
not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and i s  marg i nal ly 
s ign i f i cant a t  the . 1 0 l eve l . The organ i za t i onal var i ab l e  
for - pro f i t  s t atus i s  pos i t ive ly as soc i a t e d  w i t h  not - f o r ­
pro f i t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion a n d  i s  s i gn i f i cant at the . 0 1 
l eve l . 
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Summary of Chapter 5 
Chap t e r  5 has pre sented the resul t s  of  the ana lys i s . 
They i nc l uded t he des c r ipt ive and mu l t iva r i a t e  f i nd i ngs for 
t he 1 9 9 9 , t he 2 0 0 0 , and the poo l ed s tudi e s . The 
re l a t ionships o f  t he var i a b l e s  to the acqu i s i t i on mode l , t he 
for - pro f i t  acqu i s i t ion mode l , and the not - fo r - p ro f i t  
acqu i s i t i on model  a l so were present e d . 
Chapter 6 :  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Th i s  chapt e r  present s a summary and exp l anat i on of  
s i gn i f i cant f i nd i ngs re l a ted to hosp i t a l acqu i s i t i on .  
Resul t s  o f  the ana l ys i s  of  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and analyses 
o f  the const ruct s a re used to answer the research que s t ions . 
I mp l icat i ons for hos p i t a l  managers and pol i cy makers are 
a l so out l i ned . L i m i t a t i ons of  the research are des c r i bed . 
The chapter conc l udes w i t h  sugge s t i ons for areas of  f uture 
research . 
The purpose of  t h i s  study i s  to  expl ore the 
r e l a t i onship between hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and other factors 
subsequent to  the Bal anced Budge t Ac t of  1 9 9 7 . The 
l i t e rat ure sugge s t s  t ha t  the Bal anced Budget Ac t of 1 9 9 7  and 
the i ncrease in HMOs have generated gre a t e r  compe t i t ive 
pre s sure on hosp i t a l s . The se compe t i t ive pre s sures create 
more envi ronment a l  uncer t a i nty and have prompted s t rateg i c  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons . 
The market cons t ruc t , wh i c h  re f l e c t s  the demand for 
hosp i t a l  serv i c e s , i nc l udes the fol l ow i ng var i ab l e s : i ncome 
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pe r cap i t a , percent o f  t he popu l a t ion age 6 5  and olde r ,  the 
unempl oyment ra te , the number of  HMOs , and t he Herf i ndahl ­
H i rschman index . 
The opera t i ng perf ormance con s t ruct i s  measured at the 
i nd iv i dua l hosp i t a l  l eve l and i nc l udes the fol lowing 
var i ab l e s : re turn on a s se t s ,  occupancy rat e , ope rat i ng 
expens e s  per d i s charge , f ac i l i ty age and l ong - t e rm debt to  
equ i t y . The organi z a t i ona l cons t ruct i s  measured at t he 
individua l hosp i t a l  l eve l and i nc l udes t he f o l l ow i ng 
var i ab l e s : s i ze ,  number o f  c l i n i c a l  servi ce s ,  f o r - p ro f i t  
ownership , and not - f or - p ro f i t  ownership . 
Discussion of Hypotheses and Research Questions 
The f o l lowing s e c t ion addre s s e s  the hypothe ses and 
research que s t ions based upon the ove ra l l  acqu i s i t ion mode l . 
Research Question 1 :  
• Wha t  marke t ,  opera t i ona l , and organi za t i on a l  fa c tors 
profi l e  the chara c t eri s t i cs of hospi ta l s  a cqu i red a f t er 
the Ba l anced Budge t A c t  of 1 9 9 7 ?  
The re su l t s  o f  t h i s  s t udy show a pos i t ive a s so c i a t ion 
between t he market f a c t or number of  HMOs and hosp i t a l  
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acqui s i t i on .  Hosp i t a l s  i n  ma rke t s  w i t h  higher numbers o f  
HMOs are more l i ke l y  to b e  acqu i red . Th i s  support s C l axton 
( 1 9 9 7 ) , who found that hosp i t a l s  bui l d networks that w i l l  
guarantee pat i ent f l ow and increase barga i n i ng power w i t h  
managed c are p l ans . 
The resul t s  a l so show a nega t i ve a s soc iat ion be tween 
t he market f ac t or percent age o f  e l de r l y  and hosp i t a l  
acqui s i t i on . Thi s  f i nd i ng i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s  located 
i n  marke t s  w i t h  high percentages o f  t he e l derly are l e s s  
l i ke l y  to b e  acqu i red . Thi s  i s  con s i s t ent w i t h  Ba z zo l i 
( 1 9 94 ) , who f ound that because of  reduc t i ons i n  t he Med i care 
re imbursement rat e s , a high percentage of  Med i care pat i ent s 
may re sul t i n  t he i nabi l i ty to cove r opera t i ng expense s .  
Such a poor paye r mix reduces a hospi t a l ' s  prof i t , crea t e s  
f i nanc i a l  d i s t re s s  and may l ead to hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ion . 
The s tudy s hows a negat ive a s soc i a t ion between t he 
opera t i ng pe r f ormance var i ab l e  re turn on asset s and hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ion . Thi s  i s  cons i s t ent w i t h  rese arch by Baz zol i 
and Cl eve r l ey ( 1 9 9 4 ) , who found that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ow 
prof i t ab i l i t y  or operat i ng l os s e s  a re more l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i red or c l o s e . More recent l y ,  Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9A )  found 
t hat not - fo r - prof i t  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  poor f i nanc i a l  
per formance a re l i ke l y  cand i dat es f o r  acqu i s i t i on .  
The s t udy shows a negat ive a s s o c i a t ion between t he 
operat i ng performance var i a b l e  occupancy rate and hosp i t a l 
acqui s i t i on . Thi s  supports Lee and Al exande r ' s ( 1 9 9 9 )  
research , whi c h  found a reduc t ion i n  occup ied beds t o  be 
as soc i a t e d  w i t h  a change i n  ownership . 
The s t udy a l so f ound pos i t ive a s soc i a t i ons be tween 
f ac i l i ty age and long - t e rm debt and hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  
Hosp i t a l s w i t h  o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  are more l i ke l y  t o  be 
1 38 
acqu i red . Accord i ng to Ki rchhe i me r , ( 2 0 0 1 8 )  many hosp i t a l ' s  
f ac i l i t i e s  a re o l d  and requ i re rep l acement . S i nce these 
hosp i t a l s  have l e s s  debt capa c i t y  and a l so marg i na l  
pro f i t ab i l i ty , t hey l ac k  the debt and equ i t y  cap i t a l  to  
support the i r  opera t i ons or f i nance growth i n  servi ces . The 
l ack of  cap i t a l  forces t hem to con s i de r  s e l l i ng t he i r  
f ac i l i t i e s  t o  other organ i zat i ons , e spec i a l l y to for-pro f i t  
organi za t i ons that have access  t o  s tock equ i t y  cap i t a l . 
Thi s s t udy ' s resul t s  support McCue and Furst ( 1 9 8 6 ) , 
who found t ha t  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  more l ong - t erm debt are more 
l i ke l y  cand i da t e s  for hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . More recent ly , 
Phi l l i ps ( 1 9 9 9A )  f ound that t he e conomic pres sure s on 
hosp i t a l s  caused by reduced t h i r d - party payment s and 
i ncreased compe t i t ion have i ncreased t he i r  debt l eve l s  
l eading t o  acqu i s i t i on . 
The organi za t i onal var i ab l e  number of  serv i c e s  has a 
nega t i ve a s soc i a t i on w i t h  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . Thi s  i s  
cons i s t ent w i t h  Al exander and Morr i sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , who found 
l im i t e d  c l i n i cal  serv i ce to be a s soc i ated w i t h  hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on .  More recent l y ,  Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9A )  found t hat 
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many s t a nd - a l one hosp i t a l s  l a c k  t he breadth of  serv i c e s  to 
nego t i a t e  f avorab l y  w i t h  phys i c i ans , i nsurance compa n i e s  and 
supp l i e r s  and t hus f requent ly end up b e i ng acqu i re d . 
The f o l l ow i ng research que s t i on i s  r e s t a t e d  i n  t erms of  
hypot he s i s  H1 . 
Research Question 2 :  
• D o  a cqu i red hospi ta l s  opera t e  a t  a finan c i a l  l os s ? 
H1 : Gi ven exi s t i n g  mark e t  and organ i za t i on a l  fa c t ors , 
those hospi ta l s  wi th poor opera t i ng performan ce 
( l ower re t u rn s  on a s s e t s  and l ower occupan cy 
ra t e s ) a re more l i ke l y  than o ther hospi ta l s  t o  be 
a cqu i red . 
As expec t e d , the re l a t ionship addre s s ed i n  Research 
Que s t i on 2 and pred i c t ed by Hl is supported for return on 
a s s e t s . The s t udy i nd i c a t e s  that hosp i t a l s w i t h  l ower 
re turns on asse t s ,  whi c h  equa t e s  to  l ower pro f i t s ,  are more 
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l i ke l y  t o  be acqu i red . Thi s  i s  cons i s tent w i t h  previous 
research by McCue ( 1 9 8 6 )  and Harma t t a  and Bogue ( 1 9 9 7 ) , 
wh i c h  found t hat hosp i t a l s  t hat have low pro f i t  marg ins and 
a re i n  f i nanc i a l  d i s t re s s  are more l i ke l y  to be acqu i red . 
The f i nd i ng i mp l i e s  that poorly perf orm i ng hosp i t a l s  w i l l  
seek pot en t i a l  buyers t o  survive . 
I n  further support o f  Hl , t he s tudy f ound that 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower oc cupancy ra t e s  are more l i ke l y  to be 
acqu i re d . S i nce oc cupancy mea sures management ' s  abi l i ty to 
market i t s  s e rvi ces and f i l l  its  ava i l ab l e beds , l ower 
occupancy rate is indicat i ve of  weak management (Al exande r 
and Morr i s s ey , 1 9 8 8 ) . Hence , f ac i l i t i e s  w i t h  l ow occupancy 
are l i k e l y  cand i da t e s  for acqu i s i t i on .  More recent re search 
by Burns et  a l . ( 2 0 0 0 )  found that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  occupancy 
rat es l ower t han the nat iona l ave rage of  4 8 %  a re more l i ke ly 
t o  be acqu i red . 
Research Question 3 :  
• D o  a cqu i red hospi ta l s  own aging p l an t a n d  equ ipmen t and 
l a ck the finan c i a l  cap i t a l  t o  repl a c e  th ei r p l an t and 
equ ipmen t ?  
The f o l l ow i ng r e s t a t e s  t h i s  research que s t ion i n  t erms 
of hypo t he s e s  H2a and H2b . 
H2a : Gi ven exi s t i n g  mark e t  and organ i za t i on a l  fa c t ors , 
those hospi t a l s wi th l i mi ted deb t capa c i ty ( i . e . 
h i gher deb t pos i t i on )  are more l i kely than o ther 
hosp i ta l s  to be a cqu i red . 
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Th i s  s t udy found a pos i t ive a s so c i a t ion between long ­
t e rm debt and t he l i ke l i hood o f  acqui s i t i on .  Thi s  c l early 
i nd i c a t e s  that the higher the l eve l o f  debt , the greater t he 
l i ke l i hood o f  acqu i s i t i on . The f i nding i s  cons i s t ent w i t h  
re search b y  Ba z zo l i  ( 1 9 9 4 ) , whi c h  found t h a t  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
h i g h  debt cannot obt a i n  l oans or bond f i nanc i ng to renova t e  
the i r  a g i ng phys i c a l  p l ant s and so become cand i da t e s  for 
acqu i s i t ion . Subsequent research by Mark ( 1 9 9 9 )  a l so found 
that a cqui red hosp i t a l s had h igher l eve l s  of debt t han did 
s imi l ar but  non - acqu i red hosp i t a l s . 
H2b : Gi ven exi s t i n g  mark e t  and organ i za t i on a l  fa c t ors , 
those hosp i t a l s wi th aging p l an t s  a re more l i kely 
than o ther hospi t a l s  t o  be a cqu i red . 
Fac i l i t y  age was found to be pos i t ively a s soc i a t ed w i t h  
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . Thi s  support i s  s t a t i s t i ca l ly 
s igni f i c ant and shows that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  o l de r  phys i c a l  
p l ant s a re more l i ke l y  to be acqu i red . The f i nd i ng supports 
Al exande r and Morr i sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , who found that acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  had o l der f ac i l i t i e s . More recent l y ,  Ki rchhe imer 
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( 2 0 0 1 )  found that for-pro f i t  organi zat ions are i ncrea s i ngly 
purcha s i ng hosp i t a l s  that lack t he cap i t a l  to  rep l ace or 
upda t e  ag i ng p l ant and equ ipment . 
Research Question 4 :  
• D o  a cqu i red hospi ta l s  have fa c i l i t i es l oca t ed i n  
mark e t s  wi th l es s  comp e t i t i on and fewer HMOs ? 
The fol l ow i ng r e s t a t e s  t h i s  research que s t i on i n  t e rms 
of hypot heses H3 and H4 . 
H3 : H ospi t a l s  l oca ted i n  l e s s  compe t i t i ve mark e t s  
(h i gh Herfi ndah l - Hi rschman Index) are more l i kely 
to be acqu i red . 
Thi s  s tudy found no s t a t i s t i c a l ly s igni f i cant 
r e l a t ionship between t he Herf indahl - H i rs chman I ndex and 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
H4 , Hospi t a l s l oca ted i n  mark e t s  wi th fewer HMOs a re 
more l i kely to be a cqu i red . 
Th i s  s t udy found a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i gni f i cant pos i t ive 
r e l a t ionship between t he number of  HMOs and hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ion . There f ore , i t  can be conc l uded that the more 
HMOs in a market ,  the gre a t e r  t he l i ke l i hood for hosp i t a l  
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acqu i s i t ion . Thi s  f i nd i ng i s  cons i s t ent w i t h  previous 
s t ud i e s  by Connor e t  a l . ( 1 9 9 7 ) , who found t ha t  acqu i s i t i ons 
occur in l e s s  concentrated market s ,  w i t h  more HMOs . Thi s  
f i nd i ng i nd i c a t e s  that acqu i s i t ions occur i n  re sponse t o  
mul t ip l e  compet i tors and t o  pres sure f rom p r i c e - sens i t ive 
managed care organi z a t i ons . I t  di f fers f rom the f indi ng i n  
t he Al exande r and Mor r i sey ( 1 9 8 8 )  acqu i s i t ion s tudy t ha t  
i nd i c a t e d  t h a t  hosp i t a l s  i n  f avorable market s  were more 
l i k e l y  to be acqu i red . 
Research Question 5: 
• Do a cqu i red hospi ta l s  have sma l l er fa c i l i t i es and 
provi de fewer servi ces ? 
The fol l owing re s t a t e s  t h i s  re search que s t i on i n  t erms 
of hypo t he s i s  Hs . 
Hs : Gi ven exi s t i n g  marke t fac tors and opera t i on a l  
performance , t h o s e  hospi ta l s  wi th fewer beds and 
fewer t o t a l  servi ces are more l i kely than o thers 
to be a cqu i red . 
As expec ted , a s t a t i s t i ca l l y  s i gn i f i cant negat ive 
assoc i at i on was found between hosp i t a l  serv i c e s  and 
acqu i s i t i on .  
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Thi s  means t hat hosp i t al s w i t h  f ewe r serv i c e s  
a re more l i ke l y  t o  be acqu i red . The f i nd i ng i s  cons i s tent 
w i t h  previ ous emp i r i c a l  s t udi es by McCue and Furs t  ( 1 9 8 6 )  
and Al exande r and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , whi c h  a l so found that 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l imi t e d  serv i c e s  were more l i ke l y  to be 
acqui red . The l i ke l y  expl ana t i on i s  that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
f ewer s e rv i c e s  may s e e k  buye rs i n  order to expand the i r  
serv i c e s .  I n  add i t ion , f ewer serv i c e s  l imi t t he abi l i t y  of  
a hosp i t a l  to  gene rate pat i ent revenue and may resu l t  in  
l ower pro f i t ab i l i t y . 
Wh i l e  not addres s ed i n  t he research que s t i ons , H6 
con s i ders the assoc i a t ion between not - for - pro f i t  ownership 
and hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . 
H6 : Gi ven exi s t i ng mark e t  fa c tors and opera t i ng 
performan c e ,  those hospi ta l s  wi th no t - for -profi t 
own ersh i p  are more l i kely than o thers to be 
a cqu i red . 
Th i s  s tudy found no support for an assoc i a t ion be tween 
not - for -pro f i t  owne rship and acqu i s i t ion but doe s show 
support for a pos i t ive a s s o c i a t i on be tween f o r - pro f i t  
owne rship and acqu i s i t i on . Gray ( 1 9 9 7 )  enume rates t he 
soc i a l  bene f i t s  of  not - for - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  ownership : 
cha r i t y  care , m i s s ion , and commun i t y  t rust . The l imi t ed 
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potent i a l  for pro f i t i ng f rom communi ty bene f i t s  make s 
acqu i s i t ion o f  not - f or - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  una t t ract ive to f o r -
pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . I n  add i t i on , a s  t he conversion 
l i t erat ure exp l a i n s , regulatory cons t ra i n t s  may app ly to t he 
t rans fer of  pub l i c  bene f i t s . Thus , s t a t e  regulators may 
re s t r i c t  t he abi l i ty of not - f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  to t rans f e r  
t he i r  owne rship t o  f o r - prof i t  compan i e s . 
C l axton e t  a l . ( 1 9 9 7 ) , po int out that because t he not ­
f o r - p ro f i t  organ i za t i onal form i s  des igned to f ac i l i t a t e  
community bene f i t s , pub l i c  part i c ipa t ion i n  any conve r s i on 
proce s s  mus t  be s i gn i f i cant . Consume r groups , communi ty 
organi za t i ons and t he s t a t e  a t t orney gene ral are a l l  l i ke l y  
t o  part i c i pat e . Not surpr i s i ng l y ,  recent rese arch by 
Needl eman e t  a l . ( 1 9 9 9 )  found that mos t  corporate 
acqu i s i t i ons o f  not - f or - prof i t  hosp i t a l s  t ake p l ace in 
s t a t e s  w i t h  no proc e s s  of  publ i c  ove r s i ght . The l i t e rature 
on conve r s i on shows t ha t  to  protect t he publ i c  bene f i t s  
f ound i n  non - p ro f i t  organi zat ions s t a t e  regu l a t ions make i t  
d i f f i c u l t  for non - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s to  t rans fer the i r  
ownership to f o r - p ro f i t  companies . 
Recent s tudi e s  by Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9A )  and Ki rchhe imer 
( 2 0 0 1 ) , suggest  that , desp i t e  t he obs t ac l e s , for-pro f i t  
cha i ns are acqu i r i ng a l i mi ted number of  not - f or - prof i t  
hosp i t a l s . I n i t i a l l y ,  t he not - f or - prof i t  acqu i s i t i ons were 
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those w i t h  poor f i nanc i a l  perf ormance that were f a c i ng 
c l osure . However ,  more recent l y  f o r - p ro f i t  syst ems have 
been acqu i r i ng more succ e s s f u l  not - f o r - pro f i t  hosp i t a l s . 
The resu l t s  o f  t h i s  s t udy demonstrate a s igni f i cant 
pos i t ive a s soc i a t i on be tween f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus and hosp i t al 
acqui s i t ion . Th i s  f i nd i ng i nd i c a t e s  that f or - pro f i t  
hosp i t a l s a re l i kely candida t e s  f o r  acqu i s i t i on .  As 
d i s cu s s ed by Rob i nson ( 2 0 0 2 ) , t he high rate of f or - pro f i t  
acqu i s i t i ons may b e  due part l y  t o  the l imi t ed number o f  not -
f o r -prof i t  acqu i s i t i on cand i da t e s . I ns t ead , t he acqu i r i ng 
corporat ion l ooks to  acqu i r i ng f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  a s  a 
means o f  incre a s i ng i t s  revenue and prof i t s . 
Discussion of the For-Profit Acquisition Model 
The f o r - p ro f i t  acqu i s i t ion model  ana lyzes t he samp l e  
hosp i t a l s  t h a t  were acqu i red b y  f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons 
w i t h i n  each s t udy . As i nd i c a t e d  i n  Tab l e  1 9 ,  the f o l lowing 
var i ab l e s : Herf i ndahl - H i rschman I ndex , opera t i ng expenses , 
hosp i t a l  s i z e ,  and f o r - p ro f i t  s t a t u s  a re s t at i s t i cal l y  
s igni f i cant i n  t he f or - pro f i t  mode l . 
The for - p ro f i t  mode l support s H3 , demon s t rat i ng a 
nega t ive assoc i at i on between t he H e r f i ndahl - H i rschman I ndex 
and hospi t a l  acqu i s i t i on by f o r - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons . As 
expe c t e d , hosp i t a l s  i n  compet i t ive market s  a re more l i ke ly 
than o t hers to  be acqui red by for - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . 
Thi s  i s  con s i s t ent w i t h  research by Burns e t  al . ( 2 0 0 0 ) , 
which found t hat hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons are more l i ke ly i n  
market s  w i t h  l ow concent rat i on a s  shown b y  an H H I  be l ow 
1 , 6 6 5 . 
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The f or - pro f i t  s t udy suppor t s  Hs f i nd i ng a nega t ive 
a s soc i a t ion between s i ze and hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on by a for-
pro f i t  organ i zat i on . The f i nd i ng means t hat sma l l e r  
hosp i t a l s  a re more l i ke l y  t o  b e  acqu i red . I n  t e rms o f  
marke t powe r ,  acqu i s i t ion incre a s e s  the company ' s  s i ze and 
t hus i t s  market power ( Cope l and and Weston , 1 9 8 8 ) . Hosp i t a l  
organ i za t ions s t r i ve f o r  more prof i t s  not only through 
gre a t e r  e f f i c i ency , but a l so by i nc rea s i ng market share , 
which spreads the f i xed cos t s  o f  p l ant and equ i pment over 
l arge r  product i on vo lumes . Th i s  v i ew of  acqu i s i t ions was 
supported by Needl eman ' s  ( 1 9 9 7 )  researc h ,  whi ch found that 
for - pro f i t  acqu i s i t ions focused on organ i zat i ons w i t h  
sma l l e r  s i ze and l owe r occupancy rat e s . 
The for - pro f i t  st udy found a pos i t ive a s s o c i a t i on 
be tween ope ra t i ng expenses and hosp i t a l acqu i s i t ion by for-
pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . Thi s  f i nding means that hosp i t a l s  
w i t h  h i gh ope rat i ng expenses are more l i ke l y  than others t o  
b e  acqu i red by a for-prof i t  organi z a t i on . S imi l a r l y ,  
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Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9 B )  found that for - pro f i t  organi za t i ons acqu i re 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  the int ent of  improvi ng e f f i c i ency and mak i ng 
a s  much pro f i t  as pos s i b l e . According to Ki rchhe i me r  
( 2 0 0 1 B ) , f o r - pro f i t  organi zat ions expect t o  aggre s s i ve l y  cut 
expen s e s , t hus ra i s i ng t he i r  prof i t s . 
F i na l l y ,  t he f o r - p ro f i t  s t udy found a pos i t ive 
a s soc i a t i on between f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus and hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on .  Thi s  f i nd i ng means that for - p ro f i t  
organi za t i ons are more l i ke l y  t o  acqu i re f o r - p ro f i t  t han 
not - fo r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s . The f i nd i ng i s  cons i s t ent w i t h  
re search b y  Al exander and Mor r i sey ( 1 9 8 7 ) , whi ch found t hat 
96 percent of acqu i red for - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s were acqui red by 
f o r - p ro f i t  organ i za t i ons . More recent l y ,  re search by 
Phi l l ip s  ( 1 9 9 9A )  found that s t and - a l one hosp i t a l s  were 
f requent l y  acqui red by f o r - p ro f i t  organi z a t i ons , because 
t hey had l ac ked the s i ze and breadth of  serv i c e s  t o  compete 
e f f e c t ive l y  i n  t he market pl ace . 
I n  summary , a s  d i scussed by Robi nson ( 2 0 0 2 ) , f o r - pro f i t  
organi zat i ons are acqu i r i ng sma l l e r  f ac i l i t i e s  i n  e i ther 
rural or urban communi t i es  where t he acqu i r i ng organ i zat ions 
can s t rengthen t he i r  market pos i t i on .  Many such 
acqu i s i t i ons i nvol ve o l der f ac i l i t i e s  w i t h  high opera t i ng 
cos t s . For - p ro f i t  organ i zat i ons hope to make them more 
pro f i t ab l e t hrough e f f i c i ency and aggre s s ive p r i c i ng .  
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Discussion of the Not-For-Profit Acquisition Model 
The not - fo r - p ro f i t  model ana l yzes s amp l e  hosp i t a l s  that 
were acqu i red by not - fo r - prof i t  organ i za t i ons w i t h i n  the 
studi e s . As shown i n  Tab l e  2 0 ,  the f o l l ow i ng var i ab l e s  are 
s t a t i s t i c a l ly s i gni f i cant i n  t he not - for - prof i t  mode l : 
percentage o f  e l de r l y ,  number o f  HMOs , re turn on a s s e t s ,  
occupancy , f ac i l i ty age , number o f  serv i c e s , and for - pro f i t  
s t a tus . The not - f or - pro f i t  mode l support s t he f o l l ow i ng 
hypot he s e s : H l , H2b , H4 , Hs .  
The not - for - pro f i t  model supported Hl , f i nd i ng a 
negat ive a s soc i a t ion between ret urn on a s s e t s  and 
acqui s i t i on .  The f i nd i ng means that not - f or - pro f i t  
organi zat i ons are acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ow prof i t s . 
Thi s i s  cons i s t ent w i t h  research by Al exander and Morri sey 
( 1 9 8 8 ) , whi c h  f ound t hat hosp i t a l s w i t h  l ow prof i t s  were 
more l i ke ly to be acqu i red by not - for - pro f i t  organi zat i ons . 
Ba z zo l i  and C l eve r l y  ( 1 9 9 4 ) a l so f ound t ha t  hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
poor f i nanc i a l  performance were l i ke ly cand i da t e s  for 
organi zat i onal change . More recent l y ,  Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9B )  
found that acqu i s i t ions by not - for - pro f i t  organ i zat ions were 
l inked to l ow prof i t s  and low e f f i c i ency in t he acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s . 
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A l s o  i n  support o f  HI t he not - for - prof i t  s tudy found 
occupancy rate to be negat i ve l y  a s soc i ated w i t h  acqu i s i t ion 
by not - fo r - pro f i t  organ i za t i ons . Thi s  f i nd i ng means that 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ower occupancy rates are more l i ke ly than 
others t o  be acqu i red by not - f or - pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . The 
f i nd i ng i s  cons i s tent w i t h  re search by Lee and Al exander 
( 1 9 9 9 ) , wh i ch found that l ower occupancy rates i n  communi ty 
hosp i t a l s  are negat i ve l y  a s s o c i a t e d  with organ i za t i ona l 
change . Needl eman ( 1 9 9 7 )  a l so found t hat not - for - pro f i t  
organ i zat ions focused on hosp i t a l s w i t h  l ower occupancy 
rat e s  for a cqui s i t i ons . 
The not - fo r - p ro f i t  model supported H2 f i nd i ng that 
acqu i red hosp i t a l s  have o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s . I n  other words , 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  o l de r  f ac i l i t i e s  are more l i ke l y  t han others 
to  be acqu i red by not - for - pro f i t  organ i za t i ons . Hosp i t a l s  
fund repl acement s o r  cap i t a l i mprovements through opera t i ng 
resources or c ap i t a l  re serves . Fac i ng such nec e s s i t i e s  and 
reduced pro f i t s  due to t he BBA and t he incre a s i ng cost o f  
cap i t a l , hosp i t a l s  w i t h  ag i ng f ac i l i t i e s  a r e  more l i ke ly 
t han others t o  be acqu i red . Th i s  f i nd i ng i s  cons i s tent w i t h  
research b y  E r n s t  and Young ( 1 9 9 9 ) , and w i t h  t he analys i s  by 
Ki rchhe i me r  ( 2 0 0 1A )  on t he growi ng numb e r  of hosp i t a l s  w i t h  
o l d  f ac i l i t i e s  that a r e  be i ng acqu i red b y  not - for - prof i t  
organ i z a t i ons . From an e f f i c i ency perspect i ve , a 
repl a c ement f ac i l i ty provides t echno logy for new c l i n i c a l  
s e rvi ces , enhances the organ i zat ion ' s  image , and improve s 
ope rat i onal e f f i c i ency . S i nce hosp i t a l s w i t h  o l der 
f ac i l i t i e s  wou l d  requ i re s igni f i cant i nves t ment s through 
operat ing f unds or new debt , to achi eve t hose goa l s ,  t hey 
are more l i ke l y  to be a cqu i red . 
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The not - for - pro f i t  mode l supports H4 . f i nd i ng t hat 
hosp i t a l s  i n  ma rket s  w i t h  more HMOs are more l i ke l y  t han 
others to be acqu i red by not - for-pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons . The 
f i nd i ng sugge s t s  that t he greater number of HMOs i n  a 
marke t , t he more l i ke l y  not - f or - pro f i t  acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l s  
w i l l  purchase hosp i t a l s i n  order to expand t he i r  network o f  
f ac i l i t i e s . 
The not - fo r - p ro f i t  mode l supports Hs . f i nd i ng that the 
number o f  servi c e s  i s  nega t ive ly a s soc i at e d  w i t h  acqu i s i t i on 
by not - for - pro f i t  organi zat ions . The f i nd i ng means that 
hosp i t a l s  with f ewer s e rv i c e s  are more l i ke l y  t han others to  
be acqu i red by not - f o r - p ro f i t  organi zat i ons . Th i s  s t udy i s  
con s i s t ent w i t h  research by Al exander and Morri sey ( 1 9 8 8 )  
whi c h  a l so f ound that hosp i t a l s w i t h  f ewer servi ces were 
more l i ke ly to acqu i red by not - f or -pro f i t  organ i zat ions . 
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Whi l e  not addre s se d  by a hypothe s i s ,  the not - for- prof i t  
s tudy found a pos i t i ve a s so c i a t ion between f o r - prof i t  status 
and acqu i s i t i on by a not - for - pro f i t  organi zat i on . Thi s  
f i nd i ng means that not - fo r - p ro f i t  organ i z a t i ons are more 
l i kely to acqu i re f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l s  t han o t hers . Thi s i s  
cons i s tent w i t h  research by Al exande r and Morri s sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) , 
whi c h  a l so found that not - for - pro f i t  organi za t i ons are more 
l i ke l y  to acqu i re f o r - prof i t  hosp i t al s .  
Implications of the Present Study: Theoretical, Managerial, and Policy 
There are t heoret i ca l , manage r i a l  and pol i cy 
impl i cat ions that evolved f rom t h i s  emp i r i c a l  analys i s  of  
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t ions . 
Theoretical Implications 
From a t heoret i ca l  perspect ive , resource dependence 
pos i t s  that organi za t ions that cannot gene rate enough 
revenue to ac compl i sh t he i r  m i s s ion mus t  int eract w i th the 
envi ronment to  gene r a t e  more . The more i mportant the 
resources are to a hosp i t al ' s  mi s s i on and t he greater the i r  
s c a rc i ty , t he more l i k e l y  the hospi t a l  i s  to  sac r i f i c e  
autonomy to obt a i n  them . There fore , organ i zat ions t hat are 
acqui red are more l i kely t o  be those w i t h  l owe r f i nanc i a l  
performance . 
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The resul t s  of  t h i s  study are cons i s t ent w i t h  re source 
dependence t heory in showing that hosp i t a l s  w i t h  fewer 
resourc e s  a re more l i kely to be acqu i red . The study shows 
that re source s c a rc i ty due to nega t i ve return on asset s and 
high debt l eads to i nc reased acqui s i t i ons . The se f i nd i ngs 
support resource dependence t heory and prov i de an 
unde r s t andi ng o f  t he re l a t i onship between hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions and t h e  a s soc i a t ion w i t h  pro f i t abi l i t y ,  market 
s t ruc ture , and hospi t a l  ownership . 
Corpora t e  f i nanc i a l  t heory emphas i ze s  t he import ance o f  
acqu i s i t i ons for i ncreas i ng s i ze and ma rket share and 
i mprovi ng management e f f i c i ency ( Cope l and and Weston , 1 9 8 8 )  
The theory a l so s t re s s e s  that the s t ronger a hos p i t a l ' s  
compe t i t ion , the more i t  mus t  enhance i t s  management s ki l l s  
and bus i ne s s  s t rengths . I n  t e rms of  marke t powe r ,  
purcha s i ng hosp i t a l s  i nc reased the s i ze o f  the acqu i r i ng 
hosp i t a l s ,  and thereby i ncreased t he i r  ma rket power . Market 
powe r i mpl i e s  a ma rke t domi nant pos i t ion and some e l ement s 
o f  monopoly cont rol ( Cope l and and We s t on , 1 9 8 8 ) . Gre a t e r  
market power a l l ows hosp i t a l manage rs t o  make more pro f i t s  
t hrough gre a t e r  i nt e rna l e f f i c i ency and by exp l o i t ing the i r  
f avorable marke t pos i t i on .  
I n  t e rms of  ma rket s t ructure , t he s tudi e s  found 
hosp i t a l s in marke t s  w i t h  more HMOs were more l i ke ly to be 
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acqu i red . As d i s cu s s ed by Burns e t  a l . ( 2 0 0 0 ) , marke t s  w i t h  
many HMOs create more uncert a i n t y , whi c h  promp t s  format i on 
o f  more phys i c i an and hosp i t a l  a l l iances . Kr i shnan ( 2 0 0 1 )  
a l so found that paye r - dr iven market s  and s e l e c t ive 
contrac t i ng by HMOs may have reduced hosp i t a l ' s  price s , 
pro f i t  marg ins and occupancy rat e s . Thus , t he pri c i ng 
pre s sures and reduced hosp i t a l i zat i on f rom t he onset  of  
managed care may have l owered hosp i t a l  pro f i t s  and occupancy 
rat es . By a f f i l i at i ng w i t h  a mul t i - hosp i t a l  sys t e m ,  
acqu i red hosp i t a l s  enhance t he i r  market pos i t ions to  g a i n  
market l everage over compe t i ng HMOs . 
Management i ne f f i c i ency t heory pos i t s  that acqu i r i ng 
organi za t i ons t arget i ne f f i c i ent or poorly managed 
hosp i t a l s ,  expe c t i ng that the i r  own management expert i se 
w i l l  i mprove the overa l l  f i nanc i a l  perf ormance of the t arge t  
hosp i t a l  ( Cope l and and Weston , 1 9 8 8 ) . The purchase of  
f inanc i a l l y  d i s t re s sed hosp i t a l s by an ext ernal organi zat i on 
was found by t h i s  s t udy , whi c h  support s t he management 
inef f i c i ency t heory o f  corpora t e  f i nance . F i nanc i a l  theory 
( Cope l and and We s t on , 1 9 8 8 )  a l so recogn i zes t he i mportance 
of  f inanc i a l  success to  an organi z a t i on ' s abi l i ty to replace 
e x i s t i ng pl ant and equ ipment and to f i nance new servi ces . 
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I n  t h i s  s t udy , acqu i red hosp i t a l s  had fewer servi ces and 
we re opera t i ng at a l o s s . They l acked the i nt ernal capi t a l  
t o  ma i n t a i n  pl ant and equ i pment and to fund new services . 
I n  add i t i on , the acqu i red hosp i t a l s  had h igher long - term 
debt t han the non - acqu i red hospi t a l s di d .  I n  t arget i ng 
hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l im i t e d  debt capac i t y ,  acqu i r i ng 
organ i zat i ons can provi de economi e s  o f  s c a l e  for acces s ing 
c ap i t a l  and thus l ower the cost  of  capi t a l . Thi s  s t udy 
suppo r t s  t he potent i a l  for economies o f  s c a l e  a s  a mot ive 
for hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
M an agerial I mplications 
The se resu l t s  have i mportant manageri a l  i mp l i cat ions as 
t he hosp i t a l  indu s t ry faces a more compe t i t ive envi ronment . 
The B a l anced Budge t Act o f  1 9 9 7  has s igni f i c ant ly reduced 
hosp i t a l s '  pro f i t s . Lower pro f i t s  and i nc reased compe t i t ion 
among HMOs are p l a c i ng hosp i t a l s  w i t h  l ow oc cupancy rates at 
an even gre a t e r  d i s advantage . Many i ndependent hosp i t a l s  
a re be i ng forced i nto acqu i s i t ion , bankrup t cy , o r  c l osure . 
Meanwhi l e , evidence sugge s t s  that acqu i r i ng organi zat i ons do 
not he s i t a t e  to enter highly compe t i t ive marke t s  or market s  
chara c t e r i zed by high numbe rs o f  HMOs . 
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For hosp i t a l manage rs , t h i s  s tudy sugge s t s  t hat 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on is s t rongly as soc i a t e d  with poor 
operat i ng perf ormance as shown by l ow pro f i t s  and occupancy 
rat e s . The re fore , hosp i t al  managers are cha l l enged to 
i mprove organ i zat i ona l performance i f  t hey w i sh to  avoid 
acqui s i t ion .  I f  unsuc c e s s ful i n  doi ng so , hosp i t a l  managers 
in f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h  f ewer c l i n i c a l  serv i c e s  c an ant i c ipate 
a cqui s i t i on .  I n  add i t i on , t h i s  s tudy shows t ha t  dec l i ni ng 
occupancy rat e s  among acqu i red hosp i t a l s  may have 
cont r i buted to the i r  l ower prof i t s . I n  t urn , l ower pro f i t s  
reduce cap i t a l  i nve s tment , technolog i c a l  i nnova t i on , and 
c l i n i c a l  servi ces . Those factors increase t he l i ke l i hood of  
a hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . 
Policy I mplications 
I n  t erms of po l i cy , t h i s  s t udy ana l yzed hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i ons subsequent t o  t he Bal anced Budget A c t  of  1 9 9 7 . 
The i mpact of  reduced Medicare re i mbursement a f t e r  t he 
Bal anced Budget Act o f  1 9 9 7  pl aced gre a t e r  f i nanc i a l  
pre s sure whe reby t he propor t i on of  hosp i t a l s  ope rat i ng at a 
l o s s  rose to  3 7 %  i n  1 9 9 9  compared to 2 1 %  i n  1 9 9 6  ( MedPac , 
2 0 0 1 ) . A l t hough t he s t udy d i d  not ana l y z e  the f inanc i a l  
cond i t i on o f  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions be fore the BBA o f  1 9 9 7 , 
recent s tudi e s  that eva luated t he acqu i s i t ion of hosp i t a l s 
prior t o  BBA , Phi l l ips ( 1 9 9 9 )  and Mark ( 1 9 9 9 )  found that 
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acqu i red hosp i t a l s  were operat i ng at a l os s . The out come of  
t h i s s tudy a l so f ound operat i ng l os s e s  among acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  re l a t ive to non - acqui red f a c i l i t i e s  a f t e r  BBA . 
Thus , a weak f i nanc i a l  cond i t ion was a contr ibut i ng f ac t or 
i n  a hosp i t a l  s e l l i ng out to  an acqu i r i ng f ac i l i t y  i n  t he 
t i me pe r i ods p r i or t o  and subsequent t o  BBA . 
Howeve r ,  p r i or to  BBA hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons peaked at 
99 acqu i s i t i ons in 1 9 9 6 , and the n  decl i ned to 63 i n  the year 
2 0 0 0 . The dec l i ne sugge s t s  that t he acqu i r i ng hea l th care 
organi zat i ons are becom i ng more s e l e c t i ve a f t e r  BBA in t he 
t ypes o f  hosp i t a l s  t hey purchase . They may be s e l e c t i ng the 
hosp i t a l s  t ha t  a re located i n  marke t s  w i t h  many compet i ng 
HMOs and f ewe r Med i c are pat i ent s ,  so t hey can bo l s t e r  the i r  
net work and negot i a t e  more f avorabl e  payment rat e s . Thus 
acqu i r i ng hosp i t a l s  may be s e l e c t i ve in avo i d i ng marke t s  
w i t h  l arge Medi ca re marke t s  that wou l d  p l ace t hem a t  r i sk to  
change s i n  Med i care re i mbursement . 
The pool o f  potent i a l  acqu i s i t ion cand i da t e s  may be 
reduced , a s  we l l , because acqu i r i ng organi zat i ons f i nd the 
ope ra t i ng and f i nanc i a l  probl ems o f  many t arget hosp i t a l s  to  
be o f  such magni t ude t hat turna round is  unl i ke l y . When such 
hosp i t a l s  c l o s e , the e f f e c t s  on t he hea l t h  s t atus of 
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communi ty re s i de n t s  and a l so on the l ocal  economies are 
mat t ers o f  urgent publ i c  concern . The c l osure of  hosp i t a l s  
i n  commun i t i e s  w i t h  ag i ng popu l a t i ons wi l l  reduce e l de rly 
peop l e ' s  a c c e s s  t o  care . 
The f i nd i ng s  o f  t h i s  study i nd i c a t e  that for - pro f i t s  
are more l i ke l y  t han non - pro f i t s  to  b e  acqu i red . Needl eman 
et a l . ( 1 9 9 7 )  point out the i nc reased publ i c  sc rut i ny of  
not - for - pro f i t  hosp i t a l  conve r s i ons has l im i t e d  t he i r  
acqu i s i t i on by f o r - prof i t  organi z a t i ons . That has 
accel erated the acqu i s i t i on o f  for-pro f i t  hosp i t a l s  by f o r -
pro f i t  organ i zat i ons . The phenomenon may re f l ect  pub l i c  
s kept i c i sm about the l ong - t e rm comm i t ment o f  f o r - p ro f i t  
owne rs to  prot ect i ng ful l commun i ty access  to  hea l t h  
servi c e s . I ncrea s i ng l y ,  as we l l ,  commun i t i e s  fear l os i ng 
local  control ove r  hosp i t a l  pol i cy . 
I n  v i e w  o f  these i s sue s , pol i cy makers shou l d  con s i de r  
whe t he r  t h e  publ i c  i s  be t t er served by more i nve s t ments i n  
outpat ient c a r e  or b y  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons as a way o f  
keeping i npat i ent serv i c e s  i n  a commun i t y . The i s sue i s  o f  
part i c u l a r  conce rn i f  the acqu i r i ng corpora t ion s e e s  that 
prov i d i ng i npa t i ent serv i c e s  t hrough i t s  acqui s i t ion dra ins 
i t s  f i nanc i a l  re sources . 
Low occupancy l eve l s  usua l l y  mean l ow demand for 
i npa t i ent servi c e s . I t  i s  import ant to  under s t and occupancy 
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and l eve l o f  serv i ce s  as t hey r e l a t e  to ope ra t i ng e f f i c i ency 
and organ i za t i ona l s t ab i l i ty .  As pol i cy makers seek 
increased e f f i c i ency i n  t he hea l t hcare del ivery sys t e m ,  they 
shou l d  mon i tor the e f f e c t  of  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion on 
subsequent organi zat i onal performance . They shoul d  a l so 
mon i t o r  a c c e s s  to  c ri t i ca l  hea l t h  servi ces w i t h i n  local  
commun i t i e s . 
More i mport ant l y ,  hea l t h  care po l i cy make rs and s t a t e  
regu l ators have l eg i t i ma t e  concerns about conve r t i ng 
hosp i t a l s  f rom not - fo r - p ro f i t  ownership to f o r - p ro f i t  
ownership . The dangers t hey fear i n c l ude t he l o s s  o f  
communi t y  bene f i t s , reduc t i ons i n  charity care , l im i t a t i ons 
on serv i ce s , and unreasonably low s e l l i ng p r i ce s . As 
ana lyzed by Gray ( 1 9 9 7 ) , acqu i s i t ions by for - pro f i t  
organi za t i ons seem t o  be dr i ven by l ow acqu i s i t i on p r i ce s , 
l ax regul a t ory ove rs ight and the hope of  obt a i n i ng 
su f f i c i ent ma rket share to nego t i a t e  e f fect ive ly w i t h  l arge 
hea l thcare purchasers . 
Cons i s t ent l y  w i t h  Gray ' s f i ndi ngs , t h i s  s tudy shows 
that f o r - p ro f i t  hosp i t al s are more l i ke l y  than not - f o r ­
pro f i t s  to  be acqu i red . S i nce f ewer not - fo r - p ro f i t  hospi t a l s 
are be i ng acqu i red by for-pro f i t  compani e s , t he soc i e t a l  
bene f i t s  of  non - p ro f i t  hosp i t a l  owne rship are b e i ng 
pre served . For - pro f i t  organ i z a t i ons may have dec i ded not to 
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acqu i re not - f or - prof i t  hosp i t a l s  because of  t he s c rut i ny 
they face f rom communi ty l eaders and s t a t e  regu l ators . 
Un fortuna t e l y ,  howeve r ,  these f i nanc i a l ly weak non - p ro f i t  
hosp i t a l s  that need cap i t a l  t o  cont i nue to provide care may 
t hus l os e  the opt ion of se l l i ng t he i r  f ac i l i t i e s . As a 
re s u l t  t hey may c l o s e . 
Limitations of the Present Study 
Th i s  research i s  a c ros s - s e c t i ona l s t udy o f  t he 
r e l a t ionships between hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion and market 
cond i t i ons , ope ra t i ng perf ormance , and organ i za t i ona l 
factors a f t e r  passage o f  the Bal anced Budge t Act o f  1 9 9 7 . 
Thus , the s t udy a s s e s s e s  the re l a t i onship of  the i ndependent 
var i abl e s  on t he dependent va r i ab l e , hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion ,  
a t  one po int i n  t ime . Howeve r ,  t he conceptual mode l 
sugge s t s  that t i me may i n f l uence hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . A 
l ong i t ud i nal  s t udy woul d  show the change s i n  t he va riables  
over t i me . Such a l ong i tudinal s t udy woul d  enhance t e s t i ng 
of  the conceptual mode l used i n  t he present s t udy . 
Expans i on o f  the s t udy t o  i nc l ude periods prior to t he 
Bal anced Budge t Ac t of  1 9 9 7  wou l d  highl ight change s f rom the 
earl i e r  periods . I t  wou l d  a l so eva l uate t he impac t  of  
subsequent l eg i s l a t i on i n c l u d i ng the BBRA of  1 9 9 9  and t he 
B I PA of  2 0 0 0 , whi c h  count eracted some of  t he negat ive 
e f fe c t s  of the BBA . 
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A second l i mi t a t ion of  the s t udy conce rns the 
l im i t a t i ons o f  the secondary dat a  sources i n  terms of  the i r  
accuracy and comp l e t e ne s s . The dependent va riab l e , hosp i t a l  
acqu i s i t i on w a s  abst racted f rom Modern Hea l t hcare f o r  t he 
respect ive s tudy p e r i ods . Thi s  repre sent s a comprehens ive 
dat abase of  i ndependent hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons but the s t udy 
d i d  not eva l u a t e  var i a t i ons re l at ed to for-pro f i t  corpora t e  
t akeovers . Pert a i n i ng t o  the i ndependent vari abl e s , t he 
Ame r i can Hosp i t a l  As soc i a t ion dat a  i s  derived f rom annual 
survey da t a  and i s  subj ect  to  i n t e rpre t a t i on as t he hosp i t al 
submi t s  the dat a . I n  add i t ion , t he Medi care Cost Report s 
are revi ewed by t he Cent er for Med i c are S e rv i c e s  ( CMS ) but 
are not aud i t e d  by an i ndependent ext ernal organi zat i on . 
As a resu l t , t here a re l im i t a t ions i n  t he abi l i t y  of  t he 
dat a  t o  measure the cons t ruc t s  and t heory employed i n  t he 
s t udy . 
A t h i rd l i m i t a t ion of t he s t udy i s  t he cont rast be tween 
acqu i s i t i ons i n  rura l and urban local i t i e s . The var i a b l e s  
numb e r  of  HMOs a n d  percent o f  t he e l de r l y , were anal yzed 
w i t hi n  the market cons t ruct and may be a f f e c t ed by rural 
versus urban va r i a t ion . 
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A f i na l  l im i t a t ion of  t he s t udy i s  var i a t i on caused by 
geograph i c  locat ion . Thi s  s t udy d i d  not analyze the 
acqu i red hosp i t a l s  accord i ng to geographi c  local i t y . 
Areas for Future Research 
The present s t udy has prov i de d  import ant i n forma t ion 
about hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ions f o l l ow i ng the Bal anced Budget 
Act of  1 9 9 7 . Howeve r ,  f urther re search i s  sugge s t e d  i n  t he 
f o l l ow i ng areas . As not ed i n  t he conceptual mode l , t h i s  
s t udy doe s not addre s s  t he causal re l a t i onships among the 
i ndependent var i ab l e s . Further research us i ng path ana lys i s  
o r  l i near s t ru c t ural  equat ion mode l i ng woul d  he lp i dent i fy 
t he comp l ex re l a t i onships between marke t fac tors , 
opera t i onal perf ormance factors , organ i zat ional fac tors , and 
hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i on .  
By i ncorpora t ing dat a  f rom before t he Bal anced Budge t 
Act o f  1 9 9 7 , fut ure research u s i ng l ong i tudinal  ana l ys i s  
wou l d  enhance unde r s t andi ng o f  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons . Such 
a s t udy wou l d  measure hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons over t ime and 
cou l d  help re l a t e  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons to change s in t he 
env i ronment . Such a l ong i tudinal s t udy might a l so show 
whether t he e f f e c t  t he BBRA of 1 9 9 9  and B I PA 2 0 0 0  have 
a l t e red t he acqu i s i t i on prof i l e . 
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By addi ng othe r  marke t va r i ab l e s , future re search wou l d  
i mprove unde r s t and i ng of  the compet i t ive envi ronment driving 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion . For examp l e , i t  wou l d  be u s e f u l  to  
bet t e r  unde r s t and how l oc a l  marke t s  t hat are dominated by 
maj or t ea c h i ng hosp i t a l s  may a f f e c t  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons . 
Given the number o f  acqu i s i t i ons and the i r  e f f e c t  on 
pub l i c  we l f are , t he app l i ca t i on o f  f ederal ant i - t ru s t  po l i cy 
cont i nues to be debat ed . Furt her analys i s  u s i ng the 
Her f i ndahl - H i rschman i ndex and other measures may prov i de 
key i nforma t ion l eading to more e f f e c t i ve app l i ca t ion of  
gove rnment ant i - t rust  pol i cy . 
Hosp i t a l  f i nanc i a l  per f ormance a f t e r  be i ng acqu i red i s  
a n  area o f  ongo i ng concern . As a resul t ,  future research 
shou l d  focus on t he abi l i ty o f  hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion to 
i mprove t he compet i t ive pos i t i on of  t he organ i zat i on . Such 
research wou l d  addre s s  t he abi l i ty to reduce cost s ,  i nc rease 
pro f i t s  and f und capi t a l  i mprovement s . By exami n i ng 
hosp i t a l  cos t s  and price s t ru c t ure f o l lowing acqu i s i t i on 
research cou l d  i dent i fy e f f i c i enc i e s  of  sca l e . 
Thi s s tudy prov i des evidence that some hosp i t a l s , 
part i c u l a r l y  t hose w i t h  poor pro f i t ab i l i ty and l ocat i ons i n  
weak market areas do not a t t ra c t  acqu i s i t i on . S i nce such 
f a c i l i t i e s  may we l l  face bankrup t cy and c l osure , f uture 
research shou l d  examine i s sue s concerning c l osed hosp i t a l  
1 64 
f ac i l i t i e s . Thi s research shou l d  a s s e s s  the d i f f erences 
between acqu i s i t ion and hosp i t a l  c l osure . Add i t iona l l y ,  i t  
shou l d  eva l ua t e  t he impact of  acqu i s i t i on o r  c l osure on 
a c c e s s  to care w i t hi n  local communi t i es . 
F i na l l y ,  s i nce t h i s  s t udy focused on hos p i t a l  
acqu i s i t ions , a natural ext ens i on woul d  b e  t o  ana l y z e  
f a c tors a s soc i a t ed w i t h  divesture of  previously acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s . Thi s  woul d  show i f  cert a i n  s e t s  o f  hosp i t a l s  are 
repeatedly i nvolved in acqu i s i t ions by for - pro f i t  
organ i z a t i ons o r  have ongoing characteri s t i c s  a s soc i at e d  
w i t h  poor performance . 
Conclusions 
The s tudy examined t he i n f l uence of  ma rke t f a c tors , 
organ i z a t i ona l pe rformance , and operat i ona l charac t e r i s t i c s  
o n  hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . The re su l t s  show that acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  are t hose l oc a t ed in marke t s  w i t h  more HMOs and 
l ow percentages of e l de r l y  pa t i ent s . I n  add i t i on ,  acqu i red 
hosp i t a l s  have t he common opera t i ng perf ormance 
charact e r i s t i c s  of l ow prof i t s , l ow occupancy rates , older 
f ac i l i t i e s , and higher l ong - t e rm debt . Acqui red hosp i t a l s  
a l so have common organi zat i ona l f actors : f ewe r c l i n i ca l  
serv i ce s ,  and f o r - p ro f i t  s t a t u s . The se f i nd i ngs a re 
cons i s t ent w i t h  recent emp i r i c a l  stud i e s  about me rgers and 
acqu i s i t i ons by McCue and Furst ( 1 9 8 6 ) and Al exander and 
Morr i sey ( 1 9 8 8 ) . 
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More recent res ea rch by Mark ( 1 9 9 9 )  a l so found that 
acqu i re d  hosp i t a l s  had negat ive returns on a s se t s . The 
resul t s  suggest  that hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t ion i s  a response to a 
hosp i t a l ' s  poor f inanc i a l  hea l th . I t  seems c l ea r  t hat , 
pol i cy makers mus t  w e i gh the r i sks a s soc i at e d  w i t h  for­
pro f i t  owne rship aga i n s t  t he r i sk of  a hosp i t a l  c l o s i ng down 
i f  i t  does not conver t  to be i ng for- prof i t . Mark ' s research 
shows that hosp i t a l  f i nanc i a l  performance i mprove s fol l ow i ng 
acqu i s i t i on . The i mproved perf ormance i s  re l a t e d  to bet t e r  
management and more a c c e s s  to  resources . 
The pre sent s t udy ' s re su l t s  support t he use of  both 
resource dependence and corpora t e  f i nanc i a l  t heory as 
t heore t i c a l  f rameworks exp l i ca t i ng hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on . The 
s tudy a l so document s t he i mport ant ro l e  of f o r - p ro f i t  s t atus 
i n  pred i c t i ng fut ure hosp i t a l  acqui s i t i ons . 
Chapter Summary 
Th i s  chapter has summa r i zed the st udy f i nd i ngs and 
i n t e rpre t e d  them . I n  add i t ion , the impl i c a t i ons o f  the 
s tudy f i nd i ngs for both hea l t hcare manage rs and po l i cy 
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makers were de s c r i bed . Limi t a t i ons of  t he s t udy and areas 
for fut ure research were i dent i f i ed . 
The f i nd i ngs of  t h i s  s t udy are useful  i n  t hat they 
cont r i bute to underst and i ng hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i ons i n  
re l a t ion to a w i de var i e t y  of  i ndependent va r i ab l e s . The 
s tudy resul t s  support i t s  conceptual mode l ,  sugges t i ng t hat 
hosp i t a l  organi za t i ons re spond to various f actors l eading to 
hosp i t a l  acqu i s i t i on .  There fore , hospi t a l  managers can 
exert i n f l uence on whe ther the i r  hosp i t a l s  are acqu i red . 
Pol i cy makers can u s e  t he s t udy t o  predi c t  the i n c i dence o f  
hosp i t a l acqu i s i t i on and to s t udy t he pos s ib l e  e f f e c t s  of  
acqu i s i t ion on operat i ng e f f i c i ency and a c c e s s  to  care . I n  
summary , t he s t udy provides a conceptua l model  supported by 
re source dependence t heory and f i nanc i a l  t heory that has 
good pred i c t ive powe r . 
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